POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

Managing Editor
DUMAS MALONE

Associates
SHEPARD B. CLOUGH
HERBERT H. HYMAN
PHILIP C. JESSUP
CARL S. SHOUP

Assistant to the Managing Editor
GRACE H. GERBERICH

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
JUN 18 1958
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a non-partisan review. Every article is signed and represents the personal view of the writer. Manuscripts, books for review, and communications regarding articles and exchanges should be addressed to the Managing Editor, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

Copyright 1958, by the Editors of the Political Science Quarterly.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE JUNE ISSUE

CECELIA M. KENYON, Associate Professor of Government at Smith College, is at work on a book on realism and idealism in American political thought. Among her writings are the articles, "Where Paine Went Wrong" and "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government".

MADELINE R. ROBINTON, Associate Professor of History at Brooklyn College, is the author of *An Introduction to the Papers of the New York Prize Court, 1861-1865*. She has been studying standards of political morality in Britain. Her article on "The Lynskey Tribunal: The British Method of Dealing with Political Corruption" appeared in this QUARTERLY in March 1953. She is currently continuing her investigations in this field with the aid of a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

STANLEY J. ZYZNIEWSKI, Assistant Professor of History and research associate in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, specializes in East European affairs.

ANDREW GALBRAITH CAREY, former business executive, headed the Industry Division of the Mutual Security Agency's Italian Mission in 1953.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY, former Assistant Professor of Government at Barnard College, is now a member of the Executive Committee of the Foreign Policy Association and is presently writing on Italian government and politics. During the session of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies in Salzburg, Austria, in the spring of 1957, she was a Professor in residence. Mr. and Mrs. Carey's article on "The Varying Seasons of Italian Politics, 1956-57" appeared in the June 1957 issue of the QUARTERLY.

GEOFFREY SEED is Lecturer in American and Colonial History in St. Salvator's College, University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He has published articles in the field of Indian history, and is at present engaged on a study of James Wilson.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Volume LXXIII *June 1958* *Number 2*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

ALEXANDER HAMILTON: ROUSSEAU OF THE RIGHT

THE thesis of this paper is suggested in the title. It is that Hamilton's political thought was characterized by a heavy emphasis on a concept central to Rousseau's theory, the general will or the public good; that for Hamilton, as for Rousseau, this public good was morally and politically prior to private, individual ends, with which it was occasionally if not frequently in conflict; that the content of this public good as Hamilton visualized it was alien to the prevailing will of the majority of Americans in the early years of the Republic; that Hamilton was never able to reconcile his political ideal with his announced view of political reality; and that, as a result, his political theory is confused, contradictory, and basically unrealistic.

It is no light matter to charge Alexander Hamilton with a lack of realism. His writings are filled with references to what has been called the "dark side of humanity"; none of his contemporaries excelled him in constant emphasis on self-interest as man's dominant political motive, or in warnings against the evil passions of man's nature. Every undergraduate knows that Hamilton had a "pessimistic" conception of human nature. Every undergraduate knows, too, that the new government established under the Constitution desperately needed its finances put in order, and that Hamilton accomplished this. How, then, can such a man be called unrealistic? My argument is that Hamilton was not able to accept with equanimity the political facts of life as he saw them, or to relate them successfully to the political ideals he pursued. There remained within his thought an unresolved tension between what he believed man was, and what he be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lieved man ought to be. Such a tension is not of course unusual, but the distance between the *is* and the *ought* in Hamilton's ideas was extreme.

This tension can best be examined by comparing the Hamilton of the Federal Convention with the Hamilton of the Federalist party. They are the same man, but not quite the same thinker.

In his speech of June 18, 1787, Hamilton presented his plan of a political system proper for America. He wanted to do two things: to transfer the attachment of the people from the governments of their separate states to that of the Union; and to construct that government in such a way that it would not be wrecked by the turbulence of democracy and the imprudence of the people.

In the first part of the speech Hamilton analyzed those "great and essential principles necessary for the support of government," [1] and found that all of them then operated in favor of the states rather than of the Union. These principles of political obedience were several—interest, love of power, habit, force, influence. In order to make them support the nation rather than the separate states, Hamilton advocated an almost complete transfer of sovereignty from the latter governments to the former. This proposal is significant because of its apparent assumption that those very passions by which the people were so strongly attached to their state governments might remain sufficiently quiescent to permit the reduction of the states to the position of administrative provinces. It was the most drastic proposal of Hamilton's career and suggests his affinity with the classical tradition of the Legislator as well as his propensity—usually restrained—for Draconian measures.

In the second part of the speech Hamilton defended that part of his plan which provided for a senate and an executive elected for life. These were to serve as checks on the people's will, which would be represented in a popularly elected lower house with limited tenure. The reports of Madison and Yates differ somewhat, and for that reason I shall quote both versions of the crucial passage, beginning with that of Madison.

[1] Max Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention* (New Haven, 1911), vol. I, p. 365.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few and the many. Hence, separate interests will arise. There will be debtors and creditors, etc. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper-money instalment laws, etc. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their constitution. Their House of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest, by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier against every pernicious innovation whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness enough to answer the purpose.[2]
>
> All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and, as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a democratic Assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulence and uncontrolling disposition requires checks.[3]

I believe these statements constitute the cornerstone of Hamilton's theory. They were made in the course of debates not intended for publication, and in defense of a system which Hamilton should have known had little chance of being adopted. Here Hamilton was his own advocate, not, as in *The Federalist,* advocate of a system which he believed to be less than second best. These statements, therefore, require careful explication.

2 Farrand, *Records,* vol. I, p. 371.

3 *Ibid.,* p. 382. *Cf.* Hamilton's notes prepared for the speech, pp. 387-388.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is, to begin with, the familiar division of men into the few and the many, or the rich and the well-born, and the mass of the people. There is the further assumption that the interests of these two classes will be different, that they will be in conflict with each other at least part of the time, that the political behavior of each class will be motivated by its interests, and that each class will oppress the other if it gets the chance and has the power to do so. Hamilton does not want this last to happen: "Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other." It was not, then, a class government that Hamilton sought, at least not in the sense of one that had as its end the direct and deliberate promotion of class interests.

Thus far, there is no real difficulty in interpreting Hamilton. But the remainder of the passage, whether as reported by Madison or Yates, is less clear because it is, or appears to be, elliptical. In the second part of the passage, Hamilton suggests that the few will be more reliable in the cause of good government than the many. They, then, should have a share in the governing process, not only to protect their class interests, but in order to secure the national interest. Why will the few be the better guardians of this interest than the many? There seem to be two reasons, though neither is fully expounded.

In both the Madison and Yates versions, Hamilton expresses hostility to change and implies, if he does not explicitly state, that change is inimical to the "national interest" (Madison) or "good government" (Yates). This attitude is accompanied by the assertion that the upper class will be opposed to change. Therefore, the upper class will be the safer guardian of the public interest, not because its members are fundamentally more virtuous than "the people", but because on this particular issue—of change—their separate, class interest coincides with the public interest. It is also suggested (in the Madison but not in the Yates version) that the property of the Lords keeps that body faithful to the national interest in Britain.

This is a curious and revealing passage. Consider first the attitude toward change. It seems inconsistent with most of Hamilton's own career, for who among his contemporaries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was more constantly in the vanguard of reform than he? He was an ardent Revolutionist; he was wholeheartedly in support of the movement for a new Constitution; his proposals as Secretary of the Treasury envisoned a deliberate effort to effect profound changes in the nature of American society; and the very speech in which he expressed this hostility to change was the speech in which he was recommending changes in the existing system far too drastic for his colleagues to accept. In comparison, the fluctuating policies followed by some of the states between 1776 and 1787, and which were so deplored by Hamilton and the other delegates, were the merest piddling. Hamilton was not alone in his quest for stability, but the attitude expressed in this speech, coupled with his own ardent support of sweeping changes, does call for a bit of explaining.

Again, I think, it reveals Hamilton as the modern prototype of the Legislator: take whatever measures are necessary to establish good Laws, and then guard against the undermining forces of future change. It is an attitude which cannot be reconciled with the theory of conservatism expounded by Burke three years later, for not only does it call for radical reconstruction, but it is hostile to the gradual, piecemeal process of adaptation which Burke accepted as characteristic of the natural life of society.

Consider next the assumption implicit in the relationship Hamilton posited between the national interest, the interest of the upper classes, good government, and an inclination or disinclination toward change. He assumes, first, that change is not compatible with good government. He assumes, second, that the upper classes will not be inclined toward change. These two assumptions are explicit. There is a third assumption which is implicit: good government is that which favors or protects the interests of these classes, but not the interests of the many—for it is they who are most likely to advocate change. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that no matter how pure and patriotic Hamilton was in intent, he nevertheless tended to associate good government and the national interest with the interest of the rich, the well-born, and the few.

The exact nature of this relationship is difficult to pin down. The national interest is apparently regarded as both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

different from and separate from that of the many, and different from though not always separate from that of the few. It is, in short, distinct. It is the Hamiltonian counterpart of the Rousseauan general will, that will of the community toward its corporate good, something quite distinct from the will of all, which is the sum of individual and group private, self-interested wills. For Hamilton, this national interest was the primary end of government.

What we are concerned with here, then, is the fundamental question in any political theory: the end of government. It is a question which was not much discussed during the debate over ratification, and its answer was assumed and accepted rather than reached by any genuinely searching analysis even during the Revolutionary debate. This answer was more or less ready-made, and packaged in the doctrine of natural law and natural rights. Now this doctrine is ambivalent in its implications with respect to individuals and social unity. If the emphasis is on natural *law,* as it was during the medieval period, the doctrine tends in the direction of harmony and consensus. But if the emphasis is on *rights,* and especially if happiness is included among the rights, then the doctrine tends toward individualism. It cannot do otherwise, and it was no mere whim which led Rousseau to reject natural rights doctrine as the basis for his state.

Some political thinkers in America in the eighteenth century realized the ethical implications of their accepted doctrine quite fully, and others did not. Jefferson was among those who did. His poetic passages on the virtues of agrarianism really boil down to a belief that this way of life was the one in which men could most easily fulfill their self-interest without being driven to do so by means which corrupted their integrity or injured their fellows. If Jefferson had an "optimistic" view of human nature, it was because his expectations and hopes were limited not only by a recognition of egoism but by an acceptance of it as ethically legitimate.

Tom Paine, though fully committed to the doctrine of natural rights as a justification for freedom, was not aware of and was not committed to its egoistic ethical implications. Thus his apologia for unicameralism:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> My idea of a single legislature was always founded on a hope, that whatever personal parties might be in the state, they would all unite and agree in the general principles of good government—that these party differences would be dropped at the threshold of the state house, and that the public good, or the good of the whole, would be the governing principle of the legislature within it.
>
> Party dispute, taken on this ground, would only be, who should have the honor of making the laws; not what the laws should be.[4]

Implicit in this lost hope is the Rousseauan concept of the ideal citizen, he who distinguishes between his private interest and the public good, suppresses the former, and votes wholeheartedly for the latter.

It is my belief that this was also Hamilton's ideal, that he never abandoned it as the standard for judging political behavior, even though he fully realized that it was not in accord with the facts of human nature. This standard, essentially a non-liberal standard, was the springboard of his bitter attacks on the reason and virtue of the people. Thus I would argue that the real difference between Hamilton's and Jefferson's conceptions of human nature and their respective estimates of the people's capacity for self-government lay not in what either believed man actually to be, but in what each thought man ought to be and do. As far as politics was concerned, Jefferson thought man should pursue his happiness; Hamilton thought he should seek the national interest. One called for egoistic behavior, the other for altruistic. It was Hamilton who was the greater idealist, Jefferson the greater realist.

Yet Hamilton strove mightily for realism. His method was ambitious, arrogant, and in the great tradition of Plato, Machiavelli and Rousseau. It was the method of the Legislator. The following passages indicate the spirit of Hamilton's belief that man's nature could and should be molded for his own good as well as for that of the state.

> Take mankind in general, they are vicious, their passions may be operated upon . . . . Take mankind as they are, and

[4] Philip S. Foner (ed.), *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine* (New York, 1945), from *Dissertations on Government*, vol. 2, p. 409.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and *it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of the passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good; for these ever induce us to action.*[5]

The true politician . . . takes human nature (and human society its aggregate) as he finds it, a compound of good and ill qualities, of good and ill tendencies. . . .

With this view of human nature he will not attempt to warp or disturb from its natural direction, he will not attempt to promote its happiness by means to which it is not suited . . . but he will seek to promote his action according to the bias of his nature, to lead him to the development of his energies according to the scope of his passions, and erecting the social organization on this basis he will favor all those institutions and plans which tend to make men happy according to their natural bent, which multiply the sources of individual enjoyment and increase of national resources and strength.[6]

This is the spirit of the Legislator, though, to be sure, infinitely less ruthless than that of Plato or Rousseau. It implies wisdom on the one hand, malleability on the other, and an essentially manipulative relationship between the two. In modern times this sort of thing goes by the name of social engineering. Before and during the eighteenth century, it was usually associated with some form of benevolent despotism. Hamilton's problem, like Rousseau's, was to adapt it to republican government. The difficulty for each was the same: the people had the power but not the wisdom, while the leaders had the wisdom but not the power. How, then, could the people be made to follow wisdom? Rousseau's answer was simple: let the Legislator claim for his plans the authority of the gods.

Hamilton's answer was not so simple. *The Federalist*

[5] Farrand, *Records,* vol. I, pp. 388-389 (as reported by Yates). Emphasis added.

[6] Richard B. Morris (ed.), *Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation* (New York, 1957). Quotation from "Defence of the Funding System", dated 1795-1798 in a hand other than Hamilton's, pp. 313-314.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Papers were an appeal to reason, to self-interest, and to patriotism. Most of his other publicist ventures were similar. In spite of all his diatribes about the weakness of man's reason and the dominance of man's passions, Hamilton never abandoned hope that the better side of man's nature might be reached and might respond. Even the misguided *Caesar Letters,* if indeed they were his, represented an appeal to the people's reason. This was the idealist in Hamilton, relatively pure and certainly indestructible.

His financial program both reveals and represents the other major facet in his answer to the problem of the Legislator. It reflects Hamilton the blundering realist. It is sometimes said that, having failed to secure a permanent share in the structure of government for the upper classes, Hamilton sought to secure their attachment to the new government through his financial program. I believe this is correct. It was a long-term policy and it is succinctly stated in a sentence chosen by Professor Morris to head one of the selections in his excellent anthology. "The only plan that can preserve the currency is one that will make it the *immediate* interest of the moneyed men to cooperate with government in its support." [7] The emphasis on the word *immediate* was Hamilton's. Nearly a decade passed after this was written before he became Secretary of the Treasury, and during that period his fiscal theories were elaborated and matured. But the basic principle remained the same: the private interest of the moneyed class must be made the ally of the national interest. Selfish interest must be made to support the public good. And how? By having the moneyed class's bread buttered by the government. There would, then, be no conflict between its interest and the general welfare. So far, so good. By catering to its self-interest, one class is led to do what is right. This is a fine exercise in political realism.

But what of the other class, the "many" of the June 18th speech in the Convention? In that speech Hamilton implied, though he did not explicitly state, that the interests of the two classes, the few and the many, would be in con-

[7] *Op. cit.,* pp. 335 and 339. From a letter "To a Member of Congress". See Morris' notes for date (probably 1779 or 1780) and addressee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flict with each other. Logically, then, any policy which served the interests of the few would injure or at least jeopardize the interests of the many. It is true that Hamilton believed that his fiscal policies would serve the national interest, and it is also true that he believed they would ultimately serve the self-interest of the many. But he *did* emphasize the necessity of attaching the *immediate* interest of the moneyed class to the government, and he had stated, in *The Federalist,* that men in general were much more likely to act in accordance with what they believed to be their immediate interests than their long-run interests.[8] Logically, therefore, he ought to have expected widespread opposition to the policies he advocated as Secretary of the Treasury, and equally logically he ought to have accepted such opposition with equanimity.

That he did not is well known. His letters and papers of the 1790's are filled with blasts against Jefferson, blasts against the people, blasts against factionalism, and laments about the lack of patriotism in everyone except himself and a few kindred Federalists. Hamilton was genuinely shocked, and he should really not have been. For consider what he had done. In his Convention speech he had posited the existence of two classes, with probably conflicting interests. In the Convention and elsewhere—innumerable times—he had argued that men are dominated by self-interest. He had occasionally, though not consistently, suggested that the upper classes were more likely to be patriotic than the mass of the people.[9] Nevertheless, he had sought the support of this group, not by appealing to their patriotism, altruism, or even long-run interest, but by appealing deliberately to their *immediate* self-interest. It was to them that he held out the carrot. And it was the other class, the many, the mass of the people, upon whom he now called for patriotism, and/or appreciation of long-run self-interest. It was from this class that he now expected and demanded the greater exercise of

[8] Number 6. In the Modern Library edition at p. 30.

[9] H. C. Lodge (ed.), *The Works of Alexander Hamilton* (New York, 1885), vol. VII, p. 241. In the eighth number of his "Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7, 1801", Hamilton wrote that the safety of the Republic depended, among other things, "on that love of country which will almost invariably be found to be closely connected with birth, education, and family."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both reason and virtue. In so doing, he was not logical, he was not realistic, and he led his party straight down the road to extinction.

There were times during the late 1790's and early 1800's when he half-realized what he had done and cast about for practical solutions. In 1799 he advocated road-building as a method of courting the people's good will. It was a measure "universally popular". He also advocated the institution of a society with funds for the encouragement of agriculture and the arts. Such a program, he wrote, would "speak powerfully to the feelings and interests of those classes of men to whom the benefits derived from the government have been heretofore the least manifest." [10]

Before commenting on this proposal, I should like to place beside it a passage from another attempt by Hamilton to explain his party's failure to win popular support.

> Nothing is more fallacious than to expect to produce any valuable or permanent result in political projects by relying merely on the reason of men. Men are rather reasoning than reasonable animals, for the most part governed by the impulse of passion. This is a truth well understood by our adversaries, who have practised upon it with no small benefit to their cause; for at the very moment they are eulogizing the reason of men, and professing to appeal only to that faculty, they are courting the strongest and most active passion of the human heart, vanity! It is no less true, that the Federalists seem not to have attended to the fact sufficiently; and that they erred in relying so much on the rectitude and utility of their measures as to have neglected the cultivation of popular favor, by fair and justifiable expedients.[11]

These comments reveal the very deep conflict in Hamilton's thought. In the later one (1802), Hamilton saw his party's error in having relied "so much on the rectitude and utility of their measures, as to have neglected the cultivation of popular favor, by fair and justifiable expedients." In the earlier letter, Hamilton admitted that the benefits of the new government had thus far not been "manifest" to cer-

[10] Lodge, *Works*, vol. VIII, pp. 518-519. From a letter to Jonathan Dayton, 1799.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 597. From a letter to James A. Bayard, April 1802.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tain classes—in the context, the many. In both letters, the two Hamiltons show through: the idealist, sure of the rightness of his policies and regretful that the people were neither rational nor virtuous enough to accept them on their merits; the realist, ever ready to seek support by the enlistment of man's worse (but never worst) nature. He had deliberately done the latter to win the moneyed class over to his side in the early 1790's. Now, at the end of the decade, he proposed to do the same thing for the majority. But it was a classic case of too little, too late. He had, in effect, made a partnership between the national interest and a special class interest. I am not sure whether he intended this partnership to be permanent and exclusive. He did intend it to be universally benevolent; its fruits were meant to trickle down and be enjoyed by everyone. Yet there remains that implicit assumption of the June 18th speech: a desire for change is more likely to exist among the many than the few, because good government will leave the interests of the many unsatisfied. There is an ambivalence in Hamilton's theory which I find it impossible to resolve.

My primary interest is not to decide whether he was or was not a class theorist, however. His political ideas are significant and rewarding because they reflect and illumine a difficult stage in the evolution of liberal democratic thought.

As I have suggested earlier, Hamilton's basic difference from Jefferson, and I think from most Americans of the era, was his rejection of the ethical egoism implicit in natural rights doctrine. This difference ought not to be exaggerated. No American of the age was an advocate of unrestrained self-interest, and the concept of a general interest which may be separate from and in conflict with private interests was generally present. It was at the root of the Revolutionary generation's distrust of faction. Nor, on the other hand, did Hamilton advocate or desire an absolute subjection of the individual to the state. It was rather that Hamilton, like Paine, was more extreme in his condemnation of egoism and in fact represented an older view of the proper end of government.

This older view was pre-individualistic, pre-modern. It was the medieval view that government existed for the good

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of society, and its end therefore was the common good. One of the things that distinguishes modern theory from medieval is the greater difficulty modern theorists face in defining this concept, the common good. There are a number of reasons for this; among them are the greater unity of medieval society by virtue of Christianity, and the relative rôles of legislative and customary law in the governing process. The point is that the existence of a common good was assumed in the earlier period, and its content was easier to define. But introduce into the political system the concept of ethical individualism combined with the practice of legislative determination of policy, and the difficulty of defining the common good is obvious—by hindsight. It was not obvious in the sixteenth century, or the seventeenth. It became increasingly obvious to Americans in the first three quarters of the eighteenth century because they were virtually self-governing communities and met the problem in the everyday conduct of their affairs. Madison's Tenth *Federalist* was the culmination of a long and painful process of thought on this subject. Madison, and I think he was here accurately reflecting the dominant opinion of his contemporaries, seems to hover ambivalently between two conceptions: (1) that of an ever elusive public good somehow distinct from the clashing of selfish and private interests; (2) that of the public good as a reconciliation or compromise of these same interests.

Hamilton clung more closely to the former view. One of the reasons may have been his late arrival as a practitioner of republicanism. In this respect he was very like Tom Paine, and I think a comparison of their lives from the time of their arrival in this country will show their fundamental kinship, though one was politically of the Right, the other of the Left. Each devoted himself without reserve to the service of his country. For each of them this entailed a sacrifice of the private interests common to most men—property, or at least greater property for both, and for Hamilton, the welfare of his family. For him, the sacrifice in the end was extreme. Among the documents he wrote before the duel there is one which concludes with a sentence profoundly symbolic of his entire life. After recounting his abhorrence of the practice on religious and ethical grounds, his un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

willingness to give grief to his wife and children, his feeling of responsibility to his creditors, his intention of reserving fire on the first and perhaps even the second shot, Hamilton concluded: "The ability to be in future useful, whether in resisting mischief or in effecting good, in those crises of our public affairs which seem likely to happen, would probably be inseparable from a conformity with public prejudice in this particular." [12] He was indeed a patriot.

At every step of his career (except possibly the row with Washington), Hamilton—and Paine—put country first, self second. In a sense this was not sacrifice but fulfillment of their deepest desires. But in so far as it was fulfillment, it marked them off from other men. Each was in essence a political being, intensely so; each realized his nature, his self-interest, in devoting himself to the public good. The personality of each reinforced his conception of this public good as something better than and different from a mere reconciliation of individual and group interests. Neither ever ceased to regard his standard of political behavior as the standard proper for every man. For Paine, this meant an ever recurring optimism punctuated with bitter disillusion. For Hamilton, it meant a steady and self-nourishing pessimism. Both were idealists, and both shared the same ideal: a Rousseauistic community in which men were citizens first and individuals second. Hamilton knew his ideal was incapable of realization, and he sought a substitute which might still achieve the same goal—a government that governed in the national interest. The substitute was an alliance of upper-class interests with the national interests.

Jefferson and Madison opposed him partly because of the nature of the alliance, partly because the content of his conception of the public good was too nationalistic for their tastes. I do not think either he or they ever fully realized the more theoretical, and I think more fundamental, difference between them. The difference was subtle but profound. Jefferson and Madison were committed to the ethical individualism implicit in natural rights theory: the end of the government as the protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This doctrine recognizes the political legitimacy of egoism. Hamilton was only partly committed

[12] Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the doctrine. The basic difference between him and most of his contemporaries was that his conception of the public good was the older, corporate one, and theirs was the newer one in which the corporate element, though still present, had given ground to individualism.

The tension between these two concepts, a corporate and an individualistic public good, can be observed throughout the Revolutionary period. It underlay the colonial opposition to the British theory of virtual representation; it was central to the debates in the Federal Convention, and it was a major element in the ratification controversy. During the latter, James Winthrop seemed to be speaking directly to Hamilton when he wrote, " It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is preserved." [13] This was the spirit of the future of American politics: local interests, sectional interests, class interests, group interests, individual interests. The conflict, compromise, or sometimes reconciliation of these interests was to be the main determinant of public policy, not the Hamiltonian ideal of a transcendant national interest, not the Rousseauan ideal of an overriding general will.

Here lay the heart of Hamilton's dilemma. As a genuine patriot of his adopted country, he was loyally committed to the practice of republican government. His grave doubts about the success of the experiment stemmed from his rejection of ethical individualism coupled with his acceptance of egoism as a fact of political life. The real trouble was that his end was incompatible with the means which, as a patriot, he had to accept. Logically, he should have ended up with some sort of philosopher-king theory, and he did have leanings in that direction. Since he was not a closet-philosopher, this way out of the dilemma was closed. There was really no way out. The way he chose, an alliance of one special interest group with what he conceived to be the national interest, simply stimulated opposition to the latter because he *had* linked it to the former. So he intensified in both groups the selfishness which was his enemy, and encouraged the growth of factions which he so deplored. That

[13] From the *Agrippa Letters,* in P. L. Ford (ed.), *Essays on the Constitution of the United States* (Brooklyn, 1892), p. 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he was regarded by his contemporary opponents as a representative of class interests is perhaps regrettable, but their misunderstanding of him and his motives was no greater than his misunderstanding of them and theirs. They were wrong in believing him to be an oligarch, but they were right in believing that his political ideals were opposed to theirs. His were corporate, theirs individualistic. His end was not logically anti-republican, but, in the context of public opinion at the time, it was bound to make him doubtful that it could be achieved under republicanism. It was unlikely that the people, left to themselves, would faithfully pursue the national interest. They needed a Legislator. Hamilton volunteered for the job.

In this aspect of his thought—means rather than ends—I would again argue that Hamilton's ideas were subtly but profoundly different from those of most of his contemporaries. They all talked a lot about man's passions and emphasized the necessity of taking these into account when constructing a constitution. I think Hamilton had a much more ambitious opinion concerning the extent to which these passions could be actively used—manipulated—by politicians. Consider the benevolent passage quoted above in which he outlined the principles a wise politician must follow if he would lead the people toward the achievement of their happiness and the national interest. Consider his injunction that " it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of the passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good. . . ." Consider his proposal in the Convention to transfer sovereignty from the state governments to the national government in order to transfer the people's passions from the former to the latter. And consider his tendency during the 1790's to regard the people as dupes who had been led astray by designing politicians. All this adds up to a fairly consistent picture. The people are clay in the hands of the potter, but the potter may be either wise and virtuous, or shrewd and vicious. The former will give them what they ought to have, the latter will pretend to give them what they think they want.

As a Legislator, Hamilton was initially successful. The conditions which existed during and shortly after the inauguration of the new government were congenial for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exercise of his special talents. Afterwards, his effectiveness as politician and statesman declined with remarkable rapidity. Both his ends and his means were alien to the ideals and the experience of the people he sought to lead. Their ideals were liberal and individualistic, and their practice of self-government had rendered them impervious to the benevolent molding Hamilton had in mind to impose upon them. They would govern themselves. It was inevitable that he should be rejected.

Though his corporate idealism and manipulative methods be rejected, the central problem for which he offered them as solutions cannot be ignored. That problem is basic: how, in a nation governed by the people, is agreement on the public good to be obtained and put into effect? In this process, what is and should be the relationship between wisdom and public opinion, between private interest and national interest? These were fundamental questions when Hamilton grappled with them, and they still are. We have not yet worked out a satisfactory theory that will tell us precisely when the individual is ethically obligated to sacrifice his interests or when he may legitimately refuse to do so. Hamilton's plea for altruism in politics is relevant and salutary. The pursuit of selfish individual or group interests unrestrained by any sense of the general welfare may produce such bitter and divisive competition as to destroy the unity and consensus which sustain individual freedom as well as national strength.

Yet the Hamiltonian ideal, of each citizen placing the national interest before his own, is not without its dangers. It places an indefinite limitation on the exercise of individual freedom. There must be limits, of course, but this limit is an abstraction, and abstractions, when reified, are powerful forces to set against the solitary right and will of the individual. The national interest, with some exceptions such as sheer survival, will always be an elusive concept, its substance difficult to determine. Therefore there are practical reasons for refusing to concede it a permanently and categorically preferred position in all contests with individual, separate interests.

These practical reasons are merely corollaries of the main one. The main one is the ethical priority of the individual

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and his welfare as the proper and ultimate end of government. To this end, the national interest is logically and ethically secondary; to this end, the national interest must stand in the relationship of means. At least it must if one still accepts the Declaration of Independence as a statement of the purposes of American government. Hamilton mistook the means for the end, and tipped the scale too far in the direction of the national interest. In so doing he gave it ethical priority over the demands of the individual.

Such a priority seems to necessitate resort to manipulative techniques in order to induce the individual to forego what he conceives to be his own interest. Thus Plato resorted to the persuasion of the myth of the metals, Rousseau to the authority of the gods. In his idealistic moods, Hamilton appealed to reason; in his self-consciously realistic moods, he attempted a calculated alliance between the national interest and selfish class interests. This was bound not only to accentuate conflict between factions, but to obscure the national interest itself. Hamilton's idealism was thus vitiated by a would-be realistic policy which was both shrewd and obtuse at the same time.

The fault lay in the man himself. Hamilton's idealism was genuine and profound. It was also touched with arrogance. His penchant for what he regarded as realism was a fundamental trait of his character; he liked to think of himself as a skillful maneuverer of men's emotions. Thus his realism was likewise touched with arrogance. It may be that this dual arrogance was subjectively justified—Hamilton *was* a superior individual. But in the politics of republican government, such arrogance may operate to blind its possessor to that which he must see and understand if he is to achieve a successful blend of idealism and realism. That is the nature of man, or, more specifically, the motivation and behavior of the voter. It was Hamilton's fortune to serve his country well for a brief and crucial period in its history; it was his fate to be rejected by the countrymen whose ideals he did not share, and whose politics he did not understand.

CECELIA M. KENYON

SMITH COLLEGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE AND POLITICAL MORALITY IN BRITAIN, 1939-1957

ON JANUARY 24, 1957, an extremely interesting and moving spectacle took place in the British House of Commons. The editor of the *Sunday Express* was summoned to appear at the Bar of the House. In an absolutely quiet but full House, John Junor, the editor, was escorted to the Bar by the Serjeant at Arms bearing the Mace, the symbol of the House's authority. The Speaker, attired in the wig and robes of his office, told the editor that he had been summoned in consequence of a Report made by the Committee of Privileges which had been directed to inquire into the matter of an article published on 16 December 1956, in the *Sunday Express*. The Committee found, the Speaker continued, that

> You did not seek . . . to establish the truth of the article, nor did you appear willing to admit its obvious implications. Although given every opportunity to express your regret, you made what the Committee was only able to regard as an inadequate apology. Nevertheless . . . the House is willing to hear anything that you may have to say in extenuation.

Mr. Junor thereupon apologized

> for any imputations or reflections which I may have cast upon the honour and integrity of the Members of this House . . . . At no time did I intend to be discourteous to Parliament. My only aim was to focus attention on . . . the allocation of petrol, namely the petrol allowances given to political parties in the constituencies. In my judgment these allowances were a proper and, indeed, an inescapable subject of comment in a free Press. That was a view which I held then and hold now, Sir, but I do regret, deeply and sincerely, that the manner in which I expressed myself should have been such as to be a contempt of this House.[1]

The Speaker directed Mr. Junor to withdraw, which he did, bowing twice to the Speaker and solemnly backing out of the

[1] *House of Commons Debates*, vol. 563, col. 403.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chamber. The Leader of the House, R. A. Butler, then moved: "That this House doth agree with the Committee of Privileges in their opinion that Mr. John Junor has been guilty of a serious contempt of this House, but, in view of the apology made to this House by him, this House will proceed no further in the matter." [2] The House agreed.

What was involved in this incident? Was it mere pageantry, or was the House acting seriously in a matter it regarded as of high importance? That the answer must be in the latter sense is immediately clear if one considers the composition and history of the Committee of Privileges.

At the time it submitted the Report on which the House acted in the Junor case, this Committee consisted of ten members, all but two of whom had been members of a Ministry. Among them were: R. A. Butler, the Leader of the House; Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of the Opposition; Clement Davies, former leader of the Liberal party; the Attorney General; and a former Home Secretary. Nor was this abnormal, for the Committee of Privileges since early days has enjoyed high prestige and has often included even the Prime Minister; either the Attorney General or the Solicitor General is always a member. In the seventeenth century the Committee was appointed at the beginning of the session. For only a short interval—1833-1837—did the Committee lapse. From 1841 until 1903 it was not the practice to nominate the Committee until matters had arisen that needed referral. In 1903 the old practice of appointing the Committee at the beginning of the session was revived and has continued to the present except for three brief interludes, 1910, 1913-1918 and 1920-1922. Since 1909 it has been the regular practice to refer complaints of breach of privilege to the Committee; in earlier years a complaint was referred only when the House felt it could not deal with it directly.[3]

Questions of privilege are dealt with seriously, responsibly and immediately; they take precedence over all other matters in the House. The Committee has never been governed by a fixed code; it is guided largely by custom and accepted

[2] *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 563, col. 404.

[3] May, Sir Thomas Erskine, *Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament* (London, 1950), p. 135.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conventions built up on the basis of several centuries of experience, decisions in previous cases serving as precedents. This point was well made in the Report from the Select Committee on the Official Secrets Act:

> The privileges of parliament, like many other institutions of the British constitution, are indefinite in their nature and stated in general and sometimes vague terms . . . . Any attempt to translate these into precise rules must deprive them of the very quality which renders them adaptable to new and varying conditions, and new or unusual combinations of circumstances, and indeed might have the effect of restricting rather than safeguarding members' privileges.[4]

The proceedings of the Committee indicate that frequently in the 1940's the Committee asked the Clerk of the House to prepare a memorandum on previous cases similar to the one then under consideration. This office at that time was held by Sir Gilbert Campion, a distinguished parliamentarian, editor of the 15th edition of May's *Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament,* and himself author of an authoritative book on the procedure of the House. Sir Gilbert's research usually went back to the sixteenth century or earlier, and the Minutes of Evidence reveal that the Committee, after questioning Sir Gilbert on his interpretations, would then proceed, guided by its legally trained members, to the examination of other witnesses, in a quasi-judicial manner.

It is true that the concept of privilege as defined by May—"any act or omission, which obstructs or impedes either House of Parliament in the performance of its functions, or which obstructs or impedes any member, or officer of such House in the discharge of his duty, or which has a tendency, directly or indirectly, to produce such results" [5]—has changed over the centuries as the rôle of Parliament has changed. Early in its history, as Parliament sought to free itself from royal interference, the questions of privilege that concerned it were freedom of speech, freedom from arrest, and freedom to determine its own membership. The Civil Wars ended

[4] *House of Commons Papers,* 1938-39, No. 101, p. xiv.

[5] *Op. cit.,* p. 109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that phase, and as early as 1641 John Pym's committee was unwilling to allow parliamentary privilege from arrest to Recusants on the ground that "it must not be used for the Danger of the Commonwealth." [6]

Since the outcome of the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution had more or less ended the threat of royal interference with the functioning of Parliament, privilege came increasingly to be associated with actions that might bring discredit to the House. Although in 1702 the Commons agreed "that neither House of Parliament have power, by any vote or declaration, to create to themselves new privileges, not warranted by the known laws and customs of Parliament," [7] interpretation of precedents gives the House and its Committee wide scope in defending the integrity of the House, its members and officers.

The "serious contempt" of which Mr. Junor was found guilty involved certain complexities and occurred at a moment when tempers had been ruffled by the Suez controversy. The shock of the armed invasion of Egypt had seemed to many an aberration on the part of the government; the subsequent forced withdrawal in the face of moral pressure had served to alienate those who had supported the venture. Nothing positive had been accomplished, but its negative consequences were great. The emotional impact of the use of nineteenth-century techniques of diplomacy in a twentieth-century world frame of reference served to sharpen Britain's unhappy awareness of her changed position in this new world. Secondly, the closing of the Suez Canal intensified her sense of frustration at her inability to control the necessary flow of oil for heat and power and at the consequent need for the return of rationing after a respite of only two years. In the name of "fair shares for all", wartime techniques of controls had been continued for nine years after the end of the war and had been used to achieve a far-reaching social revolution; perhaps, when the history of the century comes to be written in true perspective, this may prove to have been one of the most significant developments of the century. Yet the method had been grievously irksome to the

[6] *Commons Journals*, vol. II, p. 261.

[7] *Ibid.*, 1702-4, p. 555.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

population, and the reimposition of controls and limitations seemed to make them all the more unbearable.

The opportunity was too tempting for Lord Beaverbrook's somewhat sensational *Sunday Express* to pass up. On December 16, 1956, it published the following leading article:

PRIVILEGE

Tomorrow a time of hardship starts for everyone. For everyone? Include the politicians out of that.

Petrol Rationing will pass them by. They are to get prodigious supplementary allowances.

Isn't it fantastic?

The small baker, unable to carry out his round, may be pushed out of business. The one-man taxi company may founder. The parent who lives in the country may plead in vain for petrol to drive the kids to school.

But everywhere the tanks of the politician will be brimming over . . . .

What are M.P.'s doing about this monstrous injustice? Are they clamouring for Fuel Minister Mr. Aubrey Jones to treat politicians like the rest of the community?

If it were a question of company directors getting special preference you may be sure that the howls in Westminster would soon be heard from John O'Groat's to Ebbw Vale.

But now there is not a squeak of protest.

If politicians are more interested in privileges for themselves than in fair shares for all, let it swiftly be made plain to them that the public do not propose to tolerate it.

The very next day a complaint was made in the House of Commons, and the offending article read.[8] Although the Speaker ruled that he did not consider it a *prima facie* breach of privilege, he was overriden by a vote of the House on the motion of the Lord Privy Seal, R. A. Butler, the Leader of the House, who was supported by the deputy leader of the Opposition. The matter was referred to the Committee of Privileges.

This prompt action checked further criticism in the press. The first edition of the *Evening News* on December 17 did carry a cartoon with the caption, " Very thoughtful o' them M.P.s giving themselves such a generous supplementary . . . nice there's one place in London where a gent can be sure o'

[8] *H. C. Papers*, 1956-57, No. 38, p. ii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

getting a drop", but in the light of the House's action the item was withdrawn from later editions. The paper promptly published an apology, and its editor despatched a letter to the Speaker of the House, expressing his regrets at the insult inadvertently tendered to him and to the House. This did not prevent this matter also being referred to the Committee of Privileges, which, however, after consideration, recommended to the House that "in view of the very proper conduct of the Editor and the staff in securing withdrawal . . . and voluntarily publishing a full and unqualified apology, no further action be taken."[9] Two other complaints, one against a local newspaper, the other against the British Broadcasting Corporation, were also referred to the Committee of Privileges.[10]

At first sight, it might seem that the House, in a mood to be unusually touchy about criticism, was infringing on the principle of the freedom of the press. In this connection, however, the debate on the Report is rather illuminating. Among the members who participated were two well-known journalists, Richard H. S. Crossman, of the Left-wing Labor *New Statesman and Nation,* and Sir Beverley Baxter, Conservative former editor of the *Sunday Express.* Both evidenced deep concern. As Mr. Crossman formulated the problem: "Of course, I care about the privileges of the House but I care, secondly, very much about the freedom of the Press, and about the relationship between the freedom of the Press and the privileges of this House, upon which democracy largely depends. If this relationship is not good and healthy democracy is undermined."[11] Yet both men agreed in their condemnation of the editorial—"outrageous", Mr. Crossman called it; "disgraceful", was Sir Beverley's word—and both men agreed on condemnation of this gross breach of privilege, even though both questioned the wisdom of what Sir Beverley called the "medieval drama" of summoning Mr. Junor to the Bar.

If two responsible journalists, both jealous of the freedom of the press and speaking from opposite sides of the House,

[9] *H. C. Papers,* 1956-57, No. 39, p. iv.

[10] *Ibid.,* No. 74.

[11] *H. C. Deb.,* vol. 563, cols. 209-10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreed on condemnation, it can hardly be argued that the action was an attempt to cover up a scandal by gagging the press. Obviously it did involve a restriction on untrammeled freedom of expression, but it has to be understood in terms of the very special thinking of the Houses of Parliament. Time and time again it has been reiterated in the House that its reputation, like that of Caesar's wife, must be above reproach and vigilantly protected against libel and abuse. The basic assumption, as stated by a member, is " that the prestige and authority of the House of Commons as a representative democratic institution must rest very largely on the trust which constituents feel in the Members of Parliament." [12] As the Report condemning Mr. Junor phrased it,

> In the opinion of your Committee, Mr. Junor has been guilty of a serious contempt in reflecting upon all Members of the House and so upon the House itself by alleging that Members of the House have been guilty of contemptible conduct in failing, owing to self interest, to protest at an unfair discrimination in their favour. Such an attack on Members is calculated to diminish the respect due to the House and so to lessen its authority.[13]

This concept that " privilege " is inextricably tied up with the successful functioning of the House long antedates the advent of modern democracy. May's *Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament,* the Parliamentary Bible to which constant reference is made in the House, refers to a Resolution of 1701, which states that the Lords and Commons had constantly punished " indignities offered to their House by words spoken or writings published reflecting on its character or proceedings . . . upon the principle that such acts tend to obstruct the Houses in the performance of their function by diminishing the respect due to them." [14]

This does not mean that no criticism is tolerated. Criticism of the judgment of the House, of the wisdom of legislation past or pending, however expressed, involves no ques-

[12] *Ibid.,* vol. 485, col. 2496.

[13] *H. C. Papers,* 1956-57, No. 38, p. v.

[14] P. 117.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of contempt or breach of privilege. For example, a local newspaper had printed the following statement by a prospective candidate for Parliament:

> . . . I have heard it said that the best club to belong to is the House of Commons. The privileges granted to its members certainly seem to be on the increase even if democracy is suffering as a result.
>
> Moreover, it is my opinion that, in the light of their sad record over the past few years, which has more than anything else been responsible for the recent crisis and petrol rationing, the very last persons to have supplementary rations should be Members of Parliament.[15]

As noted above, this item was complained of in the House and referred to the Committee of Privileges. The Committee, however, held that it was merely a criticism that related to the petrol-rationing scheme and therefore dismissed the complaint.

Similar action was taken in another case arising, not from publication in the press, but from distribution to members of a circular letter referring to " seeming irregularities in the procedures by which the Grampion Electricity and Supply Bill had been advanced in Parliament." The Committee found that the letter's statement that actions had been taken contrary to law was incorrect but was not contempt. It added an *obiter dictum:* " No question of contempt of the House arises on properly expressed criticism, however strong, of ministerial acts." [16]

The question of privilege arises, not when the soundness of policy is questioned, but when allegation is made of partiality, dishonesty, corruption, or other improper conduct on the part of the House, of the Speaker, or of individual members in their capacity as members of the House. A most scurrilous attack on an individual M.P. was dismissed on the ground that it did not allege misconduct on his part in relation to his rôle as a member; as May puts it, " libel must concern character or conduct of a Member in that capacity." [17] The House may be wrong, but it must be honest; legislation

[15] *H. C. Papers,* 1956-57, No. 74, p. i.

[16] *H. C. Papers,* 1940-41, No. 103, p. v.

[17] *Op. cit.,* p. 125; *H. C. Papers,* 1950-51, No. 149.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or policy may be excoriated as wrong, inadequate, senseless, but it must be accepted that the House has acted in good faith. This is the line of demarcation that critics in the press, on the BBC, or even in public meetings must not overstep.

"Frivolous" invocation of privilege is a danger to which the House is alert. As one member put it: "We ought to be very careful here not to confuse Privilege with the perfectly legitimate right of our constituents or of any subject to criticise Members of Parliament. . . . We are here to be criticised and to be shot at, and I think there is a danger if Privilege is to be invoked in any way in an attempt to stifle criticism." [18] The Committee itself, in a Report in an earlier press case (1948), sounded a warning:

> Whilst recognizing that it is the duty of Parliament to intervene in the case of attacks that may tend to undermine public confidence in and support of the institution of Parliament itself, your Committee think it important that on the one hand the law of Parliamentary privilege should not be administered in a way which would fetter or discourage the free expression of opinion or criticism, however prejudiced or exaggerated such opinion or criticism may be.[19]

A rather amusing application of this principle is to be found in a report on another case. In 1949 a member complained that a speech of his made in the House had been grossly misrepresented in *The Daily Worker*. The Committee took cognizance of a Resolution of the House of March 3, 1762, which declared any publication of reports of speeches of "Honourable Members" to be a breach of privilege and under which *The Daily Worker* was technically guilty. However, on comparing the version printed in *The Daily Worker* with the official record of the actual speech delivered, the Committee decided that the *Daily Worker* version "calls for no action of the House." [20]

It should also be emphasized that when allegations of corrupt or dishonorable conduct are made, the Committee of

[18] Sir Hugh O'Neill—*H. C. Deb.*, vol. 485, col. 2517.

[19] *H. C. Papers*, 1947-48, No. 112, p. iv.

[20] *H. C. Papers*, 1948-49, No. 261.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Privileges does not confine itself to the bare fact that an attack has been made but seeks to determine the truth or falsity of the allegation. In the Junor case the complaint was made and the matter referred to the Committee on December 17, 1956. On the very next day the Committee met, deliberated, and determined its line of procedure. On the 19th it questioned the official responsible for the allocation of supplementary allowances of petrol to Members of Parliament; he explained the procedure and basis of the allocation, pointing out that up to that date only four members had secured the maximum allowance of 200 miles and only because of the exceptional circumstance that their constituencies had few public means of transport. The Committee then called in the editor and questioned him rigorously as to how he had checked his information. "Did you know what the ration was, what the system was in relation to Members of Parliament?" [21] They questioned him as to where he had looked for criticisms by M.P.'s of the plan—which, incidentally, had been announced only on Friday, the 14th—in order to determine the truth of the allegation he had published on Sunday, the 16th. Under this questioning he stated he had been told that some members were receiving between 600 and 800 miles a month but admitted he had not verified the fact. Under further questioning he attempted to distinguish between allocations granted to members and allocations to local political associations, which were in fact liberal allowances. The Committee attempted to make Mr. Junor realize that the implication of his article was that Members of Parliament were refraining from attacking the allowances to the political associations because they were benefiting by them. As Sir Patrick Spens, one of the members of the Committee, said: "That means, perfectly clearly, that politicians, including Members of Parliament, are more interested in privileges for themselves than in fair shares for all." [22] On the following day, December 20, the Committee met again to consider the Report drafted for it by the Attorney General, himself a member of the Committee. The draft was read paragraph by paragraph, amended, and adopted. It recom-

[21] *H. C. Papers*, 1956-57, No. 38, p. 5, question 68.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mended that, "in view of the gravity of the contempt," the fact that the allegations were unfounded, and the editor's failure to make any effort before publication to ascertain all the relevant facts, he be severely reprimanded. Accordingly, after the Christmas recess, the matter was brought before the House for debate, culminating in the scene already described.

This disposition of the contempt aspect was not, however, the end of the House's attention to the petrol-rationing scheme. On January 28 the question was raised, and answered in writing, as to the extent of the allowances granted to M.P.'s in the first month. The Paymaster-General reported a total grant of 5,661 gallons to 471 members, or an average issue of 12 gallons, for constituency and Parliamentary activities, but including their business and professional requirements as well. As for the allowances to the constituency associations, a review of applications was to be made before final decision. On February 4 the question of local party allowances was raised again. A month later, on March 4, the question of revised allowances was raised; the Paymaster-General defended the revisions, asserting that figures announced were maximum and that no local constituency agency ought to apply for more than it neded for minimum requirements.

Thus, although the House defended itself vigorously against contempt, it did not neglect its responsibility for the fairness of the ration scheme. In its customary fashion, like a dog worrying a bone, the House pressed for information until questions were satisfactorily answered. Pitiless publicity is the method; for all questions and debates are published verbatim in Hansard and freely reported in the press.

A study of the cases referred to the Committee of Privileges and of its Reports bears out the contention that the Committee acts on a most responsible level to maintain the prestige and effective functioning of the House. Since the outbreak of World War II twenty-six complaints have been referred to the Committee of Privileges and one (the Boothby case) to a Special Committee. Of these, twelve in one way or another involved newspapers or the BBC. It would be an error, however, to suppose that the apparently high propor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of the Committee's attention given to the press is a true index of the nature of its activity, for the number of press cases brought before it is only an infinitesimal fraction of the number of criticisms of the House and its members that are constantly being made in the newspapers. The Committee takes jurisdiction only in cases that may constitute "contempt" and is not concerned with criticism of the policies of the House or of the sagacity of individual members. Almost invariably, too, press cases were disposed of either by simple acceptance of an apology or by dismissal of the complaint.

Two of these cases arose from criticisms published in *The Daily Worker*. Its charge that landlord members of the House were serving their own economic interests was summarily dismissed by the Committee on the ground that it would be beneath the dignity of the House to take it seriously.[23] The second case was that of the garbled report of a speech by an M.P. referred to above.[24]

In addition to the cases connected with petrol rationing, already mentioned, and to the Allighan case, to be discussed in another connection, there were several press cases that were varied in their content. On November 22, 1956, Arthur Lewis, M.P. for West Ham, N, put to the Prime Minister a parliamentary question, "whether he will arrange for part of the money contributed by the Government for relief in Hungary to be allocated to relief of several thousand Egyptian people who have been rendered homeless and destitute by British shelling and rocket fire in Egypt." On November 25 the *Sunday Graphic* referred to this question as "the most crazy, mixed-up question of the year," gave Mr. Lewis' telephone number, and suggested that people ring him up and tell him so. Mr. Lewis, whose telephone was rendered useless by a flood of bitter and insulting calls, complained to the House. The Committee found the editor guilty of a breach of privilege but, in view of his apology, deemed that "no further action of the House is necessary."[25]

[23] *H. C. Papers*, 1953-54, No. 31.

[24] *Supra*, f.n. 20.

[25] *H. C. Papers*, 1956-57, No. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The wife of a Conservative M.P., speaking to the women's branch of the party in her husband's constituency, unguardedly referred to a ruling of the Deputy Speaker in the House as "deplorable", a remark which the reporter of the local paper seized upon. The Committee of Privileges interrogated Lady Mellor, the reporter, and his editor, found all three guilty of contempt, but, considering the limited audience and the restricted circulation of the newspaper, reported that "the House would best consult its own dignity by taking no further action." [26]

A newly elected woman member signed an article "What a Baptism" for the *Sunday Express*. Her first week in the House had come at a time when, because of the government's narrow majority, the whips had been demanding continuous attendance of members during all-night sessions. In venturing a criticism of House procedures under the circumstances, Mrs. Patricia Ford described two of her fellow women M.P.'s snoring on couches in the ladies' retiring room; the article was accompanied by an unflattering picture of one of them, who denied ever using the room and complained of breach of privilege. The Speaker commented that it had "never been considered proper Parliamentary comment to disclose what happens in our own private apartments", and Mrs. Ford had to offer apologies as her maiden speech. Prime Minister Churchill rather felt the apology should be accepted, but Mr. Attlee, Leader of the Opposition, successfully pressed for referral to the Committee because of the newspaper's responsibility.[27] On investigation, the Committee established that the reporter's draft of the article had been read to Mrs. Ford over the telephone just after she had returned home from a long drive and amid the din of her children and dogs; she had told the reporter that since she was new in the House and ignorant of parliamentary procedures, she was counting on him to use discretion. The Committee treated her gallantly and gently, respecting her naïveté as a new member, but bore down correspondingly hard on the journalist responsible. Mr. Attlee was particularly severe, asking:

[26] *H. C. Papers*, 1950-51, No. 235.

[27] *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 514, cols. 1761 *et seq.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> It did not occur to you that the lady Members, whose activities or passivities when they were not engaged in the House were in their private rooms, might think it rather bad taste in a new Member to allude to what happened there? You did not think of warning Mrs. Ford by saying: 'You will have to live with other Lady Members, perhaps it is undesirable.' [28]

In its Report the Committee refrained from passing judgment on the taste of the article and simply recommended that the apology be accepted without further action.

In two cases complaint was filed because newspapers published statements alleged to have been made in closed sessions of the House. On investigation the Committee found that the information had actually been taken, in one case, from a press release of the Ministry of Supply,[29] in the other, from the American press; [30] the Committee therefore was content with apologies. A third case also involving secrecy was somewhat different. In 1948, the *Daily Mail* published an interview with one of the speakers on a BBC forum, who had said that "secret sessions of Parliament were useless because secret agents of a potential enemy would be there." He was quoted as saying that there were twenty-nine secret supporters of Russia in the House. After very careful study, the Committee reported that it had not summoned the commentator because the summoning of irresponsible persons "merely gave added publicity to statements which had only been made in the hope that their very sensationalism would attract to their author a public attention which he was otherwise quite unable to attract" and concluded that this incident fell into the category "which it would be inconsistent with dignity of the House and this Committee to examine further." [31]

More significant of the rôle played by the Committee of Privileges are the miscellaneous cases in which complaint arose without reference to the press. Most of them dealt with the conduct of members or with attempts to influence

[28] *H. C. Papers*, 1952-53, No. 171, p. 8.

[29] *H. C. Papers*, 1940-41, No. 94.

[30] *H. C. Papers*, 1941-42, No. 93.

[31] *H. C. Papers*, 1947-48, No. 112, p. iv.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the conduct of members. It is here that the Committee plays so important a rôle in maintaining the standards of political morality of the House and its members. Treating as breach of privilege criticism of the House or its members is only the negative side of its function. It discharges also the positive duty of maintaining respect for the House and thus enhancing its effectiveness by insisting on its members and officers behaving in a way that merits its reputation for honesty and incorruptibility.

The seriousness with which the Committee members, drawn from among the busiest members of Her Majesty's Government as well as of the Opposition, give their time and attention to the complaints referred to them is a measure of the sense of responsibility they feel. The reports of the Committee's proceedings, their reasoned recommendations, and the subsequent debates in the House help to set the pattern of what is expected of members. Vague and elastic as the code may be in detail, it is rather rigorously applied in terms of the basic acceptance of what is honorable or dishonorable conduct.

Quite obvious was the case of a brawl between an M.P. and a newspaperman in the House cafeteria. While both parties were held in contempt, the member was held "guilty of gross contempt of the House in that the blow which he struck was the most serious feature of the whole affair. The fact that the assault took place in the presence of strangers and was observed by them aggravates the contempt, for it is bound to lower the House in the estimation of the public." [32] Since both offered full apologies, no further action was recommended. Most serious, in the opinion of the Committee, was an allegation that a member had disclosed at an informal gathering not reported in the press the substance of part of a speech made by the Prime Minister in the course of a secret session of Parliament and relating to the conduct of the war. Only the fact that, despite thorough investigation, the Committee was not satisfied that the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt induced the Committee to drop the charge.[33]

[32] *H. C. Papers*, 1946-47, No. 36, p. vi.

[33] *H. C. Papers*, 1945-46, No. 47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The extent to which the rôle of the Committee has changed over the centuries is attested by its treatment of two cases concerned with one of the oldest privileges the House of Commons had claimed, freedom from arrest. One arose from the serving upon the secretary to the Speaker, within the precincts of the House, of a summons for violation of the Road Traffic Act. Here the issue was not the conduct of an officer of the House but invasion of the House's precincts. The Committee questioned a number of high police officials, all the way up to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Home Affairs. Satisfied that the technical breach of privilege had been committed out of ignorance and that no officer of the Metropolitan Police had intended any disrespect of the House, the Committee permitted the matter to drop.[34] In the other case, at the opening of the war, a member was detained on security grounds under Regulation 18 B of the Defence Regulations, 1939. On the basis of a long memorandum from Sir Gilbert Campion, the Clerk of the House, the Committee reported that no breach of privilege had been committed. As a precedent the Committee relied on the report of John Pym's committee in 1641 in the case of Recusants, cited above, but it is obvious that the spirit had changed.[35] Three hundred years earlier Parliament had been concerned with its special privilege in the face of established royal authority, though it had been unwilling to extend corresponding privilege to the king's friends in its midst. Nowadays there is no concept that M.P.'s are exempt from the normal incidence of the law. An M.P., hurrying to the House for a vote, was held up in a traffic jam; after an altercation with the traffic policeman, he received a summons. His claim of privilege was denied by the Committee on the ground that

> the privileges of the House of Commons apply to individual members only in so far as they are necessary in order that the House may freely function. Such privileges do not exalt the Member above the ordinary restraints of law which apply to him as much and perhaps more closely in that capacity, as they apply to other subjects of the crown.[36]

[34] *H. C. Papers,* 1945-46, No. 31, p. vii.

[35] *H. C. Papers,* 1939-40, No. 164.

[36] *H. C. Papers,* 1950-51, No. 244, p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More significant for the study of political morality are some of the other cases referred to the Committee in this period. Pressure on a member to vote or act in a certain way caused several complaints. Some of these cases are fairly clear in their implications and easily recognizable for what they are. Pressure can take the form of intimidation or of promised reward. A case of attempted intimidation was an effort to influence the vote of Members of Parliament by placarding London with the following poster:

> Name of M.P.'s voting for Bread Rationing in the Commons on Thursday will be published here as public enemies and dictators.
>
> Face the Facts Association, 6 Lower Sloane St. S. W. 1.

On examination of the author and printers of the poster, the Committee accepted the printers' statement that they had been unaware that this action might constitute a breach of privilege and their expression of regret for their part in it, but it decided that the chairman of the Association had acted out of "a desire to achieve self-advertisement with a disregard of respect due to Parliament." However, it was deemed that the contempt was in fact so petty in scale and so insignificant in result that "the House would consult its dignity by taking no further notice of the offence." [37]

There were two cases in which money was offered to M.P.'s for using their influence with government departments. In one case a check for £5 was tendered by a company director in payment for contingent expenses for investigating and then raising a question in the House about the company's prosecution by the Board of Trade. After thorough investigation the Committee cited the Resolution of the House adopted on May 2, 1695: "The offer of money or other advantage to a Member of Parliament, for the promoting of any matter whatsoever, depending on or to be transacted in Parliament is a high crime or misdemeanor." However, on the evidence the Committee felt that the defendant had merely been ill-advised both in his action and in the form of his letter, and that no contempt had been intended.[38]

About two years later the Committee acted similarly when

[37] *H. C. Papers,* 1945-56, No. 181, p. iv.

[38] *H. C. Papers,* 1942-43, No. 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an M.P. reported that he had received a letter asking him to present a case before a government department, this time the Department of Scotland. The closing paragraph read: "Should you be able to bring a successful conclusion to this case, I should like—if it would be in order—to donate a cheque for One Hundred Guineas to your local Association for their Party funds." The parenthesis "if it would be in order" saved the writer from the charge of contempt. In his apology and reply to questions before the Committee, he convinced them that he had no intention of offering a bribe. The Committee, however, reiterated the Resolution of 1695, adding that "an offer to a Member's Association or party funds or to a charity, conditional on the Member's taking up a case or bringing it to a successful conclusion, is objectionable." [39]

More difficult to settle because the pressures were more subtle were cases involving business or financial arrangements that members had with outside interests which might determine their thinking and actions. Members of Parliament are not paid salaries sufficiently large for them to be able to live exclusively on them. Members, therefore, maintain their business, professional, or union connections. The duties of an M.P. are not yet thought of as a full-time job, though during their long sessions it seems little time is left them to carry on outside activities, especially when the government's majority is slim.

In May 1944, a complaint was raised in the House of Commons "of the action of the National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers in addressing a letter to Mr. [W. A.] Robinson, Member of Parliament for St. Helens, withdrawing financial support on the ground of his refusal to resign his seat." On the face of it, it seemed that economic pressure was being used for political purposes. The Committee conducted thorough inquiry into the facts. The story that emerged was that Alderman Robinson had been Political General Secretary of the Union until 1942, when he reached the age of 65 and had been pensioned. The Union gave him, in addition to his pension, an allowance of £200, plus additional funds for postage and secretarial assistance. When the Union became aware of the dissatisfaction of the Execu-

[39] *H. C. Papers*, 1944-45, No. 63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive [Committee] of the Divisional Labour Party for St. Helens with Mr. Robinson's conduct as its member and his alleged neglect in dealing with constituency matters, the Union withdrew its supplementary financial support. The Committee was convinced that no attempt was being made to influence the action of the member in respect to the way he voted or the position he took in debates in the House. It accordingly decided that no breach of privilege had been committed.[40]

In 1947, in another case in which it was charged that union pressure was being used to influence the freedom of action of a trade-union official sitting as an M.P., the Committee wrestled further with the problem of such a connection. In its Report it stated: "The relationship between a Member and an outside body with which he is in contractual relationship and from which he receives financial payment is, however, one of great difficulty and delicacy in which there might often be a danger that the rules of privilege may be infringed."[41] Mr. Churchill, who was a member of the Committee of Privileges that year, gave perhaps the most explicit statement of how the situation should be practically resolved:

> For instance, everybody here has private interests; some are directors of companies, some own property which may be much affected by legislation which is passing, and so forth. It is always the understood thing in the House that everybody makes himself perfectly safe by declaring any special interest he has in any matter about which he speaks. A Member says: 'I have a special interest in this,' and thereafter the House makes any discount they think right from what he says. He is all right. Then there are those people who come to represent particular bodies, particular groups of a non-political character in the general sense, and there again we must recognize that as one of the conditions of our varied life. . . .
>
> We are not supposed to be an assembly of gentlemen who have no interests of any kind. That is ridiculous. That might happen in Heaven but not, happily, here.[42]

In this particular case it had become clear that a wide divergence in political thinking had developed between the Exec-

[40] *H. C. Papers*, 1943-44, No. 85.

[41] *H. C. Papers*, 1946-47, No. 118, p. xii.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

utive Committee of the Civil Service Clerical Association and their parliamentary secretary, William Brown, M.P. for Rugby, who had been very closely identified with the early growth of the Association. Mr. Brown had broken with the Labor party and was sitting as an Independent. He had been most vocal and vociferous in his criticism of Labor policy, and the Executive Committee felt that because of his official position in the Union, it had been embarrassed in its relations with the Trades Union Congress. They wished therefore to sever the connection, but at the same time planned to pay in a lump sum the amount of Mr. Brown's salary and allowances until the age of retirement, at which time he would begin to receive the full pension to which he would have been entitled had he continued in his position as secretary. After arduous sifting of evidence the Committee felt that in view of the financial arrangements proposed, in which no financial loss would have been incurred by the member on his separation from his position as parliamentary general secretary, the action of the Executive Committee of the Union did not constitute a breach of privilege. However, the debates on the Report of the Committee brought forth confirmation of Mr. Churchill's position with respect to the absolute necessity of "declaring one's interest."

Perhaps the clarity with which Mr. Churchill had seen this aspect of the problem was the result of his action on and association with the case of a junior minister that arose in the early days of his wartime government. In October 1940, the House had referred—this time to a Select Committee—the investigation of the conduct of Robert J. G. Boothby, an M.P. holding the office of Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food. On motion of the Prime Minister himself the Select Committee was ordered to investigate Mr. Boothby's activities "in connection with the payment out of assets in this country of claims against the Government of and institutions in the Republic of Czechoslovakia . . . and to report whether the conduct of the honourable Member was contrary to the usage or derogatory to the dignity of the House or inconsistent with the standards which Parliament is entitled to expect from its Members."

Mr. Boothby had been an outspoken critic of the Nazis, had visited Czechoslovakia in the year before the Nazi *Putsch*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1938), had met with her leading statesmen, including President Beneš, and had sent a long memorandum on the situation there to the then Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain. He was very friendly with some wealthy Czechs, resident in London. After the fall of Czechoslovakia Mr. Boothby arranged to represent them in their claims for recovery for their losses of property seized in Czechoslovakia out of the blocked assets of the government of Czechoslovakia held in Britain. One of the Czechs in London had refused to join, despite pressure exerted on him by the group, and had applied directly to the Treasury. The Treasury had become suspicious and had tried to ascertain whether Mr. Boothby had a financial interest in the matter, thus precipitating the investigation. The investigation was no less thorough and complete than when conducted by the Committee of Privileges. The facts that emerged were that Mr. Boothby, who had been in personal financial difficulties, had been promised compensation, if his effort was successful, by a Czech friend whose family had important claims. As he himself stated in the House, after the Committee had reported:

> It is easy to be wise after the event. But, looking back, I can see now that I was guilty of a tragic error of judgment. If I had even put a postscript to this letter [to the Chancellor of the Exchequer] to the effect that . . . although I had no legal or enforceable contract with him, nevertheless I had an expectation of financial assistance from him if and when the claims of his family were met, this case could never have been brought against me.[43]

The Committee and his Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, considered his actions as reflecting more than an "error of judgment." There was never any suggestion that his position and action in attempting to block the accounts of Czechoslovakia and prevent their falling into Nazi hands had been contrary to the public interest, but his failure to disclose his interest was crucial. As Mr. Churchill, who had accepted his resignation from the Ministry, said:

> . . . my hon. Friend . . . has been one of my personal friends, often a supporter at lonely and difficult moments. . . . It is a loss to His Majesty's Government who lose a highly competent and industrious Minister . . . . The popularity of my

[43] *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 368, col. 456.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> hon. Friend, his abilities, and the manner in which during his short tenure of office he conducted himself, all add to the poignancy of our feelings, but I do not think they can influence our course of action.[44]

The Report condemning Mr. Boothby's conduct as "derogatory to the House and inconsistent with the standards which Parliament is entitled to expect from its Members" was adopted without a division. Mr. Boothby retained his seat and was subsequently reëlected by his constituency, but his ministerial career was ended.

More drastic in outcome though less tragic in circumstances was the case that led to the expulsion of an M.P. from the House—the Allighan case. The Labor party, which was then in power, had been disturbed by leakage to the press of detailed accounts of its caucuses, closed meetings held within the precincts of the House of Commons. It was, however, a Conservative M.P., Quentin Hogg, now Viscount Hailsham, recently given the responsibility of running the Conservative party, who raised the complaint on the publication in *World's Press News* of April 3, 1947, of the following article, credited to Garry Allighan, M.P. for Gravesend, County Kent:

> Every newspaper in the Street has anything up to half a dozen M.P.'s on its 'contacts' list . . . .
>
> Some of the contacts are on a retainer, some get paid for what they produce, some are content to accept 'payment in kind'—personal publicity . . . .
>
> That is one way an enterprising newspaper gets what the Party calls 'leaks.' Another way more accurately justifies that description. M.P.'s 'leak' around the bar. Being no less human than subs, some M.P.'s 'knock 'em back at the bar' and being less absorptive than reporters become lubricated into loquacity. No worth while reporter could fail to get the stuff . . . .
>
> Some of the *Evening Standard* stores [*sic*] have been verbatim reports and having been present at the meetings, I could go further and say that they were very accurate verbatim reports. Who could have taken the speeches down? I reply, any one of the score or more M.P.'s who can be seen at every Party meeting making voluminous notes.[45]

[44] *Ibid.*, cols. 461-62.

[45] *H. C. Papers*, 1946-47, No. 138, p. ii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Hogg's complaint was referred to the Committee of Privileges. The Committee questioned Mr. Allighan most searchingly but without success in eliciting satisfactory substantiation of his allegations; Mr. Allighan, indeed, denied specific knowledge of any member who had accepted a retainer for furnishing confidential information to the press. The Committee thereupon turned to published reports of a meeting of the Parliamentary Labor party held in April 23, which Mr. Allighan said were accurate accounts, and called the editors and lobby correspondents for the newspapers and wire services responsible for publishing these stories. In its subsequent Report to the House the Committee stated that "the general effect of the evidence . . . was an indignant repudiation of the suggestion that the Press sought or obtained confidential information from Members of Parliament either by paying them in money or in kind or when Members were under the influence of drink."[46]

Two newspaper editors had, however, admitted paying regularly for confidential information. In one case, the editor and lobby correspondent of the *Evening News* revealed that they had been paying an M.P. £5 weekly in cash but refused to disclose his identity. In the second case, the editors of the *Evening Standard* revealed that they had been paying the Trans-Atlantic Press Agency £30 a week for confidential reports; under pressure of questioning, the editors further revealed that these reports had been written by Mr. Allighan himself.

In its Report the Committee concluded that transactions between newspapers and members of the House whereby the latter disclose confidential information in return for payment are discreditable to both. There was some question whether the privilege of the House covered secret party meetings held within the precincts of the House; the Committee split sharply on this point, but by majority vote the resolution was submitted to the House that "Mr. Allighan, as Member of the House, in corruptly accepting payment for the disclosure of information about matters to be proceeded with in Parliament obtained from other Members under the obligation of secrecy, is guilty of dishonourable conduct which deserves to be severely punished." All agreed that "this

[46] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contempt was aggravated by the facts that he was seeking to cast suspicion on others in respect to the very matter of which he knew himself to be guilty, and that he persistently misled the Committee." [47]

The debate and action of the House on this Report are most illuminating. Proceedings on the floor were opened by the Speaker telling Mr. Allighan that he was entitled "to be heard in his place." His explanation was that his writing of the original article could be explained only by the fact that he had done it during a period of intense mental strain and that his testimony before the Committee had been given while he was under treatment for his nervous condition. The third point of the condemnation, the acceptance of £30 a week for his reports on activities in the House, he considered he could justify as the right of a professional journalist. He did, however, acknowledge that his conduct was a breach of confidence in which he had departed from the high standards of Parliamentary conduct, and for this he apologized. He then withdrew, and for five hours the House debated the course of action it should follow.

The first question was the one that had caused the split in the Committee, the question whether party meetings held within the precincts of the House were covered by the privilege of the House and therefore whether violation of the secrecy of a caucus could be considered a contempt of the House. On this issue the House divided 198–101 in support of the position of the Committee majority that disclosure "of information about matters to be proceeded with in Parliament obtained from other Members under obligation of secrecy" was dishonorable conduct. The vote was free, not along party lines.[48]

The second question entailing a division was on the penalty to be imposed. The Leader of the House had recommended suspension from the House for six months. Mr. Hogg, who had raised the original complaint, moved the amendment "That Mr. Allighan for his gross contempt of this House and for his misconduct be expelled from the House." The amendment was passed by a vote of 187–75, again by a free vote.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 443, cols. 1110-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The House then turned to consideration of the case of Mr. Walkden, who had finally admitted that he was the M.P. who had been accepting £5 from the *Evening News*. In view of the difference in the nature of the contempt, which in this case did not involve the casting of aspersions on Members of Parliament or prevarication in testimony before the Committee, the House was content to vote to limit the penalty to a formal reprimand by the Speaker. The reprimand delivered by the Speaker sitting covered in his Chair was:

> Evelyn Walkden, the House has adjudged you guilty of corruptly accepting payment for information which you obtained from your fellow members under the obligation of secrecy. If other Members acted as you did, it would be impossible to maintain that mutual confidence without which the system under which we work would break down. Your conduct, which has been publicly exposed, lowers not only yourself, but the House in public esteem. In the name of the House, I accordingly reprimand you for your offense against its honour.[49]

Mr. Walkden did not stand for Parliament at the next election.

The penalties that the House has imposed in modern times have ranged from expulsion, through public reprimand, down to the statement that the House regarded the conduct in question as contempt of the House and as likely to lower the prestige and effectiveness of the House. In themselves these penalties may seem not very severe; yet the effect of their imposition is devastating. A man stands exposed before the House for conduct which has been judged by his peers as dishonorable. What is overwhelming is the very knowledge that this condemnation has been reached by a committee that is in itself incorruptible, a committee that is not being manipulated for political or personal advantage. Condemnation by a manipulated group is a meaningless gesture which in the end destroys both the group and the manipulators. Condemnation arrived at by a group whose integrity and sense of responsibility are clearly recognized means that the individual's conduct is pitilessly and publicly exposed for what it is. Departure from the standards of honorable conduct on

[49] *Ibid.*, col. 1159.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the part of a member cannot be and is not glossed over on the grounds of personal friendship and partisan politics.

It is this strong sense of the honor and reputation of the House and of the necessity of preserving it that is so significant in maintaining the high standards of the conduct of its members. Privilege of the House is almost another way of saying responsibility; the House cannot and will not tolerate its abuse. Even the privilege of free speech in the House may not be abused. An interesting statement made in the course of the debate on the Allighan case by Earl Winterton—then known as the "Father of the House" because of his knowledge of House of Commons traditions—throws some light on a problem that plagued our Senate and House of Representatives in the 1950's:

> If anybody in the exercise of what he believes to be his undoubted Parliamentary rights, gets up in this House and makes an attack which would be libellous, and might even be a criminal libel on a person outside the House, by long practice in the House, Mr. Speaker as the Chairman deprecates such conduct, and the House as a whole, whatever its political complexion, shows by its attitude that no such attack should take place.[50]

This has been borne out most sharply by a recent incident in the House. The Labor party had been trying unsuccessfully to force the government into holding an inquiry into alleged leakage of information about the raising of the bank rate on September 19, 1957, which might have led to private gain. In the follow-up of a question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on November 12, Mr. Wilson asked:

> Will he not now, in order to allay public anxiety on this matter, state clearly whether he did or did not, or any other Treasury representative did or did not, see the Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party, who has vast City interests, the day before the bank rate went up? [51]

This tactic *The Economist* called "an example of the technique of the smear"; "the proper reaction was therefore of distaste." [52] It resulted, however, in the person so named,

[50] *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 443, col. 1140.

[51] *Ibid.*, vol. 577, col. 767.

[52] November 16, 1957, p. 570.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not then a member of the House, asking the Prime Minister for an opportunity to defend himself through a judicial inquiry against the charge stated under "absolute privilege accorded to Members of Parliament." Mr. Macmillan then agreed to the creation of a Tribunal of Inquiry under the Act of 1921,[53] to determine whether there was any justification for the allegations on the grounds:

> Parliamentary Privilege is a treasured right of the House of Commons but we should not forget that it stems from the days of relationship between the Executive and Parliament very different from those which now exist. Privilege was intended to be a buttress of liberty. It should not be used as a protection for defamation.
>
> . . . the Government has acted in accordance with precedent, in accordance with propriety, and in their final decision, in accordance with something which overrides both in the right of men, even in the highest places who have been attacked by name, to defend their honour.[54]

MADELINE R. ROBINTON

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

53 For significance of appointment of Tribunal, see Madeline R. Robinton, "The Lynskey Tribunal: The British Method of Dealing with Political Corruption", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LXVIII, pp. 109-124.

54 *H. C. Deb.*, vol. 577, cols. 1153-54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY *

HIGHLY significant in the posture of "peaceful coexistence" emphasized by Soviet leaders since Stalin's death has been the vigorous rôle assigned to Soviet foreign economic policy. The expressed desire to reduce international tensions and to compete peacefully with capitalism has been accompanied by strong Soviet advocacy of increased East-West trade and by a considerable expansion of Soviet economic relations with underdeveloped countries.

Competitive coexistence reflects in part the increasingly large share Soviet foreign economic activities have had in the major achievements of the last dozen years. This has been apparent in the rapid post-war recovery of the Soviet economy and its continued expansion, in the erection of an economic bloc, and in the current emphasis on economic relations as a major device of foreign policy. These activities have assumed a variety of forms and methods, yet the fundamental motivation has been constant—the advancement of Soviet interests.

Since all foreign economic activities continue to be a monopoly of the state, commercial considerations alone are seldom the moving spirit of Soviet policies. Rather, two basic considerations prevail: the requirements of a planned economy and the aims of foreign policy. The new economy envisaged by Lenin required that foreign economic relations form an integral part of the planning for "socialist construction". The initial mission of the state monopoly of foreign trade included defense of Soviet economy from capitalist penetration and maximizing internal Soviet strength. Variants of these tasks remain in effect.[1]

* This study is part of a larger inquiry into Soviet foreign economic relations currently undertaken by the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, at the University of Virginia.

1 See V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* (*Works*) (Moscow, 1950), XXVII, 222-223; *VKP (B) v resolutsiakh i resheniakh S'ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov Ts. K.* [*All-Union Communist Party (B) in the resolutions and decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*] (Moscow, 1941), Part 2, pp. 34-35; D. Mishutin, *Sotsialisticheskaia monopoliia vneshnei*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet foreign economic policies before the Second World War were preoccupied with the promotion of "self-sufficiency". Autarky was to attain the Soviet Union's economic independence from hostile, capitalist states, thereby simultaneously strengthening its defense while furthering the development of the socialist system. Rapid industrialization which was designed to overcome economic backwardness, however, initially required considerable imports of industrial equipment and the Soviet government displayed no hesitancy in expanding its foreign trade with capitalist states during the First Five-Year-Plan period in order to secure its needs. Nonetheless, reliance upon foreign sources of supply was viewed as a temporary expedient.[2] Once the leadership felt that the sinews of industrialization had been procured, the autarkical orientation was reëstablished and Soviet foreign trade from 1932 onward continued to decrease, even below levels of the 1920's.[3] Economic relations, therefore, had a strategic orientation, and Soviet pre-war trade was only a marginal factor in world trade.

The scope of Soviet foreign economic policies was greatly enlarged after the Second World War. Wartime destruction, the expansion of the political influence of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe and strategic decisions combined to impel it to extend its activities beyond the earlier goal of "socialism in one country." The closer correlation be-

torgovli SSSR (*The Socialist Monopoly of the Foreign Trade of the USSR*) (Moscow, 1938), p. 42; B. A. Vvedneskii (ed.), *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (*The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*) (Moscow, 1951), VIII, 286; M. Kovrizhnykh, A. Frumkin and V. Pozdniakov, *Vneshniaia torgovlia stran narodnoi demokratii* (*Foreign Trade of the Countries of People's Democracy*) (Moscow, 1955), p. 18, for views on the rôle of foreign trade. The organizational evolution of Soviet foreign trade and its directional patterns and volume are traced in Alexander Baykov, *Soviet Foreign Trade* (Princeton, 1946), and P. A. Baran, "The USSR in the World Economy", *Foreign Economic Policy for the United States* (Cambridge, 1948), edited by Seymour Harris.

2 The official explanation along these lines is in *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (*The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*), O. Shmidt, ed. (Moscow, 1930), vol. XI, cols. 719-720.

3 Soviet foreign trade was greatest in 1930 when total turnover reached 9,176.8 million rubles, over 70 per cent above the totals registered three years earlier. Over 88 per cent of the imports in that year consisted of producer goods. By 1935, Soviet trade dropped to less than 30 per cent of the 1930 total. Baykov, *op. cit.*, Appendix, Tables I, III.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween economic activities and foreign policy objectives that resulted in the final analysis led to the Soviet Union's attempt to apply the concept of self-sufficiency to a bloc of "socialist democracies" under its hegemony. While a review of these activities may seem economic in nature, attention must also be directed to political decisions in so far as they conditioned Soviet foreign economic relations.

Soviet foreign policy was not clearly defined in the first two years following the war. Victory, Soviet occupation and wartime decisions of the Allies determined the zonal limits of Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe, but it was unclear to what extent or in what manner Stalin would exploit the Soviet position.[4]

Of the two basic alternatives for Soviet foreign policy after the war—coöperation with the West or unilateral action—Stalin chose the latter. Coöperation might have secured much-needed foreign aid for Soviet reconstruction. It would have also required Soviet reliance on Western goodwill, participation in efforts to liberalize trade, and Soviet restraint both in Eastern Europe and in the promotion of communism. From the Soviet point of view, coöperation likewise portended the penetration of capitalist influences.

The almost pathological concern for "security", based on the traditional conviction of capitalism's malevolence toward the Soviet Union, acted in concert with the Soviet ideological mission of spreading communism. These considerations were primarily responsible for Stalin's decision to proceed unilaterally in strengthening the Soviet strategic position in Eastern Europe. Although control of this region became a prerequisite of defense, Soviet policy in these early years indicated no detailed plan of operations. It consisted of empirical improvisations. The initial lack of vigorous reaction from the West simply encouraged further Soviet efforts.[5] The frequently frenetic and contradictory economic

[4] Eastern Europe refers specifically to the states of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. East Germany, Yugoslavia and Albania are excluded unless noted otherwise.

[5] *Cf.* W. H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (New York, 1953); Arnold and Veronica Toynbee (eds.), *The Re-alignment of Europe* (New York, 1955); Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (New York, 1949); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, 1950).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activities in the area corroborate the empirical nature of Soviet policy.

Broadly speaking, the pattern of Soviet foreign economic activities from 1945 to 1947 ran along two lines. The pressure of internal reconstruction prompted the Soviet Union to seek trade and credit agreements with the West as it simultaneously made economic capital from its military and political position in neighboring countries. These actions took place within the framework of the strategic decision to achieve Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. For the moment, control of Eastern Europe appeared to coincide with the needs of domestic recovery and strategic considerations. But the nature of Soviet actions here was to preclude any aid from the West.

As early as January 1945, Stalin broached the question of an American loan of $6 billion, a sum regarded as too large by the United States. A "pipeline" agreement designed to alleviate the effect of abrupt cancellation of Lend-Lease aid by providing $244 million in American credits was signed in October 1945 (of this about $183 million was to be used by the Soviet Union by June 1947). However, another Soviet request for a $1 billion loan (made in August 1945) received an American response six months later which linked any negotiations with the issues of settling Lend-Lease accounts and future Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. The Soviet refusal to countenance these conditions ultimately led to a breakdown in negotiations. The only sizable grant received by the Soviet Union consisted of one billion kroner in credits ($278 million) from Sweden, of which only slightly more than half were used.

Reconstruction needs likewise impelled the Soviet Union into expanding its trade activities. Bilateral agreements were concluded with Sweden, Iceland, Great Britain and East European states, among others, by the end of 1947. Consequently, on the basis of comparable prices, the value of Soviet trade turnover in 1948 had reached, and perhaps slightly exceeded, 1938 totals. But it still represented less than 2 per cent of total world trade and could not alone speed up appreciably Soviet internal recovery.[6]

[6] The relations of 1938 prices to those of 1948 must be in the vicinity of 1:2. With the inclusion of reparation deliveries in Soviet imports, the total

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Succor from the East

In the end, the primary sources of economic aid for Soviet reconstruction proved to be those areas where Soviet military control permitted exploitation: East Germany, Eastern Europe, and, for a time, Manchuria and North Korea. A variety of expedients were adopted for this purpose.

Widespread dismantling and confiscations following in the wake of Soviet occupation were justified either by the Soviet definition of what constituted war booty or by a liberal interpretation of armistice agreements (corroborated by peace treaties in 1947). Provisions of the latter stipulated that a total of $900 million in 1938 prices (a minimum of $1.5 billion in post-war prices) was due the Soviet Union from Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Italy. They also provided for Soviet acquisition of German assets in former enemy states, restitution of plundered Soviet property, and the transfer of occupation costs to the occupied state. The lack of agreement on the German reparation question did not restrict the Soviet Union from confiscating assets in its own zone on the basis of its $10 billion demand. The plunder that highlighted Soviet actions throughout 1945 and 1946 varied in different countries, more restraint being exercised in Slavic states. But none were spared.[7]

---

trade turnover of the Soviet Union in 1948 represented about 2.4 per cent of the world total. *Cf.* U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (Geneva, 1949), Table XVI; L. M. Herman, "Foreign Trade", *Soviet Power and Policy*, George B. de Huszar *et al.*, eds. (New York, 1955), p. 359; B. H. Kerblay, "The Economic Relations of the U.S.S.R. with Foreign Countries During the War and in the Postwar Period", *Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development*, series 2, No. 5 (March 1951), pp. 15-17.

[7] Dismantling of German assets in the territory ceded to Poland has been estimated to include 25 per cent of industrial equipment. A special agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union in August 1945 stipulated that, in return for remaining German assets and the delivery of 15 per cent of reparations from Germany, the Soviet Union would receive specified quotas of Polish coal each year, ultimately until the end of Soviet occupation of Germany. These quotas were reduced in 1947 but the coal was sold at a price one eighth to one tenth of the world market price. This practice was discontinued after 1953 when reparations from Germany were renounced. *Cf.* A. Zauberman, *Economic Imperialism* (London, 1955), p. 12; T. P. Alton, *Polish Postwar Economy* (New York, 1955), p. 280; Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist East Europe* (New York and London, 1957), pp. 176-178.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Claims on former German assets likewise facilitated the Soviet organization of joint-stock corporations in Eastern Europe, mostly in former enemy states. These assets would be advanced as the Soviet share in the capital endowment of the corporations in the particular country. Technically a joint venture, ultimate control rested in Soviet hands. It was a profitable device which assured the Soviet Union a flow of reparations from the debtor state, as well as a share of the corporations also enjoying various financial exemptions. In so far as these corporations controlled or functioned in vital sectors of the economies, the Soviet Union had another lever of control within these states.[8]

The Soviet Union's preoccupation with dismantling and plunder in Eastern Europe at this time was in apparent contradiction to its strategic goal. Since political control of Eastern Europe increased in accordance with Soviet "security" aims, the siphoning of capital assets into the Soviet Union weakened the foundations of the economies forming this prospective *glacis* of defense, the reverse of what a planned economic corollary should be. This cross-purpose is explicable in terms of Soviet policy improvisations and the overriding needs of domestic recovery. When reconstruction and control of Eastern Europe were fairly well advanced by 1947, outright dismantling waned. Further reparations were taken from the current production of former enemy states.[9] Increased international tensions that prompted a redefinition of Soviet foreign policy also led to a reduction of crude ex-

[8] This device was most prominent in Rumania where corporations operated in such important sectors as petroleum production, mining, transport, etc. Hungary had six and Bulgaria four such corporations but there were none in Poland. A Soviet-Yugoslav corporation on Danubian shipping was liquidated after Tito's break with Stalin. A summary of this phase of Soviet activity is in Nicolas Spulber, "Soviet Undertakings and Mixed Companies in East Europe", *Journal of Central European Affairs,* vol. XIV (1954); *idem, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe,* pp. 166-224.

[9] After 1,225 plants had been dismantled, thirty-four Soviet-owned corporations were set up in the East German zone for this purpose, comprising by 1951 almost 30 per cent of industrial facilities. *Cf.* Ulrich Drobing, "Soviet Corporations in Eastern Germany", *Journal of Central European Affairs,* vol. XVII (July 1957); J. P. Nettl, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945-1950* (New York and London, 1951); *idem,* "German Reparations in the Soviet Empire", *Foreign Affairs,* XXIX (January 1951), 300-308.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ploitation, and Soviet foreign economic activities were aligned more with strategic considerations.

When the Soviet Fourth Five-Year Plan of reconstruction ended in 1950, the value of assets and goods channeled into the Soviet Union through these exploitational devices was considerable, and reparation payments had not yet been completed. Soviet secrecy prevents any detailed calculation but a conservative estimate of over $7 billion in post-war prices can be made on the basis of scattered information—not an insignificant sum directed to Soviet internal recovery.[10]

Reorientation of East European Trade

The collapse of Germany might have been expected to affect the directional flow of East European trade, but a radically new pattern developed inasmuch as control of Eastern Europe required Soviet economic domination. Increased trade complemented the flow of "political" imports (that is, unrequited East European exports based on the peace treaties), so that East European economies were drawn into greater dependence upon the Soviet Union.

As East European foreign trade became subject to greater governmental supervision after the war (approaching the Soviet model), vigorous Soviet activities led to a series of bilateral trade agreements with these various states.[11] Most were of a similar character: one-year agreements stipulating

[10] *Pravda* of May 16, 1950 announced that German reparations by the end of that year would total $3,650 million, and that remaining payments until 1965 would be $210 million annually. In 1953, however, further reparations were renounced by the U.S.S.R. Most estimates place the value of Rumanian goods and services at the disposal of the Soviet Union at approximately $2,000 million. Hungary's share of reparations was reduced to about $269 million by 1948 (i.e., $134.3 million in 1938 dollars), to which may be added an estimated $200 million taken by the Soviet Union as "war booty". An official Polish estimate placed the value of Soviet dismantling in the former German region ceded to Poland at $500 million. These figures alone reach $6 billion, without taking into account the value of Italian assets in the Balkans due the Soviet Union, Finnish reparations, the delivery of Polish coal to the Soviet Union at reduced prices, dismantlement in Manchuria, and other such factors. *Cf.* Spulber, *The Economies of Communist East Europe,* pp. 166-206; R. L. Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Times* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 344-345; Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1954), pp. 599-600.

[11] *Cf.* Mid-European Law Project, V. Gsovski, ed., *Economic Treaties and Agreements of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1945-1951* (New York, 1952).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the total value of the exchanges and specifying delivery quotas of commodities without reference to foreign exchange. These agreements generally included Soviet exports of food, raw materials and a minimum of equipment needed to reactivate dislocated economies. In the matter of Soviet imports stress was laid on finished products and raw materials essential for reconstruction.

The enormous change in the traditional pattern of East European trade appeared in 1946 when almost 50 per cent of it was with the Soviet Union. Various economic pressures halved this percentage the following year. The Soviet Union's own recovery placed a greater demand on materials previously exported, and it alone could not meet the appalling needs of East European post-war reconstruction.[12] Hence, its relatively permissive attitude toward the reopening of more Western trade outlets for Eastern Europe is understandable. Despite this declining share of the Soviet Union in East European trade in these immediate post-war years, this general penetration persisted, as evidenced by the fact that, while in 1938 less than 7 per cent of Soviet exports and imports were involved with Eastern Europe, these had risen to over 40 per cent by 1947 (excluding the reparation factor).[13]

Although Soviet imports from Eastern Europe exceeded exports in this period (except to Bulgaria), the Soviet Union maintained a balance of payments by exogenous methods: compensation agreements for remaining German assets, manipulation of joint-stock corporations, and so on.[14] This

[12] Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary suffered the severest wartime destruction. The estimate of the total Polish material loss is above $18 billion, while that of Hungary was believed to be 40 per cent of her national income. A summary of East European needs for reconstruction may be gathered from the U.N.R.R.A. operational analysis reports, Nos. 11, 16, 23, 27, 30, 33, 35, 44, 46 and 47.

[13] Data on Soviet–East European trade may be found in Margaret Dewar, *Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945-1949* (London, 1951); U.S. Congress, House Report No. 1845, *Final Report on Foreign Aid* (Washington, 1948); Alexander Gerschenkron, "Russia's Trade in Postwar Years", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* May 1949, pp. 85-100.

[14] Moreover, the volume of Soviet imports was enhanced frequently by a price structure imposed in favor of the Soviet Union. For example, Poland had to pay 131 zloty for each dollar's worth of imports from the Soviet Union while the latter paid 75 zloty for each dollar of Polish goods. House Report No. 1845, p. 377.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enormous shift in trade toward the Soviet Union had a doubly beneficial effect: it aided the Soviet Union's domestic recovery and contributed to its control of an economic bloc.

II

The increase of international tensions by 1947 was fostered considerably by the success of the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe. Repeated protests from its former allies failed to alter the Soviet policy of suppressing independent political groups in the region. Growing disillusionment stiffened the attitude of the West in its dealings with the Soviet Union, especially over the question of Germany's future. The likelihood of further Soviet expansion westward galvanized the United States into adopting countermeasures. Above all, the economic instability of Western Europe had to be resolved if the Communist challenge was to be met.

Out of the ensuing polarization of world politics evolved the American policy of "containment", the first major step being the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. After the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers failed to achieve any fundamental agreement, the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe was proposed, in June 1947. Concerned as it was primarily with Western Europe, the Plan was not designed to exclude Soviet and East European participation. In effect it forced a decision upon the Soviet Union, and Stalin's rejection of a general program of economic recovery corroborated his original decision to secure unilaterally the requisites of Soviet "security".

The critical consideration in the Soviet Union's rejection of the Marshall Plan was its control of Eastern Europe as a "security zone". American aid would have been obviously welcome provided it was unconditional. But adherence to a general program was viewed as inimical to Soviet interests. Molotov's objections that such a program "would inevitably render other European states dependent upon the great powers" obliquely revealed the traditional Soviet attitude that economic contact with capitalism was fraught with dangers of political penetration. Stalin had no doubts that the West's refusal to abandon its interest in Eastern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe was a primary motivation behind the offer of the United States. This offer was meant to undo Soviet control and isolate the Soviet Union. Any economic advantages accruing from participation would be more than offset by the political and strategic dangers. Consequently, despite the indicated willingness of Poland and Czechoslovakia, Soviet pressure forced rejections of American aid by the East European countries.

The Soviet decision was indirectly connected with the economic debate about the health of capitalism that developed in the Soviet Union in 1947. Eugene Varga, a prominent economist, advanced the thesis that the collapse of capitalism should not be regarded as imminent. The impact of the Second World War had brought about more state interference in the capitalist economy that tended to amend some of the more self-destructive features of unbridled free enterprise. The official attack upon this interpretation underlined Stalin's belief that the collapse was near. This naturally had a bearing upon the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan, which was regarded as an artificial stimulant for the tottering economy of the United States whose ultimate objective was the capture of new markets. An attack upon the Marshall Plan would speed up capitalism's collapse.

Consolidation of Eastern Europe

Interpreted thus, the Marshall Plan evoked a sharper response from the Soviet Union in its pursuit of "security". The consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe was now all the more urgent. The organization of the Cominform in September 1947 and the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia the following February were two dramatic manifestations of the Soviet determination to erect speedily a tractable bloc of states. Tito's successful defection intensified the vassalization process in the other states which continued to Stalin's death.

This clearer pattern of Soviet foreign policy signaling the start of the cold war also portended shifts in foreign economic policy. The opposition to the Marshall Plan was expressed in a sharp reduction of commercial contacts with the West and in Soviet efforts to erect a self-sufficient bloc of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states. Changes in the Soviet Union's economic relations with Eastern Europe were needed. Short-term advantages previously gained through crude spoliation were no longer suitable. Long-range measures were to expedite greater Soviet control and coördination over East European resources and their development, that is, the consolidation of an economic orbit. The pursuit of autarky was in effect extended beyond the Soviet Union to include Eastern Europe.

Some of the central ramifications of this decision to pursue bloc self-sufficiency included reductions in reparations and occupation costs borne by former enemy states. In some cases, previously dismantled industrial equipment was returned. The Communist-run governments emulated Soviet economic models and experience. By 1951, all the East European states had programs of rapid industrialization. This required Soviet financial backing and the first grant appeared prior to the Marshall Plan when Poland received a loan of $28 million. The interdiction upon participation in the Marshall Plan was followed in 1948 by additional Soviet grants of credit amounting close to $500 million, extended to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria. Designed to speed up industrialization, these credits made Eastern Europe largely dependent upon Soviet exports, thereby reducing further trade between this area and the West.

Further impetus to this redirection of East European trade was given by the series of bilateral trade agreements negotiated between the Soviet Union and these states from July 1947 to April 1948. These pacts now covered a longer period and provided for larger exchanges, usually extending for five years with provisions for annual protocols fixing deliveries. Trade and coöperation agreements among the bloc states themselves were rapidly concluded as well.[15]

The Soviet intention of knitting an economic orbit independent of contacts with capitalist countries was corroborated further by the organization in January 1949 of a Council for Economic Mutual Aid aimed at greater coördination among the various economies. This organization, however, appeared little more than a symbol in the years to Stalin's death. Fragmentary evidence showed little centralized effort

[15] Mid-European Law Project, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward coördination as bloc members continued planning without regard for any international division of labor and continued to make economic agreements on a bilateral basis. Shortly thereafter, however, there was a deviation from Soviet bilateralism when a multilateral agreement was concluded in June 1949 among the Soviet Union, Finland, Poland and Czechoslovakia.[16]

Along with this evolution appeared a modification in the official Soviet attitude toward foreign trade. The previously defensive posture of Soviet trade was dropped. In Mikoyan's words, the aim of Soviet trade was " no longer to defend the Soviet economy but to bind others to it." [17] The increasingly noneconomic motivations of Soviet foreign economic policy were given public recognition. The binding of East European economies to the Soviet Union presented economic advantages to the latter as well. Soviet import requirements were frequently met on more favorable terms than would have been possible otherwise. In becoming a creditor nation, the Soviet Union also assumed a middleman position in controlling and profiting from any East-West trade. Importing East European goods in excess of immediate needs permitted the Soviet Union to reëxport them selectively, thereby reducing its import surplus.

An indication of the degree of Soviet success in forming an economic orbit is in the trade data to 1952. The decline of Soviet–East European trade appearing in 1947 was arrested and reversed. The $380 million turnover of that year was more than doubled the next year and almost quadrupled by 1950. It reached a volume of about $2.6 billion by 1952. Approximately 38 per cent of East European trade, excluding East Germany, was with the Soviet Union at this time. There was likewise a parallel trade increase among the East European states, accounting for 33 per cent of their total turnover. Consequently over 70 per cent of East European trade in 1952 was Soviet and intra-bloc trade.

[16] Finland was to ship 100 million rubles' worth of goods to the Soviet Union which, in turn, would deliver to Poland and Czechoslovakia 80 million rubles and 20 million in goods respectively. The latter states were then to ship to Finland identical amounts of exports.

[17] *Pravda*, December 21, 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conversely, the percentage of Soviet trade directed toward Eastern Europe also grew, from one third of total turnover to almost one half by 1952. This trading bloc was further expanded by Soviet (and to a lesser degree, East European) trade with China and North Korea after 1949. Soviet trade with Asian communist states in 1952 was in the vicinity of $1.6 billion, roughly 31 per cent of its total turnover. Consequently, almost 80 per cent of all Soviet trade was within the communist orbit by 1952.[18]

A steady attenuation of trade between the West and both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe paralleled these developments. Owing in part to conscious Soviet choice, this decline also reflected the restrictions adopted by the United States and its allies. The American government set up an export licensing system as early as March 1948 which forbade shipment to the Soviet bloc of goods listed as having strategic significance. An informal organization to implement international coöperation along these lines was set up in January 1949 among American allies in Western Europe. This embargo was intensified after the outbreak of the Korean War. Consequently, Soviet trade with the United States and its allies dropped sharply between 1948 and 1950. Soviet trade with all of Western Europe, comprising about one fifth of its total turnover in 1948, fell to less than one tenth by 1950. While the decline of East European trade with Western Europe was less precipitous in these years, the radical departure from traditional patterns is indicated by the fact that in 1950 the whole Soviet European bloc exported less than one third of the pre-war volume to Western Europe and imported less than one half.[19]

This attrition was no deterrent to the steady increase of

[18] Based on data in U.N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe,* vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 45. The reader should be cautioned on the uncertainties of dollar estimates of intra-bloc trade because they either are based on absolute figures published in national sources and converted on the basis of the exchange rate of 4 rubles to a dollar or are derived from value indices applied to latest available data. This involves various discrepancies and the data should be regarded as "indicative of orders of magnitude rather than as precise statistics."

[19] Derived from data in Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Ninth Report to Congress), *The Strategic Trade Control System, 1948-1956* (Washington, 1957), pp. 93 and 105 (hereafter cited as Ninth Report to Congress); *Direction of International Trade,* vol. V, No. 8, p. 39; U.N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe,* vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 35 *et seq.* and 43 *et seq.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet trade turnover in these years. An official statement in 1952 placed the volume of Soviet trade at three times the pre-war turnover. The sizable expansion, against the steady decrease in trade with capitalist countries, prompted Stalin in 1952 to observe that "parallel world markets" coexisted, those of capitalism and of socialism. His analysis implied the basic advantage afforded the Soviet Union: the ability to manipulate the bloc in economic warfare with capitalism, thereby deepening the latter's crisis. But this analysis was not consistent with realities. It ignored a problem shared by all of the members of the bloc which belied Stalin's optimistic prediction that the bloc soon would not be in "need of imports" from capitalist countries.[20]

Although the Soviet Union assumed the position of a more advanced country promoting industrialization in the bloc-member states, it too had to contend with problems of its own industrial expansion. This involved a high degree of selectivity in which Soviet exports of equipment and materials to Eastern Europe had to be counterbalanced by imports from this region that would facilitate continued Soviet expansion. The commodity composition of intra-bloc trade bears this out.[21] Yet this expansion tended gradually to preëmpt the amount and types of available Soviet exports to Eastern Europe, and, later, to China. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union could not fill all the needs of Eastern Europe. Limited trade with the West had to be tolerated, precluding "self-sufficiency" for the bloc. Therefore, while Soviet trade with the West fell sharply and American trade with Eastern Europe likewise slumped, the trade between Eastern Europe and American allies in Europe was not as sharply affected. The 1948 volume of trade amounted to approximately $787 million, of which $334.4 million consisted of East European imports. The total turnover fell to about $700 million in 1952, but East European imports slipped only slightly to $333.6 million.[22]

[20] Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1952), pp. 26-30.

[21] A summary of the composition of Soviet–East European trade is in L. M. Herman, *Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.*, Report No. A-6, Council for Economic and Industry Research (Washington, 1954), pp. 18-36.

[22] Ninth Report to Congress, p. 93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The commodity composition of East-West trade underscored the hunger of the Soviet bloc for capital goods. More than half of the imports in 1950 consisted of transport equipment, machinery and vital raw materials. In fact, despite the relative decline of East-West trade after 1948, machinery imports to the bloc actually exceeded pre-war volumes.[23] The situation at the start of the 1950's was one in which a considerable expansion in the industrial base of the Soviet bloc was accompanied by an increase in foreign trade (notably intra-bloc), but not at a rate high enough to meet the continued need for capital goods.[24] There were indications that efforts were contemplated for coördinating the industrial expansion of bloc members in order to contend with this problem. But the similarity of import needs of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe made it obvious that capital goods had to be procured from the outside if the desired pace of industrial development was to be maintained, especially after China's entry into the bloc. Moreover, the industrial growth of the Soviet Union itself required greater flexibility in its programs and commitments. This was difficult to achieve under the restricted trade conditions which by 1951 reduced the West's exports of machinery and vehicles to the Soviet bloc to one third of what had been sent in 1948.[25] The trend could no longer be ignored by the Soviet Union. To these essentially economic considerations must be added the apparent tendency toward a reëvaluation of Soviet foreign policy begun during the course of the Korean War. Acute hostility toward the noncommunist world had reached a point of diminishing returns from the Soviet point of view. The Communist-sponsored "peace campaign" was followed by the first concrete indication of a possible shift when, in July 1951, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations broached the feasibility of an armistice in Korea.

23 U.N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe,* vol. III, No. 2, pp. 52 and 60.

24 U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1953* (Geneva, 1954), p. 61. In fact, the trade of Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria increased at a rate lower than that of industrial expansion. U.N., *World Economic Survey for 1955* (Geneva, 1956), p. 112.

25 The United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy and West Germany exported two thirds of all machinery to the Soviet bloc. British exports of this type fell from $37 million in 1948 to $8 million in 1951. U.N., *World Economic Report, 1950-1951* (New York, 1952), pp. 110-112.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Within the context of these considerations, the implied revision of the official Soviet attitude toward trade with capitalist countries that appeared in the latter part of 1951 is understandable. Soviet promotion of more commercial relations with the West as inaugurated at this time stressed "trade on mutually advantageous terms." The climax came in April 1952 when a Soviet-sponsored International Economic Conference was held in Moscow and Soviet spokesmen predicted the possibility of East-West trade expanding two or three times its size by 1955. Prospects of large-scale orders were held out to Western business men.[26]

The Soviet Union's effort was relatively inconsequential because its primary motive was to weaken the strategic controls of the West. Soviet offers of large orders for consumer goods were made dependent on increased shipments of strategic items. Since the licensing systems remained in effect, no major change in the East-West trade pattern occurred, although Soviet trade with Western Europe did show a slight increase.[27] This campaign, however, remained an early manifestation of the foreign policy reappraisal. There were indications of this even before Stalin's death. It was prompted by both Soviet achievements and failures and led to the policy of peaceful coexistence, subsequently refined. Although Soviet foreign economic activities may not be exclusively contingent upon foreign policy decisions, their frame of reference was conditioned by this reëvaluation.

The essence of Soviet foreign policy to about 1951 had been sharp and undisguised hostility toward capitalism. Two parallel developments prompted the Soviet consideration of alternatives. On one hand, the expansion of the Soviet Union's power reduced its hyperconscious desire for "security". Control of Eastern Europe now gave the Soviet Union a frontier in depth. China was an ally and the atom bomb had been in Soviet possession since 1949. These were positive factors pointing to greater strategic self-confidence.

Perhaps more influential in the direction of change was the adverse trend that excessively militant Soviet behavior

[26] A recount of Soviet views and actions on trade with capitalist states before and after 1951 is in L. M. Herman, "The New Soviet Posture in World Trade", *Problems of Communism*, vol. III, No. 6 (1954), pp. 9-16.

[27] U. N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, vol. V, No. 2, p. 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had created. The West was increasingly energetic in opposing Soviet actions. The success of the Marshall Plan was accompanied by a series of moves designed to effect greater political and military cohesion among Western allies. The rise of NATO and plans to incorporate West Germany into the alliance system were particularly undesirable from the Soviet point of view. The Korean War gave impetus to a determined and speedier rearmament in the West. Tactics more efficacious than the brusque methods of the cold war seemed necessary to stop this harmful trend.

III

Beginning in 1951, many of the harsher features of Soviet foreign policy were gradually scrapped. Stalin's interpretation of the world situation in 1952 stressed that antagonisms among capitalist states were becoming more intense than any between the West and the Soviet bloc. It followed that the large "socialist camp" should seek to reduce international tensions in order to exploit these intra-capitalist strains. Moves toward a *détente* between the West and the Soviet Union germinated.

Stalin's death did not alter the substance of this new orientation. His successors have intensified its implementation and the theme of coexistence has received wide coinage. The assurances and minor actions stressing the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union still seek to encourage centrifugal tendencies in the West for the ultimate disestablishment of the military defense system. Simultaneously, a new factor in international relations has developed with the recent appearance of an Afro-Asian bloc of nations. A primary Soviet aim has been the encouragement of neutralism among these states and support of any Afro-Asian interests bearing an anti-Western connotation. Broadly speaking, these constitute the fundamental features of the Soviet Union's new tactics in pursuit of traditional aims—the spread of its power and the cause of communism.

These simplified considerations impelling a change in Soviet foreign policy obviously have had an influence on Soviet foreign economic activities. Some of the innovations subsequent to Stalin's death, however, must also be viewed in the light of Soviet internal economic problems and condi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. An awareness of only the political motivations underlying the three major facets of Soviet foreign economic activities today—trade with the West, intra-bloc relations, and the policy toward underdeveloped countries—would be inadequate.

Soviet Economic Development

Several factors in the economy of the Soviet Union deserve attention in that they bear upon its foreign economic activities. In the relatively brief span of thirty years the Soviet Union has become the second industrial power in the world because of an unusually high rate of investments which have been concentrated on plant construction and heavy industry. Among other results of this program, the costs of industrial production have declined relative to the costs of nonindustrial production (extractive industries and agriculture). Nor has the latter matched the rate of growth of industrial production. It is also evident that the Soviet Union is not endowed with all the raw materials needed for continued industrial expansion. A shift appears to have been taking place in relative costs to the disadvantage of additional output in the agricultural and mineral sectors.[28]

The Soviet Union's rôle as supplier of vital raw materials for the industrialization of bloc members has added strains to its economy because its own advance requires a higher consumption of these same materials. From this standpoint, the Soviet Union is in a less advantageous position to continue traditional exports of raw materials and foodstuffs.[29] On the other hand, it can now export a relatively varied line of simple capital goods. While the current Soviet program toward underdeveloped countries may be preëminently inspired by political motives, this factor of economic feasibility supplements its strength. This ability means that Soviet activities may not be as constrained as they otherwise would be if political motivation alone supplied the impetus.

[28] R. L. Allen, "The Economics of Soviet Foreign Trade Policy", unpublished manuscript, 1957, and his "Soviet Russia and the Underdeveloped Countries: Trade and Aid", *World Today*, May 1957, pp. 207-219.

[29] Aspects of this problem are discussed in David Granick, "Economic Relations with the U. S. S. R.", *Resources and Planning in Eastern Europe*, edited by N. J. G. Pounds and Nicolas Spulber (Bloomington, 1957), pp. 129-149.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet an apparent paradox exists in the total trade turnover of the Soviet Union because it is still a net importer of capital goods. The considerable expansion of the industrial base notwithstanding, Soviet leaders plan greater industrial growth. However, the rate of growth of industrial production, averaging roughly 15 per cent annually before 1951, has been steadily declining. Estimates now place the annual rate between 8.7 per cent and 13 per cent. Before the Sixth Five-Year Plan was canceled, it stipulated a 10.5 per cent increase.[30]

This has a direct connection with the Soviet Union's desire to expand trade with the West because it must import certain types of capital goods which its own economy has not yet succeeded in producing economically. Soviet leaders also probably view trade as a device to arrest the decline in the rate of industrial growth and to eliminate shortages due to improper planning or failures in plan fulfillment. A realization of the greater value of trade seems apparent, beyond any political motivations. Finally, expanded trade with the West can likewise serve the avowed, but still frustrated, aim of raising the Soviet standard of living.

In terms of economic considerations alone, the picture that emerges is that the Soviet Union seeks expanded imports of capital goods from the West in exchange for exports that do not have a high priority, such as timber. Simultaneously, comparative selectivity enables the Soviet Union to export other types of capital goods to underdeveloped countries on an economic basis in exchange for desirable raw materials. Undue emphasis upon these factors should be avoided because Soviet foreign economic policy appears increasingly to be an adjunct of foreign policy. Yet equally necessary is the recognition that the economic aspect can be complementary.

Expansion of Trade with the West

A perceptible relaxation of tensions in 1953, along with Stalin's death and the emphasis rapidly given to the theme of

[30] *Cf.* D. R. Hodgman, *Soviet Industrial Production, 1928-1951* (Cambridge, 1954); *idem*, "Industrial Production", *Soviet Economic Growth*, edited by Abram Bergson (Evanston, 1953), pp. 225-245; J. A. Kershaw, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Economy", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1956, pp. 35-49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" coexistence ", created more favorable circumstances for the new leadership in resuming the campaign for increased East-West trade. A somewhat liberalized domestic policy, in which Malenkov's program for raising living standards was highlighted, may have had some influence in softening previous Soviet insistence on strategic imports. Soviet trade officials at the U.N.-sponsored trade conference in Geneva in April 1953 expressed a willingness to purchase more " soft " goods. Throughout that year increased Soviet activity resulted in trade agreements with countries previously having only limited contacts with the Soviet Union—for example, Argentina, Iceland, Greece, India.

These continuing Soviet efforts have been partially successful. Against the over-all expansion of Soviet trade with the noncommunist world, the volume of Soviet trade with Western Europe has shown substantial increases. The 1951 volume amounting to more than $400 million has been more than doubled in the last five years, to over $850 million. This growth has been abetted by the pressures of Western interests, which led to a downward revision of the list of items subject to Western embargo (from 260 to 170 categories by August 1954). Meanwhile, Eastern Europe's volume of trade with the West (including that between East and West Germany) experienced a similar expansion as total turnover by 1956 had risen over $500 million above the 1954 volume of approximately $1,225 million.[31]

The commodity composition of Soviet trade with the West reveals that much of this increase in Soviet imports consisted of consumer goods and materials, the value of which more than doubled in three years. However, Soviet imports of capital goods likewise rose, from about $130 million in 1952 to about $175 million in 1954, a reflection of the continuing needs of Soviet industrialization for capital imports of a more specialized nature. In fact, Soviet imports of machinery and equipment in 1955 comprised approximately one third of total imports, as they did in 1938.[32] Yet the increases

[31] U.N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe,* vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 45.

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 46; V. Alkhimov, " Growth of the U.S.S.R.'s Foreign Trade Ties ", *Partiinaia Zhizn,* No. 17 (1956), as condensed in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* vol. VIII, No. 48 (December 28, 1956), p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

registered since 1952 are apparently short of Soviet aims and hopes because a desire for more trade is still maintained by Soviet spokesmen.

Relaxation in Eastern Europe

A relative liberalization of Soviet economic relations with Eastern Europe since Stalin's death has been evident. The Soviet abandonment of crude exploitational practices, the increase of Soviet credits to bloc members, a decreased pace of industrialization, and greater East European trade with noncommunist countries have been major examples of the liberalization. But no one factor has been decisive in promoting this development. While this liberalization may stem partly from Soviet confidence and strength, it has also been conditioned by the peculiar features of the bloc's economies, by ferment in Eastern Europe, and by the Soviet recognition that the Stalinist system is incapable of resolving basic problems arising under new conditions.[33]

The short-lived "New Course" of 1953 publicly revealed the nature of Eastern Europe's economic difficulties. Relentless industrialization had led to sharp imbalances. Ineffective coördination accompanying the emphasis on heavy industry created "bottlenecks" and resulted in a deterioration of machines and quality of production. The depression of living standards stemming from a scarcity of consumer goods and inadequate agricultural production (due to underinvestment and the coercive feature of collectivization) affected labor productivity. In fact, the flow of foodstuffs and raw materials was jeopardized. The strains generated by these interdependent factors were considerably responsible for Soviet acquiescence in modifications that were adopted in order to redress some of the disproportions on a modest scale. This cannot be construed, however, as an indication of the abandonment of Soviet intentions to coördinate the economic development of the bloc. Efforts in this direction, under less stringent economic conditions, appear more energetic now than in Stalin's time.

[33] An analysis of Soviet attempts to emerge from the *cul-de-sac* of Stalinism is in Harvey Wheeler, "Problems of Stalinism", *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. X, No. 3 (September 1957), pp. 634-674.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Particularly evident since 1953 have been the changes in the volume and pattern of East European trade. Previous increases rested primarily on greater intra-bloc trade, but the Soviet campaign for expanded trade with the West effected parallel increases in Eastern Europe's trade with the non-communist world. Throughout 1955 and most of 1956, the rate of increase was greater than that of total East European trade or intra-bloc trade.

Western Europe continues to occupy the leading position in the non-bloc trade of East Europe, but the latter's trade with the Middle East more than doubled between 1953 and 1956.[34] Undoubtedly stimulated by Soviet political motivations, this also may reflect the pressures upon Soviet resources that have been exerted by the industrialization needs of Eastern Europe. To the extent that some of the East European states are able to export manufactured goods and equipment in exchange for needed raw materials from the Middle East, the Soviet Union is thus relieved from supplying such materials presently found in less abundance.[35] East European expansion of imports of capital goods from the West likewise serves the ultimate interest of the over-all Soviet program of industrializing the bloc. The increase of trade between East Europe and the free world over the last few years, at the expense of the concept of bloc "self-sufficiency", is clearly understandable in this connection. Nonetheless, the fundamental trade orientation has not been altered. Intra-bloc trade remains roughly two thirds of the total trade of Eastern Europe, and Soviet trade alone preëmpts 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the exports and imports.

Post-Stalin economic developments in the East European states reflected the degree of Soviet control established by 1953. Malenkov's "New Course" was imitated by bloc members before the year's end, and the Soviet announcement the following year stipulated that new economic plans of Eastern Europe were to be formulated with reference to the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1956. Khrushchev's return to an emphasis on heavy industry in 1955 had a parallel

[34] *Cf.* U.N., *World Economic Survey for 1956*, p. 249; *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, vol. IX, No. 2 (August 1957).

[35] R. L. Allen, *Middle Eastern Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Mainland China* (Charlottesville, 1958), p. 58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effect on the East European economic programs, and the Soviet decision to reduce the rate of industrial growth to the slight benefit of the consumer likewise brought corresponding decisions in Eastern Europe. Further evidence of Soviet intentions to press for the economic coördination of the bloc appeared in statements made at the Twentieth Party Congress in March 1956.[36] Planned industrial specialization by such bloc members was to remove the need for each state to develop all branches of industry. The May 1956 meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance held further deliberations along this line.

Meantime, Soviet leadership had apparently concluded that the more obvious forms of exploitation were now unnecessary or embarrassing. Throughout 1954 most of the joint-stock corporations in Rumania and Hungary were liquidated, a process completed in all of Eastern Europe by 1956, and Soviet-owned enterprises were returned to the East German régime.

Economic imbalances and the impact of de-Stalinization were among the factors leading to the dramatic events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. These had serious economic ramifications in Soviet–East European relations, most important of which was widespread disruption in economic programs. Failure of intra-bloc deliveries, along with a recognition that the enormous discontent had to be partly alleviated by a rise in the standard of living, brought a further downward revision in the rates of investment for heavy industry in all states. Soviet leaders appear to have recognized that it was no longer feasible to pursue politically determined objectives regardless of cost to bloc members. This recognition was quickly manifested in a more liberal treatment of Eastern Europe which appeared in the flurry of new agreements between the Soviet Union and bloc members. More Soviet credits were extended and quantities of foodstuffs shipped to the various states. In some cases, early debts to the Soviet Union were canceled or a moratorium granted.[37]

[36] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies* (New York, 1956), II, 38 and 83.

[37] Poland, Albania, Hungary and Rumania had debts canceled, the latter two based on their purchase of Soviet shares in joint-stock corporations that had been liquidated earlier. Based on information in *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, p. 18, and on compilations made by L. M. Herman and placed in *The Congressional Record*, vol. 103, No. 156, August 27, 1957.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet credits to Eastern Europe in 1956 and 1957 exceeded those granted during the previous decade, over $1,200 million as compared to less than $1,100 million.[38]

Current indications point toward a more reasoned Soviet treatment of Eastern Europe, but these in no way warrant speculation that the Soviet Union will permit its economic ascendancy to decline. Its plans for 1957 envisaged a 13 per cent increase in its East European trade, but of greater portent are the activities for economic coördination. The CEMA meetings in June and September of 1957 emphasized the coördination of national plans for a period of ten to fifteen years, and the groundwork for a multilateral bloc agreement on clearing trade payments has been announced. The nature and purpose of this coördination were defined to include the coördinated development of specific sectors and coöperation in production, that is, the application of an international division of labor.[39]

Soviet Policy Toward Underdeveloped Countries

The most striking development in Soviet foreign economic policy since Stalin's death, one that has provoked concern in the West, has been the economic offensive launched at the industrially backward states of Asia and Africa. Consonant with the posture of peaceful and competitive coexistence, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since 1953 have expanded their economic relations with these underdeveloped countries by capitalizing on the intense interest they have exhibited in rapid economic growth. Soviet disclaimers of ulterior motives emphasize the absence of political or ideological features in these relations and ascribe this increased activity to the simple desire of promoting cordial relations and peace.

38 *Ibid.* These instances of liberalization, of course, should be regarded for the most part as Soviet responses to actual political and economic debacles (as in the cases of Hungary and Poland), or as attempts to prevent such developments. The fact that the Soviet Union has condoned Polish credit negotiations with the United States rests on its recognition of the extreme straits in which Poland finds herself, as well as the political success of the Polish "October".

39 At the latter meeting in 1957, permanent secretariats were established in different capitals to expedite the work of committees concerned with the allocation of resources and materials, e.g., Warsaw (coal), Prague (engineering), Berlin (chemicals), Budapest (timber).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Credit grants for capital goods, arms and technical assistance and the expansion of trade through bilateral agreements have been the components of this program.[40] Agreements involving the equivalent of nearly $1.9 billion were concluded by the end of 1957, three fourths of which are with states in Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union has supplied over 50 per cent of these credits on lenient and attractive terms with flexible provisions: the repayment period usually extending from ten to thirty years and interest running from 2 to 2½ per cent.[41]

Offers of economic and military technical assistance have been an important feature, and by 1956 at least fourteen countries of Asia and the Middle East had such agreements with the Soviet bloc. Soviet and Czechoslovak specialists are the most numerous in these areas, while Egypt, Syria, India and Afghanistan are the leading recipients. For the most part, the increasingly ubiquitous Communist technicians have been active in large developmental projects. On the other hand, Soviet-bloc states are hosts to Asian students training as specialists. In the past year, over 2,000 technicians and students have gone to bloc countries for study and training.[42]

The expansion of Soviet-bloc trade with states in the Middle East and Asia can be seen in the increasing number of trade and payments agreements signed between 1953 and 1956. This number leaped from 29 to 89, and the Soviet

[40] Available data on this Soviet offensive to the end of 1956 can be found in Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and Their Implications for the United States* (Washington, 1957). A supplementary study prepared by the U.S. Department of State is reprinted in *The New York Times,* January 4, 1958.

[41] India, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan have received most bloc attention, with over 68 per cent of the aid committed to them. This program is sufficiently new to prevent any precise determination of the rate of utilization of these credits. However, approximately a year and a half after the Soviet credits of $145 million to Afghanistan had been offered, less than 10 per cent of them have been used. The $100 million loan to Indonesia offered in mid-1956 was accepted by the Indonesian Parliament in February 1958. Further details of this facet of Soviet-bloc activity are in R. L. Allen, "The Soviet and East European Foreign Credit Program", *The American Slavic and East European Review,* vol. XVI, No. 4 (December 1957).

[42] *New York Times,* January 4, 1958, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union alone, with agreements with only three states in 1952, had signed with seven others by 1956.

Admittedly, the increased trade has not been spectacular in terms of total aggregates or percentages for any of the parties involved. In fact, Soviet-bloc trade with Western Europe has been on a much greater scale. Only Iran, Afghanistan, Burma, Turkey and Egypt have more than 10 per cent of their trade with the Soviet bloc. But the significance rests on the substantial increases made in certain regions. Middle East imports from the Soviet bloc, for example, rose from 2.4 per cent to 3.6 per cent of total imports between 1952 and 1956; and exports to the Soviet bloc rose similarly, from 3.5 per cent to 4.6 per cent. Soviet-bloc selectivity has also been responsible for the persistent increases of particular imports from certain countries, such as cotton from Egypt and rubber from Ceylon. Equally revealing is that a larger share of this trade with underdeveloped countries rests with Eastern Europe than with the Soviet Union, indicating that the Soviet Union is prepared to go further than in the past in permitting Eastern Europe to fill its import gaps for raw materials from outside the bloc.

An appraisal of the motivations behind this offensive toward underdeveloped countries easily reveals the direct connection between the economic activity of the Soviet bloc and the fundamental aim of Soviet foreign policy, the extension of Soviet power under the banner of competitive coexistence. A strong economic position achieved either by significant trade or as a creditor nation would enable the Soviet Union to exercise more political influence upon the neutralist states. The pattern of the Soviet campaign already confirms the predominance of this political motivation.

However, economic factors must also be considered for a realistic appraisal of the strength of this Soviet offensive. While the Soviet Union has no abundance of capital goods for export and remains a net importer of them, its industrial base has expanded sufficiently to permit exports of certain simpler types of capital goods. The complex needs of further industrialization and the shift of relative costs of production in favor of industry because of the less advanced state of the nonindustrial factors make it economically feasible, even advantageous, for the Soviet Union to supply a market for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the primary products of underdeveloped states.[43] Concomitantly, the expansion of East European trade on the same basis relieves the pressures on Soviet resources. Therefore, these economic factors enhance the ability of the Soviet Union to sustain an economic campaign essentially motivated by political objectives.[44]

IV

In conclusion, the increased reliance of the Soviet Union upon foreign economic activities as a device for achieving political aims has been an outstanding feature of the post-war period. Except for the early years when its badly weakened economy and unstable world affairs dictated rapacious behavior, the foreign economic policy of the Soviet Union has been increasingly well planned, and its awareness of the efficacy of economic techniques more acute. This evolution has effected some changes in the official attitude toward the rôle of foreign economic policy. Under the impact of strategic decisions and the polarization of world politics, the pre-war hypothesis of "self-sufficiency" had to be expanded beyond the Soviet Union to embrace a bloc of states. Soviet foreign economic activities were no longer anchored in the concept of self-defense but assigned an aggressive mission—the creation of an economic bloc. Redirection of East European trade was but one facet of this development.

However, Soviet success along these lines posed other problems and created pressures that compelled a further modification of the autarkical premise. Despite undisputed control of Eastern Europe, the domestic recovery of the Soviet Union, and the addition of China as an ally, the bloc could not achieve self-sufficiency. Certain features of the Soviet economy and the burdens added by bloc industrialization required an expansion of trade with the rest of the world.

43 Despite such crosscurrents as the complex pattern of Soviet grain imports and exports in 1956, the Soviet Union remained a net importer of grain. Re-export of Egyptian cotton does not contradict the increased capacity to absorb such imports by Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the increased competition given Western Europe in textile industries. U.N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, vol. IX, No. 2, pp. 39 and 42-44.

44 The political motive, of course, makes unlikely continued Soviet generosity with long-term credit extensions to these countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The offensive of 1951 meant greater Soviet recognition of the values and effects of foreign trade. This coincided with the Soviet Union's reëxamination of its cold war foreign policy.

Since Stalin's death, the theme of coexistence has indicated a further expansion and correlation of Soviet foreign economic activities with foreign policy aims. The pressure for increased trade and the Soviet assistance program have been designed to aid in disrupting Western alliances, encourage neutralism and spread Soviet influence. Yet the desired benefit from more trade with the West and Soviet ability to increase exports of certain capital goods and imports of raw material have been complementary to the political motivations. Consequently, Soviet foreign trade more than doubled between 1950 and 1955. A continuation of present trends is highly probable.

In the final analysis, there is no evidence to suggest that Soviet foreign economic policy has dropped its pre-war orientation, that is, no inextricable economic ties with the world economy. But indications of structural changes in the Soviet economy and an acute consciousness of world trends predispose the Soviet Union to adopt more flexible economic techniques and a more liberal interpretation of autarky.

STANLEY J. ZYZNIEWSKI

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OIL FOR THE LAMPS OF ITALY

AS A RESULT of recent Italian oil ventures in the Middle East and Africa, the great government-controlled oil and natural gas organization of Italy, the *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*—generally called ENI—has moved front and center on the stage of international oil politics. ENI's new rôle is but an enlargement of the one it has been playing for some time within its own country, in an attempt to secure and maintain a controlling voice in the production of oil for Italy. Lined up against ENI on both stages have been the international oil companies and some of Italy's largest enterprises. Italian public opinion, though divided, has in general tended to support ENI.

The two opposing groups were so deadlocked in a struggle for control over oil and natural gas, both recently discovered in Italian soil, that Parliament was unable to enact much-needed oil legislation from 1951 to 1957. The new law which was placed on the statute books in the latter year appeared to give the victory to ENI, with the result that at least *Gulf Italia,* a subsidiary of Gulf Oil, withdrew from all attempts to find or extract oil on the Italian mainland. Since then the battle has continued outside Italy, notably in the Middle East and Africa. The international oil companies refused ENI the full partnership it sought in the consortium formed in 1954, after the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil properties in Iran, but in turn were discomfited by the terms that ENI gave in the agreement of 1957 with the National Iranian Oil Company. The pendulum of conflict has swung further, for in January 1958 the head of ENI, Enrico Mattei, accused the international oil companies, especially the American, of thwarting ENI's attempts to secure a concession for oil exploration in Libya. This the companies promptly denied, indicating that by the provisions of the Libyan petroleum law other companies besides ENI affiliates had been excluded.

The state of affairs can best be understood by knowing the background against which the struggle has been waged for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ENI to develop, the reasons for the great Italian demand for oil, and in particular the story of ENI itself: its ascent to power, the position it occupies in Italy today, and its effect on international politics. It is particularly important to try to understand Italian attitudes toward these matters as they so frequently differ in background and reasoning from American ones.

Sources of Energy—A Major Italian Problem

The rise of ENI is one response to the Italian need for oil from both domestic and foreign sources. That need can hardly be overstated, in view of Italy's poverty in sources of energy and her rapidly rising consumption of energy. Water as a source of hydroelectric power, which constitutes three quarters of the total electric power produced in Italy, exists in important amounts only in the North and has already been developed near its economic limit. Future electric power demands will have to be met increasingly by steam rather than hydroelectric stations and this steam power in turn will add to fuel needs except for the few stations using natural steam. Almost all Italy's coal is found in some minor poor-quality deposits in Sardinia, with high sulphur and low heating content. Though Italy has some oil of her own, her supply is but a drop in the large bucket of demand, while natural gas, discovered in quantity since the Second World War, also meets but a fraction of the country's energy requirements. Nuclear power plants will ultimately substitute heat generated by fission for that presently available in coal or oil, but, although nuclear energy for industrial purposes is further advanced in Italy than in many countries, it is not yet available. Meantime, Italy's energy consumption has doubled since 1949 because of a rising standard of living and increasing industrial production. Even the slowing down of the general rate of expansion of the Italian economy during 1956 did not affect the consumption of energy, which continued to increase at a higher rate than the preceding year.[1] It is estimated that the demands for energy will more than double again before the end of the next decade.

[1] ENI, *Annual Report and Balance Sheet*, 30th April 1957, p. 202. The unfavorable agricultural situation was mainly responsible for the decline.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is thus an increasing need for importation of fuel, adding heavily to the trade deficit and to the expenditure of foreign exchange. In 1956 the country produced only somewhat over a million tons of coal and imported nearly 11 million.[2] At the end of the Second World War, oil and gas had been discovered in the Po Valley in the North of Italy, but oil in significant quantities was found only in 1953, when *Gulf Italia* located a large pool of oil near Ragusa, Sicily. Two years later the total output of all Italy was barely 200,000 tons, of which 130,000 came from the Sicilian wells and the remainder from the peninsula.[3] Although in 1956 total production had jumped to over half a million tons, it was still so far from adequate that over 18 million tons had to be imported.[4] According to the Central Institute of Statistics, there was an increase in the trade deficit for petroleum products from somewhat over $187 million in 1955 to $246 million in 1956.[5] Were it not for the impressively large production of natural gas in Italy, imports of both coal and oil would have to be larger still. In 1956, for example, the 157 billion cubic feet of natural gas produced within the country [6] saved the importation of 6.6 million tons of coal. However, gas production, though increasing each year, cannot erase that part of the trade deficit caused by fuel imports.

The Suez crisis spotlighted Italy's dependence on oil imports and her need for developing her own sources of supply to as full an extent as possible. Of the somewhat over 18 million tons of oil imported in 1956, 8½ million would have normally moved through the Suez Canal, and 7 million by pipeline to the port of Saïda (Sidon), with a small balance

2 "Production, Imports and Stocks of Coal in Western Europe", *Economic Survey of Europe,* United Nations, 1957, Ch. III, Table 3, p. 6.

3 *Annuario Statistico Italiano,* 1956, Istituto Centrale di Statistico (Rome, 1956), p. 207.

4 "The Italian Government Economic Survey for 1956", *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review,* March 1957, No. 40, p. 114, quoting table of *Bollettino Mensile di Statistiche del Commercio con l'Estero,* Istituto Centrale di Statistica.

5 ENI, *Annual Report,* 1957, p. 111, quoting *Bollettino Mensile* and *Statistiche Petrolifere,* 1956, Unione Petrolifera.

6 *Servizio Studi,* AGIP-ROMA, quoted in *Review of Economic Conditions in Italy,* July 1957, Banca di Roma, p. 381.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coming from elsewhere. In addition to the advantage which Italy has in her comparative proximity to the sources of Middle Eastern supply, there is the added advantage in that payment for this oil is made in sterling, which helps conserve Italy's dollar balance.

ENI produces nearly all the natural gas but somewhat less than a quarter of the oil found in Italy. In 1956, the ENI output of gas was 93 per cent of the country's whole production, or more than 157 billion cubic feet,[7] but it supplied only some 135,000 tons of oil out of the total of somewhat over half a million produced in Italy.[8] By far the major part of the oil was located and produced by *Gulf Italia.* ENI's failure to find oil in significant quantities has been one reason for the serious criticisms of its work and has been a causal factor in its desire for overseas activities.

The Discovery of Gas—and Mattei

ENI's origins go back to the *Azienda Generale Italiano Petroli,* the Italian General Petroleum Corporation, generally known as AGIP, which was founded in 1926 by the Fascist government in its attempt to make good its policy of autarchy. State expenditures in the search for oil were centered in AGIP and a large grant of power was given it to engage in all activities relating to industry and trade in oil products. By the end of the Second World War, the total oil production of AGIP and private companies together amounted to only some 10,000 tons a year, all from the Po Valley. Natural gas was produced in small amounts and was largely compressed in tanks and used to propel trucks and cars.

With the coming of peace, the government took an unimpressed look at the small results obtained by AGIP and its seemingly dim future and ordered its Northern Director, Enrico Mattei, to liquidate the company. It is said that private companies could have bought AGIP for about a million dollars but there were no bidders. Mattei disregarded his instructions, retained his equipment and technicians,

[7] ENI, *Esercizio,* 1956-57; *Corriere della Sera* (Milan daily), Nov. 13, 1957, p. 14.

[8] ENI, *Esercizio,* 1956-57; *Servizio Studi,* AGIP. The ENI figures include gas condensates, so ENI's production of actual crude oil was materially less.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kept his political irons hot in Rome, and went ahead with prospecting. He proved to have been a good gambler, for, in late 1945, AGIP found a large natural gas field at Caviaga, near Milan.

Enrico Mattei is one of Italy's ablest but most controversial figures today. The son of a *carabiniere,* Mattei at fifteen was working as an apprentice in a leather factory; barely four years later he was the head of a tannery with about 50 employees. He became known in World War II because of his courage as a leader of the Catholic partisans in Northern Italy. While it is true that he attained eminence first via the political route, it is also true that he is that rarity in Italy, a top executive who rose from the ranks. A combination of brilliant organizer and extraordinary administrator, as well as a clever politician, he is more than any one of the three alone. A member of Parliament until 1953, he was forced to choose between it and his position in the government oil and gas agency. He took the latter, for he is a "doer" and aggressive promoter who has had the ability to make his dreams of industrial empire come true. Even most of his enemies admit that he runs a live and well-managed organization. For all his power, he lives simply and unostentatiously, finances an orphanage in the town from which he came, and has such an exuberant and boyish delight in fishing that he ranks catching salmon in Alaska as one of his notable achievements.

Mattei is frequently criticized for high-handedness. In the early days after the discovery of natural gas, when he could not call upon a law of eminent domain in laying the pipelines to carry the gas where industry needed it, he is reported to have slashed his way ahead, leaving some nine thousand broken local ordinances which required the issuance of permits. He got the job done quickly and well in a country where the wheels of bureaucracy grind so slowly that they sometimes fail to grind at all, but many people question the means by which he reached his end. His reluctance to be crossed appears equally clearly in Iran where he has shown that if he cannot obtain his ends by one means, he will by another. Numerous charges besides high-handedness are directed at Mattei, but most of the others are basically criticisms

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the policies and monopolistic power of ENI under his leadership. These criticisms will be discussed later.

Under Mattei's leadership, AGIP discovered various natural gas fields in the Po Valley, all near the hub of Italy's heaviest industrial concentration and so in the midst of the largest potential market. As the importance of the gas finds became apparent and as hopes rose that discovery of oil would follow, the government was deluged with applications to prospect for oil and gas. Standard Oil of New Jersey, which had long wanted to become "a contented Jersey grazing in the fertile plains of the Po",[9] is reported to have asked for exclusive prospecting rights for the largest part of the whole valley. Shell and some of Italy's great industries, such as Montecatini Chemical and Milan Edison, Italy's largest power company, made similar requests. A host of firms, large, medium and small, independently or in combination, followed suit. So great was the rush that the government, doubtless not without political pressure, threw its hands up and refused to allow any of the applicants to come into the Valley.

By now Mattei had become the head of AGIP, with increased public recognition and public backing. He pushed further exploration of the Po Valley until, after several outwardly uneventful years, the large Ripalta gasfield was discovered in 1948. The next year came new fields at Cortemaggiore, where oil is also found in small quantities and from which comes part of the much-advertised *Supercortemaggiore* brand of high-test gasoline, known by its picture of a six-legged black animal with a flaming tongue. After further new finds, the largest gas field yet located was tapped in 1953 at Ravenna on the Adriatic coast. Although ENI has opened up some small gas fields near Catania in Sicily, all the great fields are in the Po Valley and all except Ravenna are close together.

Construction of pipelines to transport the gas was a logical step for the government agency to undertake as new fields were added to the supply. The *Società Nazionale Metanadotti,* the National Gas Pipelines Company, familiarly known

[9] Herbert Solow, "The Biggest Capitalist in Italy", *Fortune,* July 1954, p. 162.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as SNAM, was organized as an AGIP affiliate to accomplish this. By the end of 1956, SNAM had developed 2,800 miles of pipeline, the longest in Europe.

The present pricing policies for natural gas provide funds to assist the government oil and gas combine in financing further explorations in Italy and elsewhere, including the Middle Eastern and African ventures. Though produced at low cost, gas in Italy sells at a price based on the equivalent heating value of coal or fuel oil, whichever is lower, rather than on the cost of production of the gas itself. High prices also assure rapid amortization of the cost of pipelines, in consideration of the mere 27 years which the proved gas reserves are expected to last at the present rate of production.[10]

By 1952 the success of AGIP in finding natural gas in the Po Valley not only brightened the whole Italian industrial picture but also worked in favor of legalizing the *de facto* monopoly AGIP had obtained when the government held up the issuance of further permits for Po Valley exploration. In 1953 the government agency was given the legal monopoly for all oil and gas development in the Po Valley, except for concessions already granted in the Po Delta.

The major part of the Po Valley gas is dry, almost pure methane. Whether oil is present in the ground in real quantities is still in question. Thus far, the government monopoly insists that the gas exists for the most part without oil, but various companies which worked permits in the Po Valley in the past think that it holds promise for oil. Disappointment at the government monopoly's failure for many years to find oil was only temporarily lessened by some small finds at Parma in 1957. Prodded by the veteran statesman, Senator Don Luigi Sturzo, by the efforts of various oil companies to obtain admission to the Po Valley, by the withdrawal of *Gulf* from the Italian mainland after the passage of the 1957 oil law, and by mounting criticism of the government oil monopoly in the winter of 1957-1958, the Italian Cabinet proposed the reopening to private enterprise of certain areas of the Po Valley—but only of areas to be selected by the government oil concern itself.

[10] Italian underground gas reserves are officially estimated at more than 5,700 billion cubic feet, equivalent to about 27 years' production at the 1957 rate of 157 billion cubic feet. *Petroleum Press Service*, October 1957, p. 389.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Development and Organization of ENI

The law of 1953 which established the government monopoly of oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Po Valley set up the *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi* as a new government agency, with Mattei at its head and AGIP as one of its subsidiaries. In addition to its exclusive rights in the Po Valley, ENI is given the power of operating in the rest of Italy in competition with other oil companies. Above all, in words reminiscent of the Fascist grant of power to AGIP, ENI is authorized to engage in any activities of national interest in the field of hydrocarbons. This large grant of power, coupled with Mattei's brilliant leadership and the vast funds secured from the sale of natural gas, has enabled ENI to move forward into a veritable empire stretching beyond the confines of Italy.

Among its enterprises, the ENI complex includes: the AGIP chain of retail gasoline and oil distribution, whose filling stations, newly designed in ultra-modern style, dot the landscape, dispense a fifth of all gasoline and oil sold in Italy, and now run modern motels; the largest bottled gas distribution system in the country, AGIPGAS; the largest refineries, which processed nearly a quarter of all the oil refined in Italy in 1956; plants for the manufacture of lubricants, chemicals, dyestuffs and asphalts; a fleet of eleven oil tankers, including two ocean-going vessels, with still more large and small ships to come; natural steam power production; manufacture of oil-well machinery; and hundreds of miles of pipeline to carry gas from the wells to its ultimate destination. Near Milan, at San Donato, ENI has built a multi-million-dollar development, the City of Methane, with apartment houses, recreation centers, warehouses, shops, great garages, and a large, well-equipped motel. Here is the hub of the gas distribution system and near here is ENI's research center.

As its activities have grown, ENI has developed a corporate structure which is an arrangement of wheels within wheels. Its numerous subsidiaries are a veritable nightmare of alphabetical symbols. With the creation of ENI, the exploration for, and production of, oil and gas were removed from AGIP's control and placed in a new subsidiary, AGIP-Mineraria, almost wholly owned (99.75 per cent) by ENI. AGIP itself was reorganized into a sales and distribution organization for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oil products for the entire ENI group and has become the second subsidiary, owned 60 per cent by ENI and 20 per cent each by two government insurance organizations. The third subsidiary, SNAM, entirely owned by ENI, has built the impressive pipeline system. The fourth ENI subsidiary is ANIC (*Azienda Nazionale Idrogenazione Combustibili*), in which are centered the new ENI chemical interests in synthetic rubber and fertilizer. ENI owns just over half of ANIC stock (51.025 per cent) while the remainder is held by a large number of private stockholders. The fifth and newest of the pillars of the ENI empire is AGIP-Nucleare, owned half by SNAM and half by AGIP-Mineraria, which is carrying out the ENI program for the use of nuclear energy for industrial purposes. AGIP-Nucleare in turn has joined with the great government holding company, the *Istituto Ricostruzione Industriale* (IRI) in the formation of the *Società Italiana Meridionale Energia Atomica* (SIMEA) for the construction and operation of a nuclear power station in Southern Italy. AGIP-Nucleare has provided three quarters of the capital and IRI one quarter.[11]

The ENI organization is heavily involved in " mixed ownership ", part government and part private capital, common in Italy and baffling to most outsiders. Government ownership and private ownership have here become strange bedfellows. Of the many possible examples, one may cite the following: IROM (*Industria Raffinazione Olii Minerali*), a large refinery owned 51 per cent by AGIP and 49 per cent by British Petroleum, in which incidentally the British government has the controlling interest; the STEI (*Società Termo Elettrica Italiana*) power plant near Milan, owned in equal fifths by AGIP, the Milan Municipal Power plant and the industries of Montecatini Chemical, Milan Edison and the Falck steel works; ANIC, the ENI subsidiary concerned with chemicals, which owns half of the STANIC refinery properties, while Standard Oil of New Jersey owns the other half, as the name compounded of Standard and ANIC indicates; and the former German chemical concern of A. E. Bianchi, of which ANIC owns just over half (51 per cent) and Monte-

[11] The IRI holdings are subdivided among three companies of the IRI group. See ENI, *Annual Report*, 1957, p. 113.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

catini just under half (49 per cent). There are many other alphabetical horses in the stable of ENI's mixed enterprises, for in Italy this type of organization has been a favored means of securing private capital for government enterprises and vice versa. The dangers of such combinations are beginning to be seen, however, for the 1957 Italian oil law forbids ENI to join with private enterprises in a mixed ownership arrangement to carry out oil prospecting or exploration.

Two of ENI's largest domestic ventures, both farseeing, important and ambitious, involve the gas fields near Ravenna. These fields, with large proved reserves, are nevertheless located far from any sizable existing market. ENI decided to take the mountain to Mahomet by locating at Ravenna its chemical plant using gas as a raw material. The plant, constructed by the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation and the Phillips Petroleum Company, both American concerns, is the largest factory in Europe for the production of synthetic rubber. The first test run, produced in mid-December 1957, was a harbinger of the 55,000-60,000 tons of annual output which is planned, beginning in 1958.[12] Synthetic rubber is not only a new product for Italy, but one in great demand in Western Europe generally. Ravenna, once a proud seat of empire but long since sunk into decay and removed from the sea by the silting of the River Po, is taking on a new lease of life as the new factory employs some of the city's former unemployed. Not only Ravenna but the whole Italian economy will benefit from the production of the rubber and from possibilities in the new plant for other synthetic products, such as plastics, hitherto dependent on chemicals that come from coal.

The Ravenna plant will also manufacture nitrogenous fertilizer, so essential in Italy's attempt to raise her agricultural activity. Fertilizer consumption is less per acre in Italy than in any other country of Western Europe. ENI claims that the 650,000 tons of fertilizer which it plans to produce annually[13] at Ravenna can be sold at prices substantially below present levels, even though ENI will charge itself the same rate for natural gas as other chemical concerns pay. ENI further insists that this competition will even-

[12] ENI, *Esercizio*, 1956-57. [13] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tually result in a general reduction of fertilizer prices which in turn will cause increased output.

ENI has stretched its mandate for "activities of national interest in the field of hydrocarbons" to include nuclear energy, which can at least be said to be "of national interest". In view of Italy's acute energy shortage, ENI is pushing the completion of two nuclear electric plants, one each in the North and South of Italy. One will begin to function in 1962.

A highly publicized accomplishment of ENI was taking over the bitterly strike-ridden Pignone textile machinery plant of Florence in 1953, after first the workers and then the mayor of the city, Giorgio LaPira, had occupied the factory in an attempt to prevent its closing. With its machinery changed to that for the manufacture of oil drills and other products used by ENI, the old plant, renamed the New Pignone, now makes cylinders for ENI bottled gas, gas compressors and drills. In March 1957 the New Pignone turned over to AGIP the first great oil drill it had built under license of the Dresser Industries of Texas.

The great kingdom of ENI is not only wide in scope and impressive in physical plant but by any standard is big business, comprising 48 subsidiary companies. As of 1957, ENI's total assets amounted to $172.8 million, with its net worth placed at $67.6 million and its profit for the year at $7.3 million.[14] Some observers, however, put ENI's true worth at between $1 and $2 billion, as they presumably question the basis on which the stocks of ENI's subsidiary companies have been valued and particularly the valuation given ENI's natural gas reserves in the Po Valley. In any case, as Italian accounting practice varies considerably from that in the United States, and as ENI is a public corporation, it is difficult to assess ENI's reported figures by American standards.

Even in Italy, ENI's budgets provoke constant criticism. As presented to Parliament, the budgets are more in the nature of annual reports of activities than detailed estimates for future expenditures, and frequently appear designed to conceal, not reveal, ENI's financial position. Friends of ENI

[14] ENI, *Annual Report*, 1957, pp. 173-178, "Balance Sheet at 30th April 1957" and "Comments on Some Items of the Balance Sheet", pp. 155-167.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

point out that in this ENI is similar to private businesses in Italy, and that ENI should not be blamed for accounting defects inherent in the Italian system of administration, both public and private. Certainly, however, a government concern should be a leader in careful accounting practices.

The Oil Law—ENI vs. Private Capital and the International Oil Companies

The struggle for control over Italian oil has taken place largely in the legislative arena, where ENI and the international oil companies have maneuvered for position and dominance. According to Italian law, mineral deposits of whatever kind under the surface of the land belong to the government. No landowner can prevent drilling on his property by anyone with a permit for exploration from the government, nor does the landowner share any possible profits, though he may receive damages for injury to his property. The crux of the parliamentary battle in Italy has been the issuance of permits for concessions and the amount of royalty to be paid the government.

Sicily, by virtue of its semi-autonomous position under the Italian Constitution, was able to enact its own oil legislation. Its law of 1950 provides substantial encouragement to private industries to enter the search for oil. In 1957, however, ENI secured a favored position in Sicily, in practice if not in law. By the terms of the ENI concession granted that year, the Sicilian government receives 25 per cent of the shares of the producing companies to be formed if oil is found, in addition to standard payments under the law.

The opposition between the respective advocates of the private and public oil companies was so bitter that it took six years to fight the parliamentary battle which culminated in the passage of the oil and gas law of January 6, 1957, applicable to all of Italy except the Po Valley and Sicily. Together with limitations on the amount of land that may be acquired by any one company, the law reserves to the government a narrow strip of land surrounding each concession. These strips are put up at auction, as are concessions which for one reason or another have been abandoned. Royalty payments are based on a sliding scale according to the daily

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

output per well, starting at 2½ per cent and ranging up to 22 per cent. The private companies claim that, when income taxes are added, total payment amounts to over 50 per cent.

ENI is in a preferred position under the law on several counts. Limitations on the size of the areas for which applicants may receive licenses for prospecting and concessions do not apply to it. Royalties from private companies may be paid in kind if the government so decides and in this case the oil or gas is channeled to ENI. Under some conditions, ENI may be allotted corridors or other valuable areas.

As a result of bitter wrangling, the private companies also won certain advantages. ENI is not allowed to bid at the auctions, nor did it secure the 60-40 division of profits for which it had fought as a way of driving out the private companies. But the victories of the private companies were not enough to offset what they considered the discrimination against them. Soon after the passage of the law, *Gulf Italia* carried out its threat of withdrawing from the Italian mainland and continuing operations only under the more favorable Sicilian law.

ENI and Middle Eastern Oil

In various parts of the Mediterranean world, including France, Spain, Egypt, Lebanon and Iran,[15] and extending as far south as Somaliland, ENI is at work. It is searching for oil, selling it or shipping it back to Italy, building pipelines and selling bottled gas as far East as Pakistan. Agreements with Yugoslavia and Ethiopia are also being negotiated.

ENI's activities in Egypt and Iran, however, are the ones which have placed it in the spotlight of international oil politics. ENI secured entry into the Egyptian oil picture by buying the lion's share of the existing International Egyptian Oil Company (IEOC). This company in turn has a controlling interest (51 per cent) in the *Compagnie Orientale des Pétroles d'Egypt,* which is owned to the extent of just under half (49 per cent) by two Egyptian government agencies and which has important concessions in the Sinai penin-

[15] See Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, "Italian Oil and the Middle East", *Foreign Policy Bulletin,* Feb. 1, 1958, vol. 27, No. 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sula. ENI has estimated that the output of the Sinai wells will reach two million tons this year,[16] of which over a million tons will go to Italy. ENI has acquired other interests in Egypt, including SNAM's pipeline construction and AGIP-Mineraria's refinery and gasoline stations, which sell both gasoline and bottled gas.

The most important aspect of the Egyptian agreement is its partnership arrangement with local government interests at the operating level, which paved the way for developments in Iran. In Lebanon, a similar pattern was followed in the formation of a company for the marketing of liquid gas, the Gaz Orient Company, half of whose capital comes from ENI and the other half from the Lebanese government.

Negotiations between AGIP-Mineraria and the Iranian government were secretly undertaken in August 1956, when the battle in Italy between ENI and the private oil companies over the division of profits under the proposed oil law was at its height. On March 14, 1957, AGIP-Mineraria signed an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the nationalized oil concern that had formerly belonged to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A new company, the *Società Irano-Italiana dei Petroli* (SIRIP), was established on a 50-50 basis as a joint company to carry on oil prospecting and development in three areas of Iran close to fields already richly producing.

The exceedingly complex agreement is a departure from the types made by the international oil companies with Iran and other Middle Eastern oil countries. In those agreements, the oil company either pays a lump sum on assignment of the concession or else agrees to pay annual rent throughout the period of exploration for oil, or both. The Iranian-Italian agreement, on the other hand, provides that the Italian partner will pay the costs of exploration and SIRIP will enter the agreements only when and if oil is found; then SIRIP will pay half the cost of operations. AGIP-Mineraria, supplying its personnel and equipment, agrees to expend $6 million for the first four years of the life of the agreement and $2 million a year for the next eight years, but may withdraw any time after the end of the first four years.

[16] *Petroleum Press Service*, October 1957.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The provisions for division of profit have caused a furor. The 50-50 principle, introduced by the oil companies in Venezuela in 1943,[17] was taken to the Middle East in 1950 when it was applied in Saudi Arabia, to the consternation of the British who were paying a much lower percentage in Iraq. Since then, the 50-50 division has become the common standard of oil agreements so that, after payment of taxes and royalty, profits are divided on a 50-50 basis between the contracting oil company and the government from whose country the oil comes. The Italian contract with Iran outwardly conforms to that standard, but actually there is more to it than meets the eye. Although the Iranian government is given half the net profits, the other half is divided between the two partners in SIRIP in proportion to the capital held by each. As AGIP-Mineraria and NIOC each holds half, each secures 25 per cent; but as NIOC is a government corporation, theoretically at least the Iranian government receives 75 per cent of the profits. There are enough discounts and exceptions, however, to make the 75 per cent less advantageous economically than it seems at first blush. In any case the share of the profits is only part of the story. For instance, two of ENI's concessions are offshore, where the costs of drilling a well are high, and the third concession is so far from the coast that if oil is found in it, it will be necessary to build a long pipeline to get the oil as far as the sea.

ENI's willingness to take in a Middle Eastern country on a basis of partnership may prove more important in the future than the division of profits. The political implications of both are possibly more important than their economic aspects. They are being used as the basis of contracts now in process of negotiation in other parts of the Mediterranean world.

The Pros and Cons of ENI

ENI, like Mattei, has its bitter opponents and ardent advocates in Italy. It seems fair to say that a large segment of public opinion in Italy regards its activities favorably. Even its enemies admit it is not just another bumbling bureauc-

[17] Leonard M. Fanning, *Foreign Oil and the Free World* (New York, 1954), p. 82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

racy. It has put into effect many changes advocated by the survey of its organization made by an American management firm in 1955. The next year ENI instituted a five-day work week in its oil, gas and chemical activities, although the six-day week is still the rule in Italy. ENI personnel is not part of the Italian public administration and so has been recruited for ability and efficiency and is paid accordingly instead of as civil servants.

Many Italians take satisfaction in ENI's accomplishments and are pleased that their government's own oil company has secured new sources of oil for Italy in other countries, thereby reducing the amount of foreign exchange expended for purchases of oil. ENI's success in finding and exploiting the natural gas in the Po Valley makes a subconscious if not a conscious appeal to Italian nationalism, and ENI's Middle Eastern and African activities furnish a renewed sense of power to Italy in the Mediterranean world.

On the other hand, many other Italians are critical of ENI's expansion outside the country and believe the big profits earned in natural gas should be invested in Italy herself, where there is great capital shortage, especially in the South. In spite of ENI's record in the development of natural gas, moreover, there are many people who criticize its high price; there are those who say ENI is more interested in exploiting gas than finding oil, and that the exploitation is to the detriment of possible oil deposits. Certainly the criticism is true that ENI has had a poor record in finding oil in Italy in comparison to private industry.

The arguments put forth by ENI's critics tend generally to support the many private companies who wish to share in the finding and exploitation of Italian oil and who look askance at the ENI contracts around the Mediterranean and especially in Iran and Egypt. The critics stress the fact that drilling for oil is more often unrewarding than otherwise, and that no one company can have enough money or equipment to cover even the Po Valley completely. They argue that it is not the function of government, certainly in a country with as high a budgetary deficit as Italy, to risk public funds in the hunt for oil. This objection raises questions as to the fundamental purposes of government, concerning

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which opinions differ greatly in Italy. In many quarters, however, there is a growing distrust of the power and wealth of ENI and of the "statism" inherent in such an arrangement of government-in-business. Italy has long had such organizations, notably the *Istituto Ricostruzione Industriale* or IRI, which controls a large amount of Italian industrial production and a sizable cross section of the nation's economy. The mounting fear of government participation apparent in many places in Italian life reflects distrust of IRI as well as ENI. This fear is given particular point by the new nuclear agency for industrial uses, SIMEA, owned by IRI and ENI.

Political parties have been sharply divided within their own ranks in their attitudes toward ENI. Among the Christian Democrats, the mass Catholic party, a wide variety of views from Left to Right can be found. Their Left, including the new Minister of State Participation, Senator del Bo, is inclined to view ENI with an auspicious eye, while the party Right, including Foreign Minister Pella, views it with a drooping one. Not only do those on the Right wish the whole picture to be painted with the oils of private initiative, but they fear the effect on Italian foreign policy of ENI's foreign ventures.

The Social Democrats, or Right-wing Socialists, favor state control but their Right is critical of ENI and Mattei. The Republicans, the mavericks of the Centre, logical and intellectual, have criticized ENI for joining hands with private enterprise in "mixed companies". The Liberals, strong advocates of laissez faire, generally regard ENI with little favor. The aged statesman, Senator Don Luigi Sturzo, the brilliant founder of the Popular party (the forerunner of the Christian Democrats) and now strongly opposed to any government operation or control, has engaged in a long-drawn-out battle with Mattei in the public press and in the halls of Parliament. The winter of 1957-58 brought a particularly bitter contest when Senator Sturzo attacked ENI's expenditure of government funds for advertising purposes.

To the Communists and Left-wing Socialists, ENI represents an entering wedge into the nationalization of industry and so in general is welcome. Their logic is far from impec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cable, however. In 1950 their workers in the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor, the CGIL, protested against the banning of private enterprise in the Po Valley for fear of increased unemployment. In the hope of promoting opportunities for work, the Left voted for the passage of the Sicilian oil law favoring private enterprise, though they have sometimes regretted their stand.

To some Italians who are neither Socialists nor Communists, oil exploration and exploitation by ENI both within and outside Italy represent an anchor to windward in the, to them, new and unfamiliar sea of oil. Basically they trust neither the international oil companies nor their own large industries. The defense of competition, they feel, lies in a concept strange to American ears—the formation of public monopolies such as ENI, which alone can be powerful enough to compete with the giants of private enterprise and thus, according to their view, safeguard the public interest. Some of these opponents of the international oil companies fear they might shut down their Italian wells in a time of depressed world prices, though the oil companies insist the need of the Italian economy for oil is so great as to prevent such a move. Others of this group of opponents are beginning to change their minds and see in the pro-ENI aspects of the 1957 oil law the danger that the experience of the international oil companies will be totally lost to the Italian mainland, as witness the withdrawal of *Gulf* from any activity there.

If, as is frequently asserted, it is true that ENI has little direction by responsible parliamentary authorities, it will be increasingly difficult, as ENI's power grows, to keep it within the lines of Italian domestic or foreign policies if ENI believes its interests lie in a different path. ENI claims that the laws give the government entire control over the policies of its management; ENI's critics insist, however, that there is no real effectiveness to these controls, for they are subject to political pulls. The Ministries and Parliament to date have tended to keep their hands off an organization which is profitable, effective, generally high in public regard, and run by as dominant a man as Mattei. The Italian Parliament, furthermore, has no real parallel to the procedure of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congressional inquiry and has less ability to dig out with any degree of speed the whole story of governmental and business activities. If the ENI empire, stretching overseas and into the nuclear field, continues to expand and grow in power with less than adequate scrutiny by Parliament into either its fields of operation or its finances, it alone could bring the young Italian democracy to grief. Even a man so opposed to the international oil companies as Professor Ernesto Rossi has seen this danger and President Gronchi, left of center in many of his sympathies, appears to be beginning to wonder if the handwriting may be on the wall.

While Italy has barely wet her feet in the pool of Middle Eastern oil, ENI has waded in far enough to cause more than mere political ripples. As a newcomer in Middle Eastern oil operations, ENI has had no position to protect and little reason to be careful of the position of the major oil companies. The latter, as noted earlier,[18] had seen no reason to give ENI the share it wanted in the international oil consortium in 1954. While Mattei is far from being without rancor at this, he also sincerely believes himself charged with the task of seeing to it that Italy's oil requirements are met from his own country and abroad. He believes that, by providing what he considers advantageous terms to an oil-producing country, he is more apt to secure a steady supply of oil for Italy than otherwise, and at what he thinks will be a lower cost.

Mattei is, however, fully aware of the important political implications of the Iranian-Italian agreement and he is anxious to win friends and influence people in the Mediterranean world, regardless of whether his moves may upset the delicately balanced apple cart of Italian foreign policy and start a foreign policy of his own. Perhaps the most important feature of ENI's agreements with Middle Eastern and African countries is their demonstration of ENI's willingness to take these countries in as partners. Such actions have great political appeal at a time when Arab and other Middle Eastern and African nationalisms are on the rise. In so far as these agreements appeal to the emotional nationalism on which communism battens, they are dangerous. If, on the

[18] See *supra*, p 234.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other hand, they might be the beginning of a new deal in the much-disturbed Middle East, they might contain the germ of advantages for peace in that section of the world. While many Italians believe that the international oil companies not only have taken profits from the Middle East but have contributed to its welfare in a marked degree, there are also many others who believe they must go further. Walter Lippmann has pointed out that the United States must aim at an accord in the Middle East which will at one and the same time promote an independence and neutrality of the Middle Eastern states and assure European access to the oil.[19] He believes that this essential basis of improved understanding may be found in a new arrangement about the oil that will grant more favorable terms to the Arab countries. Some Italians see in the Middle Eastern activities of ENI a beginning of such terms, while others see in them a danger to the whole Western world of which Italy must remain a part.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY
ANDREW GALBRAITH CAREY

NEW YORK, N. Y.

19. Walter Lippmann, "The Vicious Circle in Syria", *New York Herald Tribune*, November 24, 1957.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRITISH REACTIONS TO AMERICAN IMPERIALISM REFLECTED IN JOURNALS OF OPINION 1898-1900

"AS THE British Foreign Office ultimately conforms to public opinion, of which it stands in exaggerated awe, the opinion of the ordinary Englishman on matters of foreign policy is of no little importance." The view here expressed in the *National Review* of August 1900, though somewhat overstated, contains sufficient validity to warrant a closer study of British public opinion in relation to foreign policy than it has hitherto been accorded. There can be no doubt that foreign policy in a democracy is profoundly influenced by articulate opinion, whether in a negative sense of imposing a veto on a contemplated course of action or in the rarer positive sense of stimulating the adoption of a particular outlook; and at all times the climate of opinion, affecting members of governments and civil servants as well as "the ordinary Englishman", is a basic influence on policy.

During the years after 1898, Anglo-American relations became increasingly close and fundamentally amicable, while Anglo-German relations became increasingly suspicious and discordant. On the surface, Britain had as much reason to fear the growth of American as of German power; or, conversely, as much reason to seek German as American friendship. In 1898 it was after all America, rather than Germany, that seemed likely to become Britain's most powerful, and potentially most dangerous, imperial and naval rival; yet Anglo-American relations grew closer, and actions which if perpetrated by Germany, or any other Power, would have incited a fearful denunciation in Britain were condoned or even praised when performed by the United States. It is not without significance that from 1898 British informed opinion was preponderantly well disposed toward the United States, and suspicious and hostile toward Germany, and that there was created a climate of opinion conducive to associ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ation with the United States and antagonistic toward Germany. It is the purpose of this article to analyze and assess, and where possible to explain, the attitude of British informed opinion toward American imperialism in the years 1898-1900.

In 1898 British opinion in general—though there were some conspicuous exceptions—chose to regard American intervention in Cuba as wholly admirable, and in no sense a threat to British interests; whereas similar action taken by any other Power would have been condemned as immoral and regarded as a warning of a future threat to the safety of the nation. Recent American action with regard to Britain's controversy with Venezuela might have seemed to serve as a warning of the danger of a more powerful America; with the prospect imminent of a rapid upsurge of American power it seemed to have been forgotten. Instead, there was shown considerable satisfaction at the fact that the power of the United States in relation to Britain was growing.

It is unnecessary to illustrate at any length the widespread approval in Britain of the advent of the United States as a major world—and imperialist—Power. Though American policy in 1898 and after had its vociferous critics in Britain, it is quite clear that the great bulk of informed opinion was highly sympathetic toward the American venture in Cuba and the Philippines, and that despite not infrequent rolls of distant thunder the climate of opinion was friendly to American expansionism. The view of Edward Dicey that American imperialism gave "promise of gain rather than loss to our own country"[1] was the predominant opinion; and the strong emotional sympathy felt for American imperialism rendered resistance to it by the government politically inexpedient.

More interesting than to illustrate the extent of British approval of American policy is to examine the reasons for it. The attitudes of British sympathizers can conveniently be placed into three main categories—rational, emotional (which may include mystical) and practical. Arguments which may be termed "rational" were based on theories of "historical inevitability" which not only strengthened the case of those

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV (1898), 501.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who welcomed American expansion but also led many critics to a reluctant acceptance of it as something which could not be prevented and therefore must be accepted with as much grace as their nature would allow. Arguments termed "emotional" were based on ideas of racial affinity and of moral responsibility for human welfare, and usually implied rather than stated a common political and cultural heritage. The "practical" arguments which were put forward concerned mainly matters such as mutual aid in foreign and commercial policies and against common external dangers. It is worth noting that the "rational" and especially the "emotional" categories contained factors peculiar to the Anglo-American relationship; whereas the "practical" arguments could apply, sometimes more effectively, to other nations, especially to Germany.

Arguments of the "historical inevitability" type maintained that the United States had reached a stage in its development when overseas expansion was to be expected—that this was "'mysteriously' imperative".[2] Attempts were made to show that imperialism was in keeping with the history and traditions of the United States—that "destiny" compelled the United States to the course it had apparently taken. It was contended, for instance, that the history of the United States contained clear indications that isolationism in foreign affairs was merely a phase; that the Monroe Doctrine itself was in spirit "a violation . . . of the non-intervention policy"; that American relations with Mexico gave evidence of expansionist tendencies; and that but for the Civil War the United States would have long since come to play a major part in world affairs.[3] It was suggested also that existing social and economic problems required for their solution the adoption of policies of stimulating overseas trade and developing a colonial empire; and that the fact that the international prestige and influence of the United States were much less than proportionate to its strength was producing a sense of inferiority which rendered an expansionist outburst "perfectly natural".[4]

[2] *Blackwood's Magazine*, CLXIII (1898), 703.

[3] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 492-93.

[4] *Blackwood's Magazine*, CLXIII, 563-65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was, however, an emotional offshoot of the historical inevitability argument which received the most ardent attention, and inspired the most fluent rhetoric. In support of the view that the destiny of the United States involved of necessity the adoption of imperialist policies, the " instincts of the Anglo-Saxon race " were frequently cited by those who welcomed without reservation that development. American imperialism was thought to reflect " the Anglo-Saxon desire for expansion "; it was attributed to " the strange and irresistible *Drang* of the Anglo-Saxon race "; and it was an inescapable part of " the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon in the Western as well as in the Eastern hemisphere." [5] Sir George Clarke probably reflected the prevalent official view, as well as informed public opinion, when he wrote:

> The isolation of the United States from the affairs of the world is no longer possible. They must and they will assume their rightful position among great nations, with the responsibilities and the difficulties entailed. . . . The inherited instincts of the race are forcing the American people onward and outward. . . . Race energy and race aptitudes, not blind chances, have made the United States second only to the mother country as a commercial Power. The same forces that have created the British Empire have built up the great Republic, and will irresistibly bring it into the front rank of the States of the world.[6]

Apart from these inherited racial instincts which made American expansion historically inevitable, great emphasis was placed on racial affinity as a reason for supporting the new American enterprise. Racial affinity was a purely emotional concept, inspired by a spirit of Anglo-Saxon brotherhood and requiring nothing more than the racial relationship as an incentive to closer association and mutual support. The racial argument aroused great fervor among its propounders, and great contempt among some of a more practical disposition, even when they were strong advocates of Anglo-American collaboration. Undoubtedly it exercised a great influence; and it probably provided the most powerful

[5] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 499; *Edinburgh Review*, CLXXXIX (1899), 258-59; *Westminster Review*, CLIV (1900), 463.

[6] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 193-94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incentive in Britain toward support of American policy in the years 1898 to 1900. It was openly asserted by some contemporary observers that Britishers in general sympathized with the Americans in the conflict with Spain chiefly "because they are our own flesh and blood."[7] Extremists expounded the concept of a supra-nationalism, with race rather than nation the effective "inspiration" to action,[8] and there was a general obsession with the idea of the unity of the "Anglo-Saxon" race, which was assumed to embrace the great majority of the population of the United States as well as of Britain. So widespread was adherence to the concept of Anglo-Saxonhood that only occasionally was an argument based on it expounded at length; though incidental references to the concept were very frequent, it remained for the most part an implicit assumption. To the bond of race were added as a matter of course the bonds of language, history and tradition, the whole producing a concept of Anglo-American homogeneity which made mutual sympathy and support natural and proper at all times.[9] "The present cordial and intimate relations between the two great kindred countries", it was asserted by W. L. Clowes, "are the outcome, not of any self-seeking diplomacy, but of natural feeling."[10] It is not without significance that Drake, Hawkins and Raleigh were sometimes cited as important elements in the Anglo-American historical tradition.

Closely related to ideas of historical inevitability and to faith in racial affinity was the widely held belief in the divine mission of the Anglo-Saxon peoples as agents of world civilization. This was the theme of countless articles, and the sincerity with which it was usually treated is evident. Since in its evangelical content lay the moral justification for British imperialism, it would clearly be hypocritical not to welcome the participation of the kindred Americans in imperialist

[7] *Spectator*, LXXX (1898), 566.

[8] *Fortnightly Review*, LXIV [New Series] (1898), 891.

[9] The strength of the influence of the race–history–tradition thesis is indicated by the care taken to refute it by some "realistic" commentators even though they were well disposed toward closer Anglo-American relations. See, e.g., *Fortnightly Review*, LXIV, 166-67.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 884.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enterprises. It was, however, necessary to concede to the Americans equality with the British in virtue and intelligence. In performing this operation some writers had difficulty in concealing their consciousness of magnanimity, and showed a somewhat condescending attitude in extending Anglo-Saxon racial superiority to the American branch. But, despite any mental reservations, the position was taken that in view of their inherent superiority the British and American branches of Anglo-Saxondom had a compelling moral duty to work together to set the pattern of world civilization. This was to be done not merely by enlightening primitive peoples, but by obliging civilized states to act in their international relations in accordance with Anglo-Saxon concepts of justice and humanity.

The duty of the United States with regard to the "backward" peoples was stressed frequently and at length, and was clearly the aspect of Anglo-Saxon international evangelicalism to which the greatest importance was attached. Many writers rejoiced with Edward Dicey that their American kinsmen had "shown that they have preserved the ideal of an Imperial mission; that they . . . are prepared to carry out that manifold destiny which is the birthright of the Anglo-Saxon race," and agreed wholeheartedly with him that the Anglo-Saxon desire for expansion had "done more than any other cause to promote civilization and progress."[11] The view prevailed that, as the British were without question superior to any other peoples as imperial administrators, the Americans must have the same inherent capacity—though perhaps for environmental reasons falling at present somewhat short of equality in practice—and that therefore they had a moral duty to make use of their talents. The *Spectator* expressed the orthodox view that "our race is meant to do in the world the work of foreman and ganger" and in that capacity fulfil its duty and its destiny "to govern and convert to civil uses the inferior races."[12] Though the *Spectator* put forward the opinion that Britain might gain an immediate advantage from the failure of the United States as an imperial Power, it also asserted that there was "no section of British opinion

[11] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 499, 501.

[12] *Spectator*, LXXXI (1898), 136.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which does not desire that America shall succeed in the development of her new Empire," and expressed the belief that so long as America ruled her tropical territories " in the interests of humanity and justice," no one in Britain would ever " envy her her possessions, nor their expansion into a dominion as great as our own." [13] The Americans were regarded not as colonial rivals but rather as " fellow-labourers in the work of the better ordering of the world." [14]

The application of the " moral duty " theory to Cuba and the Philippines—Puerto Rico was virtually ignored—took slightly different forms. In the case of Cuba certain conspicuous difficulties had to be overcome—the proximity of the island to the American mainland, its position in relation to the proposed isthmian canal, and the fact of heavy American capital investment made it appear that strategic and economic considerations rendered the acquisition of Cuba imperative, with any imperial mission motivation altogether superfluous. A number of writers did openly assert that the United States would be perfectly justified in annexing Cuba for purely selfish reasons, and in fact would be foolish not to do so—no other nation, including Britain, if faced with a similar situation, would have hestitated for a moment. But the more popular view was that the decisive consideration would be the fulfilment of an imperial mission. Emphasis on this motivation may have been inspired by the suspicion —it was hardly yet a conviction—that to justify the acquisition of Cuba simply on grounds of overriding national interest might place the British West Indies in jeopardy. In any event, the Spanish-American War was in general interpreted as a war of liberation in which humanitarian motives predominated, and it was widely assumed that Cuba would be brought under direct American control. The Teller Amendment was received by many with surprise and dismay, mitigated only by the belief that before very long the United States would nevertheless be obliged to annex Cuba. Some observers did consider that indirect American control would suffice to lead Cuba into the paths of progress and enlighten-

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 821, 233.

[14] *Fortnightly Review*, LXVIII [New Series] (1900), 789.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, but the more general view was that in spite of the reluctance of the United States to acquire Cuba outright it ought to do so and in fact would have to.

In the minds of evangelical imperialists, though not of all observers, the moral duty of the United States to annex the Philippines was hardly vitiated by any other consideration. The legitimate commercial aspirations of the United States in the Far East, and the need to prevent the aggrandizement of Germany in that area, itself quite compatible with a sense of imperial mission, were occasionally referred to, but the remoteness of the archipelago and the supposed primitiveness of the Filipinos compelled support for annexation on grounds of moral duty. There was even expressed a sense of relief that Britain no longer need bear the imperial burden alone, now that the only other people in the world who were worthy of sharing it had become an imperial Power. Great stress was placed on the moral obligation resting on the United States to acquire the Philippines and alarm was shown that it would try to evade its full responsibility, allowing the Filipinos to continue to live in darkness or, what to some seemed even worse, allowing them to fall under the unenlightened rule of Germany. In fact it was not merely Germany that was thus regarded—the contemporary use of the term "white man's burden" was often no more than a euphemism for "Anglo-Saxon's burden". Quite distinct from fear of German political and commercial aggrandizement in the Far East was the not uncommon view of Germany as a nation devoid of any sense of moral duty regarding less civilized peoples under her rule. The opinion expressed in the *Edinburgh Review* was typical of the great bulk of contemporary comment on this issue:

> It is a national immorality to upset the government of a country and then to refuse the responsibility of governing it, and particularly so if the country in question would be left to the mercy of an insurgent faction, or to the territorial ambitions of other foreign powers. To assume control of the Philippines and to provide them with a stable government is therefore a responsibility that cannot be evaded by the United States.[15]

[15] *Edinburgh Review*, CLXXXIX, 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even the *Saturday Review,* which normally reflected the jealousy of the extreme Right of American expansion, believed that the United States, having destroyed the existing system of government, was under an obligation to administer the Philippines at any rate for some time to come.[16]

Evangelical fervor looked beyond the mission of the Anglo-Saxon nations to bring backward peoples to their own level of civilization, and welcomed the advent of the United States as a world Power as a step toward the domination of world politics by Anglo-Saxon concepts, with the consequent establishment of perpetual peace and contentment. It is more difficult here to distinguish between genuine idealists, self-righteously convinced of the divine mission of the Anglo-Saxon peoples to dominate the world, and those whose real motive was zeal for national aggrandizement reflecting a lust for power and prestige. But genuine idealism was certainly very strong, and there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of most exponents of the view that the extension of Anglo-American power would be for the benefit of mankind in general. The assumption is clearly reflected that British and American statesmen were often enlightened and altruistic, while those of other nations never were. The duty of Britain and America to work together to set the pattern of world civilization was stressed frequently. Anglo-American understanding, according to the *Spectator,* "will be a guarantee that civil and religious liberty shall be firmly established in the world."[17] The *Fortnightly Review* expressed even more forcibly the possible results of collaboration:

> The English-speaking nations, if they act in harmony, and if they prove worthy of their high destiny, hold the fate of the world in their hands. They can make right triumph over mere might; they can render wars impossible without their permisison; they can introduce an era of peace and prosperity such as has been unknown in history.[18]

Similar sentiments were expressed by many other writers. The diplomatic correspondent of the *Contemporary Review* held "that if ever there was a human institution of which it

[16] *Saturday Review,* LXXXVII (1899), 70.

[17] *Spectator,* LXXX, 718.

[18] *Fortnightly Review,* LXIV, 892.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would not be absurd to say that it would make on the whole for the Kingdom of God, it is a Treaty of Amity between the severed Powers of the English-speaking race" since "it would be difficult . . . to suggest any case in which the united strength of England and America would be ever likely to be put forth, which would not be to the advantage of mankind." [19] W. L. Clowes asserted that "if only London and Washington will it, a law for the whole earth may be proclaimed in English, and no one will dare to gainsay it"; [20] while many writers stated their belief that Anglo-American collaboration could easily bring about the suppression of war. The excessive indifference of the United States in the past toward the affairs of the rest of the world was deplored as an evasion of duty. America was accused of having stood "selfishly and cynically aloof" from "the general movement of the nations," and her anticipated acceptance of the obligations of a great nation was hailed as an event "of happy augury to the progress of the world." [21] What was, perhaps, the most arrogant, but none the less typical, expression of this point of view was presented in the *Westminster Review:*

> It is to Great Britain and the United States alone that all persons interested in the highest modern progress are now looking for its further advancement. An imperative obligation rests on these countries to act together in every crisis in which that progress, identified as it is with their greatness, is seriously threatened. Their own welfare, the welfare of the world, demands it.[22]

The extent to which many writers based their approval of American imperialism on moral concepts was severely criticized by those who adopted what they held to be a more realistic outlook, as well as by critics hostile to American policy. The evident importance the practical-minded attached to refutation of moral arguments is a fair indication of their influence at the time. A realistic attitude toward American

19 *Contemporary Review,* LXXIII (1898), 617.

20 *Fortnightly Review,* LXIV, 892.

21 *Nineteenth Century,* XLIII (1898), 293, 300; *Spectator,* LXXXV (1900), 649.

22 *Westminster Review,* CLIV, 463.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expansion, and toward Anglo-American relations, was held to require the careful assessment of the advantages to be derived from support of the United States in its imperial undertakings. Though some extremists of the Right maintained that the United States was about to become Britain's most dangerous imperial rival, and ought therefore to be opposed at every point, the majority of those who prided themselves on their realism were of the opinion that the new departure in American policy provided opportunities for mutual assistance in furthering national interests. The potential practical advantages of collaboration between the two English-speaking imperialist Powers were generally held to be mutual support in the advancement of expansionist policies (though this was much more often implied than stated), and, more specifically, security against hostile states, the furtherance of identical interests in the Far East, and the extension of the trade of both throughout the world.[23]

It is clear that China was very much in the minds of those

[23] It is perhaps worth observing that several writers thought they perceived in Anglo-American imperialist coöperation the solution to the "Irish Problem" as it existed both in the United States and in Ireland. It was quite commonly believed that anti-British feeling in the United States was confined to those of Irish ancestry, and supposed by some that as a result of the mutual dependence of Britain and the United States arising from their common imperial interests the Irish population in America would cease to exercise its hitherto baleful influence. According to one writer, recent events had "thrown into outer darkness as an international factor the Irish-American element, and the gnashings of their teeth may be heard loudly in the Bowery." *Macmillan's Magazine,* LXXIX (1898-99), 238. More seriously, it was hoped that the reconciliation of "Anglo-Celt and Anglo-Saxon" had been brought nearer and argued that "with a friendly America, concession in Ireland and the remedy of all just grievances . . . become safe and expedient." *Quarterly Review,* CLXXXVIII (1898), 240.

The view was also put forward in welcoming American expansion that the assumption of imperial responsibilities would help to develop within the continental United States a higher standard of public life, which would be to Britain's advantage since responsible statesmen would not be anti-British! The opinion was expressed that the Spanish-American War "must inevitably prove a most potent influence for good in the regeneration of American politics" since the new responsibilities acquired by the United States "are happily breeding a new 'sense of responsibility', and are already attracting a fresh class of men, of high position and intelligence, into Congress and other walks of public life." *Edinburgh Review,* CLXXXIX, 259. It was also envisaged "that in their broader field of action Americans will lose most of the narrowness in political thinking which has been their drawback, and will reason like statesmen . . . instead of like attorneys." *Spectator,* LXXXV (1900), 649.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who advocated a "realistic" approach to the question of American expansion. China was often treated specifically, and more general comment regarding foreign enemies and the expansion of trade usually assumed China to offer most scope for acts of hostility and the most profitable field for commercial expansion. It is a striking fact, however, that, while writers on American affairs often attached great significance to China, writers who were specialists on China—and there were many at this time—considered Chinese problems in the light of the rivalry of European states, and very few attempted to estimate the possible contribution of the United States to future developments. This is an interesting phenomenon, but not a significant one, as discussions of Chinese affairs as such neither reflected nor influenced opinion regarding the United States.

The typical attitude of the "realists" was expressed by the diplomatic correspondent of the *Fortnightly Review* when he asserted that although a sense of racial affinity and of common ideals might strengthen any understanding with the United States "its basis must be a community of material interests."[24] There was, however, a marked tendency to equate American interests with British interests. The advent of the United States as a major Power was welcomed on the grounds that as it would need an ally—in view of what was held to be the inevitable growth of foreign hostility—Britain's international isolation, which had begun to alarm many people, would be brought to an end. It was asserted that with the United States about to become a major factor in world politics "the first and only thought that is caught at in England is that we have probably found an ally."[25] This is an exaggeration, at least in its implication concerning the nature of such an alliance, but there is ample evidence that mutual assistance against foreign enemies was to many people the main value of Anglo-American association. When defined, the "foreign enemies" of the Anglo-Saxon peoples turned out to be the Germans rather than the Russians, with German designs in South America and the Far East the major dangers to Anglo-American interests, though occasionally

[24] *Fortnightly Review*, LXIV, 167.

[25] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France and Russia were suggested as potential members with Germany of an anti-Anglo-Saxon coalition.

Generally, it was believed that Anglo-American coöperation would eliminate danger to either by preventing war from being undertaken by a hostile Power, but the belief was sometimes expressed that in the course of the twentieth century Britain and the United States would become involved in war—most probably against grasping and aggressive European rivals in China—and that their close association would be a guarantee of victory. Nor was the war in which they might become involved always assumed to be a defensive war against foreign aggressors; mutual support in policies of territorial expansion throughout the world, involving especially joint naval action, was occasionally envisaged. Since active foreign hostility to American imperialism was generally assumed, America's only alternative to association with Britain would be a dangerous isolation. But acting in concert, Britain and the United States could face with equanimity a ring of enemies consumed with envy of Anglo-Saxon prosperity, and with resentment at the superior virtues of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. It was also expected that from close association Britain and the United States would gain a dominant international influence, which not only would give them security from attack, but would facilitate the furtherance of their ambitions by diplomatic means.

British approval of the advent of the United States as a Far Eastern Power was based largely on the belief that it would be a useful ally. But it was widely assumed that the United States not merely would give support to British objectives, especially with regard to Open Door policies, but would be content to remain the junior partner. The prospect of eventual American preponderance in the Far East, even given American acceptance of British aims and policies, would have appalled many of those who welcomed American intervention in Far Eastern affairs; and many whose sympathy with American policy was quite genuine nevertheless revealed an attitude of condescending benevolence toward supposed American aspirations. It is also evident that it was the general opinion in Britain—and, in this, British opinion was in advance of American—that the United States would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without question soon become deeply involved in Far Eastern affairs, and that to attempt to prevent involvement would be futile. This is not to imply that British acceptance of American intervention was, outside a very small group, simply making a virtue of necessity; but it must nevertheless have helped to condition the attitude of many. The "historical inevitability" argument seemed particularly relevant to China.

On specific matters, the United States was welcomed as a potential ally against attempts by other Powers to gain special commercial and territorial privileges, and to enforce general adherence to Open Door policies. In this connection it is noteworthy that what might appropriately be termed the "China Lobby" in the British press at this time was strongly critical of recent British deviations from strict Open Door doctrines, enforced by weakness in face of European rivals, and there was a prevalent wish to redress the balance of strength in order to reëstablish Open Door principles. While the China experts virtually excluded the United States from their calculations, it was perfectly natural for writers on the United States to accept the Open Door as the major British interest which American support in the Far East would help to secure. Nor was it overlooked, or regarded as unimportant, that Open Door policies were apparently more compatible with the interests of China than those favored by Germany, Russia and France. The attention given to commercial objectives in the Far East was not commensurate with the importance clearly attached to them. Expressions of opinion were somewhat vague or tentative, and often seemed to reflect insufficient knowledge among observers of American affairs either of economics or of China to allow them to present detailed arguments.

American overseas expansion was held by many to make commercial coöperation possible between Britain and the United States in the world at large. Here too, however, discussion was very superficial, and frequently betrayed a high degree of economic ignorance as well as a reluctance to deal with specific matters. The economic interdependence of Britain and the United States, compelling Britain out of self-interest to support the United States in the event of war, was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sometimes asserted but rarely illustrated; more often, a common interest in enforcing Open Door policies throughout the world, in opposition to the restrictive and monopolistic practices of other colonial Powers, was cited as the main commercial reason for welcoming the advent of the United States as an imperialist nation. It was quite often assumed that the United States would soon adopt free-trade policies—which to British free-traders seemed so clearly in America's best interests as to be inevitable—and that as apostles of economic liberalism Britain and the United States would dominate the trade of the world, to their own and the world's benefit. In spite, however, of frequent references to the commercial advantages which would derive from American overseas expansion and closer Anglo-American coöperation, because of the imprecise nature of almost all comment on this subject it is impossible to make a more accurate assessment of the prevailing opinion than that American expansionism was welcomed by many because it was felt confidently but vaguely that its commercial consequences would be favorable to Britain and to the cause of free trade.

It is evident that "practical" considerations were not sufficient in themselves to account for the great welcome given to American imperialism. At least equally strong "practical" arguments could be—and were—used to attack American expansionism as a threat to British interests. Moreover, greater "practical" advantages could probably have been obtained from association with Germany at that time than from coöperation with the United States. British opinion around the end of the nineteenth century had become conscious of Britain's declining strength in relation to other Powers, and alarmed at her diplomatic isolation. The seeming opportunity in 1898 to identify American with British interests was therefore grasped with an enthusiasm which was perhaps augmented by the fact that it presented an alternative to an arrangement with Germany, which already was arousing suspicion and resentment in Britain.

It was not because of practical considerations that British opinion preferred the United States to Germany as an associate. This was partly because a widespread repugnance was beginning to develop toward the general outlook of the Ger-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man government, but in the main was due to the very strong sense of racial and historical affinity which profoundly influenced the prevailing attitude toward the question of Anglo-American relations. This sense of affinity sometimes degenerated into racial snobbery, reflected in the attitude that Britain, if she must, might without undue loss of dignity associate with the United States, but could never associate, as an equal, with a non-Anglo-Saxon nation. But for the most part it reflected an emotional attachment to the United States strong enough to survive subsequent disappointment at the failure of the United States to reciprocate the emotion or to appreciate sufficiently the mutual practical advantages of close coöperation between the two countries. Moreover —and this is the most significant feature of all—the state of opinion in Britain in the closing years of the nineteenth century made it politically highly dangerous for any government, either then or subsequently, to adopt policies incompatible with Anglo-American friendship.

The strength of the feeling of emotional attachment to the United States is illustrated by the willingness of most advocates of close Anglo-American relations to be satisfied with no more than the spirit of an alliance. Although suggestions for a formal alliance were occasionally put forward, the general view was that an alliance would be not merely impracticable but quite unnecessary. Emphasis on informal association may have been partly the result of an awareness that the political climate in the United States precluded for some time to come all possibility of a formal alliance, and perhaps also of the realization that the United States was not at present a very valuable military ally against continental states; but considerations such as these would have led to the abandonment of any idea of closer association in the case of any other nation, whereas in the case of the United States practical considerations of this nature were regarded as comparatively insignificant. In the main, however, an informal relationship was quite sincerely regarded as the ideal, and not as the most that could be achieved in the circumstances. An informal "natural *rapprochement*" was held, for instance, to be stronger than an "artificial arrangement" like that between France and Russia; a close informal understand-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing was thought to be "far more secure than a hastily formed alliance"; while "a hard and fast alliance" was asserted to be "naturally distasteful to the robust independence of the Anglo-Saxon race." [26]

A firm conviction that the interests of Britain and the United States were now identical made this attitude possible. "Alliance may well wait," declared Sir George Clarke, "it will never be required if only the two nations realise their immense mutual interests and become familiar with the idea that united action in the defence of the honour and the rights of both might be demanded." [27] Less extravagantly, it was thought that wherever possible Britain and the United States "should lend each other mutual moral support, and should consistently decline to give aid and comfort to their numerous enemies by internecine quarrels." [28] It was also widely believed that in the event of war the United States would now automatically come to Britain's assistance, and though this view was specifically repudiated by some advocates of close informal relations, it was believed by almost everyone that in extremity both Britain and the United States would come to the help of the other—and to some this was as far as any informal understanding need go.

Outright opposition to closer Anglo-American relations can be dealt with briefly. It did not represent a considerable body of opinion and was therefore without immediate practical influence; and it falls conveniently into two categories. Hostility to American imperialism and to its corollary of closer relations between Britain and the United States came either from imperialists on the extreme Right, or from anti-imperialists. From some extreme Right-wing quarters the view was expounded that Britain's principal rival and natural enemy was the United States, and that everything possible should therefore be done to inhibit its growth as a world Power. According to this point of view, "in another generation or so there will be a hundred millions of people in America, with vast riches and probably vast fleets, which may

[26] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 193; *Spectator*, LXXXI (1898), 265; *Edinburgh Review*, CLXXXIX, 260.

[27] *Nineteenth Century*, XLIV, 195.

[28] *National Review*, XXXII (1898-99), 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be used—which many think must be used—against their greatest rival, the British Empire, and that the struggle for world-dominion must be fought in the future between those two Powers." [29]

The views of anti-imperialists were superficially very similar to those of the extreme nationalists, though the motives behind them were quite different. The anti-imperialists regarded with revulsion any collaboration between the two countries in the furtherance of imperalist policies. Much the same points were made as were put forward by Right-wing imperialists. According to Goldwin Smith, still the spokesman of anti-imperialism, British naval supremacy in the Atlantic would be threatened by a strong American fleet, Britain and the United States were commercial rivals and would find a partnership in commercial development difficult to maintain, Canada would continue to be a source of Anglo-American conflict, and the nature of American politics made a permanent partnership impossible. Smith wrote:

> That all memories of past feuds may be buried, and that hearty friendship may for ever prevail between Great Britain and the United States, will be the earnest prayer of the good and sensible in both nations. But the result of anything like a compact alliance or partnership, considering the diversity of interests, institutions, and even, since the large influx of non-British elements into the United States, of character, would be very doubtful. More than doubtful would be the result of a partnership in aggrandisement, however veiled it might be under the pretext of spreading Anglo-Saxon ideas or imposing peace upon the world. . . . The community of nations would presently arise in concert to reassert the independence of the seas, and open again a free course of progress for humanity.[30]

Though observers less extreme in their outlook tried to moderate what they regarded as an unrealistic emotional attitude toward Anglo-American relations, it was only from the extreme Right or from doctrinaire anti-imperialists that hostility to close association came—and even Right-wing critics

[29] *Saturday Review,* LXXXV (1898), 546.

[30] *Contemporary Review,* LXXV (1899), 627-28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were sometimes willing to collaborate with the United States on a strict *quid pro quo* basis.[31]

British enthusiasm for American expansionism was at its peak during the years 1898-1900. Subsequently, interest flagged considerably, although for many years afterwards a revival by the United States of openly imperialist policies would have stimulated the return of the atmosphere of the end of the century. It is not a purpose of this article to consider the reasons for this decline in fervor. Most of them are obvious: diversion of attention to South Africa, and widespread disappointment at the reaction of American opinion to the Boer War; the inevitable moderating of a state of mind reflecting an excess of emotion; an increasing realization that practical advantages from close Anglo-American association could not be achieved in any great measure for many years, and, in this connection, the assumption by Japan of the rôle in the Far East earmarked for the United States. But in spite of this, the upsurge of feeling between 1898 and 1900 never subsided completely; it did reflect factors which, whether emotional or practical, were not artificial, and though much of the enthusiasm displayed at the time turned out to have been premature, it can be maintained that in the years 1898-1900 informed British opinion regarding the United States assumed a pattern which has not been fundamentally altered.

GEOFFREY SEED

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
FIFE, SCOTLAND

31 It was suggested, for instance, that in return for assistance already given by the British navy against Spain, without which, it was claimed, the United States could not have secured a favorable peace, the United States ought to give generous treatment to Canada in the matter of tariffs and, especially, to support British policy in China. *Saturday Review,* LXXXVI (1898), 725.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEWS

America as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States Today. By MAX LERNER. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1957.—xiii, 1036 pp. $10.00.

The discovery of America threatens to become one of the endless labors of Western history. If a full millennium is needed for fulfillment of the mission, perhaps it is because men have been seeking not a place but a sign of providence or fate. In the beginning, said Locke, all the world was America; in the end, said Tocqueville, all the world will be America. Who shall speak the last word on such matters?

Max Lerner undertakes his own search for America with firm assurances that he will not play the prophet or the judge (specifically, he renounces gloomy prophecy and intentional judgment). With a broad acknowledgment to the cultural anthropologists, Mr. Lerner names as his concern "the pattern and inner meaning of contemporary American civilization" (p. xi). He seeks, in short, the common system of experience which binds Americans in a distinctive, powerful, and morally exciting community.

The reader must not expect, however, a unified analysis of life and thought in the United States sustained through a thousand pages; for Mr. Lerner has decided by the end of his second chapter that the American configuration is slack and devious. He first suggests the image of a "polar pattern", and concludes with a list of disparate polarities and a tentative proposal that cultural coherence may have emerged in "an effort, on a grander scale than ever in history, to resolve the conflicting impulses that are to be found in every civilization" (p. 73). Thus mediation, flexible and creative, is the embracing principle of American civilization for Mr. Lerner.

The substance of the volume is a bulging survey of contemporary America: of people and place, the culture of the machine, the economic and political realms; of social class and social character, the personal life cycle, belief and opinion, art and popular culture; and finally of America's world responsibilities. Principally, Mr. Lerner offers a skillful and widely informed conspectus of current social science findings about American things, organized with special reference to the terms and categories of social psychology and cultural anthropology, and evaluated (for he does deliver judgments) from the standpoint of a well-tempered, and good-tempered, post-New Deal liberalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The opening chapter on the American heritage and several sections of the following discussion of "The Idea of American Civilization" contain Mr. Lerner's best thoughts on the general nature and meaning of America. In a striking formulation, designed to balance the conflicting claims of the "Western" and "Eastern" schools of historical interpretation, he characterizes American history as a case of "extended genesis": a perpetual process of rebirth animated by the convergence of capitalist economic development, frontier expansion, and the unfolding "democratic idea". Similarly, the key to the American tradition is found in "gradualist dynamism", the constant principle of continuous change. Abandoning all caution Mr. Lerner imagines the American as "the archetypal man of the West": Tamerlane-Faustus, "cosmic man", the purest child of Renaissance and Reformation, the man "for whom the walls have been broken down" (p. 63).

This flaming image of the masterless man hardly controls Mr. Lerner's detailed surveys of the lives and thoughts of contemporary Americans; but a tamer portrait of the achievement-oriented, aggressively competitive, creatively adjusting American does persist. Without challenging directly the interpretations of Riesman, Whyte, and other dissectors of the new conformity, without denying explicitly Tocqueville's powerful diagnosis of the old conformity, Max Lerner nevertheless conveys the distinct impression that the democratic individualist, however bruised and tormented, is very much a living presence in America. Mr. Lerner reports something on the other side as well; yet it seems to me unfortunate that he leaves such crucial alternatives dangling.

The political pages show the confident hand of a veteran commentator on public affairs. The "new liberal" convictions of *Nation* and *PM* days still define the author's basic outlook. The mood, however, has turned with the times: the striking of the clock now promises undeniable advances toward "an affirmative welfare state" (p. 370). Less is made of classes and power, although still a good deal; much more of party brokerage and pluralism, of status and symbols. He is penetrating on the curious science of American party warfare, that deceptive blend of wide fancy and brute fact, although his analysis loses some of its clarity in the echoes of the old faith that the voice of the people naturally seeks justice, while the "dominant minority" blocks the way.

The boldest of Mr. Lerner's claims is the flat assertion that America has created a memorable civilization which will take its rank with Greece or Rome. In an important sense he does not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

submit his contention to a test, since most of the text is addressed, not to a delineation and evaluation of cultural achievements, but to an exploration of motives and feelings, of the common experience. Indirectly, perhaps, he is making the point that the peculiar achievement of American civilization is precisely to give extraordinary significance to the experiences of ordinary men. At any rate, the nature of his dominant interests leads to a scant and rather brusque treatment of the arts and sciences which constitute culture in the traditional humanistic definition.

A concluding assessment of this very long, brave and diverse work is difficult to make. Mr. Lerner has succeeded in rendering smoothly and literately a vast body of preformed information about a generation of American life. He does not, I think, evoke fresh understandings of the nation as Tocqueville's work did in his time or as David Riesman's, for example, does in ours. It must be added that a number of noted critics judge otherwise.

There is a valuable bibliography, and what amounts to a directory of the nation's leading commentators on American civilization is included in the acknowledgments.

MARVIN MEYERS

THE COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776. By ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1958.—ix, 318, xvi pp. $6.00.

Here is the definitive study of the newspaper attack on Great Britain prior to independence. Professor Schlesinger has been interested in this subject for a very long time, and his book shows thorough mastery of the colonial newspaper. The result is that there is much of interest and importance here beyond the accounts of anti-British propaganda.

The book is a straightforward narrative account of the newspaper attack on Great Britain and her policies from 1764 to 1776. There are two introductory chapters adequately treating the background which are models of clarity and simplicity for the reader who may not remember the details of the period. These chapters comprise Part I. Part II follows chronology in each chapter. Because Boston, New York and Philadelphia were the centers of newspaper publication and activity, there is naturally much more on these colonies, but no paper or area is neglected. Although the main treatment is of the Whig press, attention is also given to the unsuccessful efforts of the Tories to develop a newspaper following. But, as the author points out, in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the concluding years of the struggle, the Tories had been almost virtually silenced in the newspaper press, and the arguments were between different categories of Whigs. The main body of the book is on the newspaper offensive against Great Britain with extensive and aptly chosen quotations—amusing, venomous, sarcastic, argumentative. The author gets behind the scenes into the actual lives of the printers and publishers of these papers to some extent, but, in the main, the treatment is focused on the paper itself.

One of the most important features of this book, however, is not this factual account; it is the discussion of the effect of the events of the period and of the newspaper activity upon the development of newspapers and their influence in American history. The prolonged period of agitation enormously enhanced the influence of the press, says the author. People became accustomed to read newspapers, to look forward to them. From what had been in 1763 a little regarded, unimportant sheet of minor news, most of it from the mother country, the newspaper had emerged as a powerful political and social element in the life of the colonies. The American newspaper press really came of age during these dozen years. It was not simply that the newspapers provided information; their rôle as opinion-makers became fixed.

Finally, this is the real period in which the freedom of the press was established. While it is true that the Zenger case had already established the legal principle, the fact of freedom was developed and maintained during this period. Although legal freedom of the press was not enacted into American law until later, it was the Revolutionary generation which realized the necessity for it. Indeed, Professor Schlesinger concludes that, next to independence, this concept that "freedom of utterance ranks unique among human rights as the protector and promoter of all the others . . . was the Revolutionary generation's greatest legacy to the American people."

PHILIP DAVIDSON

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE

James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 1795-1843. By CHARLES GRIER SELLERS, JR. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xiv, 526 pp. $7.50.

James K. Polk was for many years an attendant lord of Jacksonian democracy, and for a few significant years he played the part of the Prince himself. A generation ago Eugene I. McCormac called attention to Polk's presidential success. Mr. Sellers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has confined himself to the successful and in some ways representative career that Polk built in the years before his presidency. What emerges is a man who is still far short of fascinating; but Mr. Sellers has more than compensated for what Polk lacks as a striking central figure for the biographer by the depth with which he analyzes Polk's milieu. He has given us a first-rate study of local politics in Jackson's own state of Tennessee; and it is hard to emphasize how important such a contribution is for the understanding of Jacksonian and pre-Jacksonian America. In Polk's time, and even after, the United States was not a nation but a congeries of states in interaction. The history of the country may be partially illuminated but cannot be fully understood by historians who, with their twentieth-century perspectives, insist on writing about the country from the standpoint of Washington, D. C. It must be written about perceptively from the standpoint of the several state capitals, and from even more provincial centers of interest, before we will be able to re-create it fully enough to sound its meaning.

Though Polk's life shuffled back and forth between Washington and his home state, it is in the analysis of the situation in Tennessee that Mr. Sellers makes his most striking contribution. During the pre-Jacksonian period Tennessee is a perfect case study in the state of political life that generally prevailed before the emergence of a fairly firm party system. The author unravels the complex factional and personal maneuverings in Polk's state, and demonstrates how little fixity of alignments there was, and how much the changes in alignments were attributable to local advantage rather than national considerations, how much to temporary gain rather than long-range strategy. The volume here goes far beyond biography, in that it sets the background for an institutional understanding of the state's politics.

In the world of personal opportunism in which he functioned, Polk was, within the limits allowed by the realities of politics, fairly consistent in following his principles—or, if one wishes, his prejudices—and, as the author shows, this very consistency in principle made his behavior sometimes anomalous in a situation governed by other determinants of behavior. By family inheritance Polk was a Republican of the old Jeffersonian school. Mr. Sellers finds the key to his thought in what Marvin Meyers has called, in his recent brilliant exploration of Jacksonian thought, "restorationism". "The context of his political thought was Old Mecklenburg [in North Carolina, Polk's birthplace], where men lived simply on the fruits of their own labor without expectations of easy wealth and dealt honestly with each other on a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basis of rough equality and mutual respect. It was this image that made meaningful the Republican dogmas he had heard from his father and grandfather. . . ."

But, as Mr. Sellers sees, this simple, rustic, nostalgic Republicanism was only one strain in Jacksonian experience, for Americans were "plunging headlong into the exploitation and transformation of a bountiful environment, yet drawn almost as powerfully back toward the simplicity and virtue of a half-imagined agrarian past." The author takes his place among those who find in the democratization of entrepreneurship one of the major clues to understanding the period. "To nascent capitalists in every village of the land, democracy was coming to mean equal opportunity for exploiting the boundless wealth of an expanding economy. Such men insisted that the Hamiltonian alliance between government and a favored few must be destroyed, so that the largesse could be opened to all the enterprising. This spirit of entrepreneurial democracy was of a very different quality from neo-Jeffersonianism, though both attitudes were often found incongruously mixed in the same individual." This study of Polk, a man of substance from a family of substance, shows how these two strains of nostalgic democracy and forward-looking entrepreneurship coexisted without conscious discomfort in a single breast.

In the face of his achievement the author's claims in his preface are curiously modest. "I hope", he says, "that readers will find the textbook clichés about the Jacksonian period sharpened by being tied to the actions of real people in concrete situations." But he has done something better than this: he has helped to subvert some of the clichés that need subverting.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933. By ROBERT H. FERRELL. New Haven, Yale University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1957.—ix, 319 pp. $4.50.

The first years of the Depression were uneventful or at least relatively unimportant in American foreign relations. There was the chronic question of the war debts and there were the meaningless motions of the London Naval Conference. With the Japanese invasion of Manchuria began the period of more critical events and greater futility. The futility Mr. Ferrell attributes mainly to the Depression, which in his view obsessed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and thus paralyzed American diplomacy or at least prevented effective action.

One may question the heavy emphasis put on this thesis. No doubt Mr. Hoover and then Mr. Roosevelt were preoccupied with the mounting seriousness of the deterioration of the economy, but still one may ask whether this was more responsible for the failure to take positive action than the reinvigorated isolationism of those years, as reflected in the so-called neutrality acts. Mr. Hoover certainly and Mr. Roosevelt probably saw economic matters as first and decided to put first things first; but also both knew—the one doubtlessly more regretfully than the other—that the temper of American opinion was such as to inhibit the kind of actions that by seeming to commit the American government might have acted as restraint on others, the Japanese especially. Mr. Stimson of course was aware of economic distress and the danger it carried, but what made him accept fatalistically his inability to offer effective resistance to what he deemed even more dangerous was the realization that the country would not support him in such a course. President Roosevelt was to become aware of the same thing in his quarantine speech a little later.

Mr. Ferrell has two chapters of special interest. The first deals with the visit of Secretary Stimson to President-elect Roosevelt at Hyde Park on January 9, 1933. Mr. Stimson's aim was to indoctrinate Mr. Roosevelt on the meaning of Japanese aggression and seek to establish continuity of policy between the two administrations—more simply, to persuade the new President not to relax the pressure Mr. Stimson had sought to exert. Mr. Stimson appears to have succeeded, though it is far from certain that Mr. Roosevelt needed persuasion. Their conversation rambled over a larger terrain than the Far East and the acount is revealing of both men as well as interesting to the reader. The atmosphere and the subtleties Mr. Ferrell conveys with deftness.

The other chapter, almost incredible as one reads it but irrefutably true, covers the World Economic Conference in London in 1933, that farcical episode, without dignity or meaning, made farcical by the Roosevelt administration and thus humiliating to the United States. The gyrations of Mr. Roosevelt himself, his economic adventurism, Secretary Hull's single-minded dedication to tariff reform, and the antics of Raymond Moley, suddenly endowed or self-endowed with seeming omnipotence—these more than anything else combined to make the Conference a dismal failure, a failure for which Europeans laid the blame on the United States, not unjustly. But again one may take issue with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Ferrell when he says that this was the last chance "to underwrite peace economically" and that with this "the American contribution to world peace came to an end." It is better political history to say that no economic measures in themselves could have stemmed the tide to war already gathering.

It may be that nothing new of importance is brought out in this book, but it is workmanlike, perceptive and interesting to read.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction. By SELIG ADLER. London and New York, Abelard-Schuman Limited, 1957.—538 pp. $6.75.

Isolation and Security. By ALEXANDER DECONDE. Durham, Duke University Press, 1957.—xii, 204 pp. $4.50.

Political historians have dealt neither kindly nor sympathetically with latter-day American isolationism. Both its leadership and the nativist ideology which informed this movement in its recent years of repudiation were enveloped in a polemical, cantankerous and politically irresponsible aura; their simple and angry formulae were at once alien to the contemporary world's problems and disturbingly symptomatic of that world's derangement; and not surprisingly these qualities found few sympathetic listeners among reasonable Americans. The diplomatic historian's method of dealing with it was to treat it much as one would treat an elderly, querulous and unreasonable uncle: to deal with it, yet never really to comprehend it. Against the static background of an isolationist generation W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason admirably described the Roosevelt administration's movement toward war and total involvement in world politics; yet neither they nor any other major historian troubled to give dimension to the leadership of this cause, nor to investigate deeply the social and ideological wellsprings from which, in its twilight life, the movement sustained itself.

This past winter the two volumes under review were published to help fill this void. While these books contrast in scope and method, they enable us to see the manners in which the historical profession is coming to grips with the meaning of latter-day isolationism.

For those who can sit through the many and often tedious acts of Professor Adler's pageant of American isolationism, the book will be rewarding. Unduly long, wanting in emphasis and sharp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distinctions, a bouillabaisse of unfortunate metaphors and clichés ("economic myopia", he says at one point, "destroyed the Republican straddle"), it takes little for granted in the way of the reader's previous knowledge. But its intent—to depict on vast canvas the whole foreign policy debate from Wilson to Eisenhower—is fairly well executed; and Adler's enormous fund of information, taken from contemporary sources, gives its subject a much-needed thickness.

Adler attributes the "neo-isolationism" after World War I to six factors: Wilson's war declaration (which alienated an "impressive minority"); the "eventual outcome" of the war (which confronted Wilsonian idealism with disillusioning realities); "unrealistic thinking concerning the nature of the peace", chiefly that of American liberals; a "new chauvinism" expounded by Beveridge, Hearst and others; "mid-western isolationism", compounded of geographic, economic and ethnic elements; and, finally, "party politics"—that is, Republican "expediency" and Wilsonian ineptitude. Lamentably imprecise, this thesis still serves as framework in which foreign policy issues can be discussed within the milieu of American society. Thin in spots (notably the post-1941 period), the narrative is admirably thick in others (notably the 1920's); and probably his feat will not be matched for some time to come.

DeConde's *Isolation and Security* is a far less pretentious, yet useful, book. The product of a Social Science Research Council summer seminar of American historians, its essays (by DeConde, Richard Current, William L. Neumann, Kenneth Thompson and others) are concise and analytical rather than narrative, ranging over a variety of post-1917 foreign policy problems: military force and United States foreign relations; the peace movement; crosscurrents of United States policy in Asia; and the interplay of isolation and collective security as concepts since 1914. One, Neumann's essay on "National Interest in Asia"—notwithstanding the author's own pacifist approach to the subject—is a really original and provocative piece of revisionist historical analysis; his suggestion, that examination of the "sociological and psychological foundations of the concept of American destiny in the Far East may come closest to revealing the roots of failure for the American approach in Asia", needs to be heeded by American scholarship. DeConde's essay, "On Twentieth Century Isolationism", is a succinct, reasonable summary of the changing content of isolationist doctrine and description of the shifting bases of the movement's support.

Adler's book and DeConde's essay at least help us discern what

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the movement of latter-day isolation was not. Both, by implication, puncture the internationalist cliché that isolationists were indifferent toward and ignorant about world politics. Samuel Lubell's thesis—that the isolationist-internationalist struggle was a kind of multi-ethnic folk dance (change partners all around!) to the music of the hemispheres—is also properly toned down. Yet neither author brings these or other conventional explanations into sharp focus, nor asks any new questions of their problem. For them, it is still the geographically isolated Middle West, with its German and Scandinavian farmers; the wild urban Irishmen; the unregenerate Progressives; the die-hard conservative Republicans. DeConde suggests that isolationism's appeal was "psychological and emotional", that its solace as doctrine was the solace of a nostalgic utopia. It is wholly proper, of course, to say these inexact things again. But this reviewer, and a number of other historians and political scientists, have suspected for some time that isolationism both before and after Pearl Harbor most profitably can be viewed as part of an all-embracing American cultural crisis commencing in the late 1890's; that foreign policy issues, urgent as they were, were surrogate to this crisis; and that—at least from the 1920's on—the chief popular strength upon which isolationism drew lay in social forces which arose, in futile revolt, against a new, complicated, urban and cosmopolitan order of things. The demand for American autonomy in world politics was, I believe, deeply related to the demand for freedom from a highly organized, unegalitarian national life which both the New Deal and urban, Eastern corporate America then represented. Whether this approach is fruitful or not, I cannot say. But the historians here represented, struggling with old questions, have not raised any new ones; and not much more, I would think, can come until they do.

PAUL SEABURY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy. By ROBERT E. OSGOOD. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957.—xi, 315 pp. $5.00.

There has grown up since the end of the Second World War a voluminous literature on the military problems of the present, the era before World War III. Many books and magazine articles have tried to peer into the future in order to find out for the guidance of political and military policy-makers the kind of warfare the next war will see. Nobody, of course, knows this.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military science and technology are changing too rapidly. And nobody knows, besides, whether the next war will be fought this year or next or ten years from now—or where. Despite this, there is no question of the need of a fundamental strategy for a war of the foreseeable future. To this task Professor Osgood applied himself with considerable skill. The result is a highly competent work, by and large.

After discussing the general theories of war and in particular the theory of limited war in Part I (chapters 1-3), the author draws upon the lessons of modern history to give in Part II (chapters 4-5) an account of the decline of limited war and the advent with World War I of war that is unlimited in its objective. In the next, the concluding, part (chapters 6-10) he analyzes America's strategy in the light of what he thinks will be the most likely developments in the international relations of the great Powers and makes the main thesis of his book a conviction that limited rather than total war is likely to be the war to be waged in the future. That being the case, reasons Professor Osgood, the sensible course for the United States (and we assume for the other Western Powers) is to develop a national strategy based on the limited type of war and to adjust its diplomacy accordingly. The invention of weapons of unprecedented destructiveness seems to have convinced Professor Osgood that a war of total annihilation is less likely to be the war of the future than one of limited objectives.

Most impressive by far are the chapters in which the author's fine historical understanding shows up. It could have been influenced by Edward Gibbon who stated that history undertakes to record the deeds of the past "for the instruction of future ages." Less impressive, and even disagreeable at times, are the purely theoretical parts of the book. Although rightly criticizing much of the casuistry that is to be found in Marxist dialectics on the theory of war, Professor Osgood is himself the victim of much unnecessary theorizing and abstraction. Is it really necessary, for example, in this day and age, to define war (p. 20) as "the upper extremity of a whole scale of international conflict of ascending intensity and scope"?

A restatement of basic postulates as if they were being stated for the first time appears to be a literary weakness. It may be, also, that too much foresight is expected of statesmen and soldiers and that not sufficient allowance is made for that awful intruder, chance, in the formulation of both foreign policy and military strategy.

All in all, this is a very good book. It also is very challenging.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To argue, not unsuccessfully in the main, for a strategy of limited war at a time when so much is heard about "total", "all-out", and "unlimited" war requires conviction as well as brains. Judging from the book, Professor Osgood is lacking in neither.

ALBERT NORMAN

NORWICH UNIVERSITY

Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. II: *The Decision to Intervene.* By GEORGE F. KENNAN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958.—xii, 513 pp. $7.50.

George F. Kennan has written another powerful book. The main theme of the first volume in this series was American reactions to the appearance of Communist power and to Russian withdrawal from World War I in the face of superior German force. This second volume centers on events such as the tribulations of the Czechoslovak legion and resulting pressures which caused President Woodrow Wilson to yield in June and July to French, British and other efforts to bring about United States military intervention in North Russia and Siberia. Mr. Kennan examines this process in microscopic detail but so great is his literary skill that the reader cannot put this volume down until he has finished it.

As in the first volume, he succeeds unusually well in combining objectivity, critical judgment and imagination. Perhaps occasionally the moralist in him overwhelms the historian. At times, too, one feels that the harshness of the author's condemnation of British, French and American decision-makers reflects too faithfully the rigorous standard of a professional diplomacy that has seldom, if ever, determined great political decisions. And yet the reader cannot fail to be instructed by Mr. Kennan's brilliant but saddening account of the tragedy of errors which, in his presentation, dominated Western policy during the fateful spring and summer months of 1918. Despite his admirable detachment, Mr. Kennan appears to be exasperated by the inefficiency and confusion prevalent in Allied capitals and to even a more disastrous degree within and among the French, British and United States diplomatic missions in Russia. By contrast, Soviet resourcefulness, singleness of purpose and unity of command stood out sharply. Most of even the abler Allied statesmen and diplomats continued during this period to see events in Russia too purely within the framework of the desperate struggle against Germany. Kennan sees Wilson's aloofness, deviousness and failure to furnish detailed policy guidance as perhaps the major

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

source of confusion. In this grim but fascinating picture the good sense and honesty of a few private American citizens interested in Russian affairs and a few members of the American Foreign Service stand out.

Ambassador Kennan expresses particular appreciation of the work of American Consuls Maddin Summers and DeWitt Clinton Poole, to whom the volume is dedicated. He also records with approval the negative and highly realistic prognostications made by Consul Felix Cole regarding the prospects confronting Allied intervention. Kennan seems to agree with Cole's position. Certainly he regards the intervention as a costly and unjustified error, but at the same time he refutes with masterful skill Soviet distortions of American policies. He also criticizes the aspects of United States policy to which Moscow had plausible grounds to object. Perhaps the most intriguing of the many ideas in which this brilliant book abounds is the suggestion that, had the Chicherin-Poole contact been permitted to develop, American-Russian relations might have taken a different turn. Mr. Kennan, of course, places this speculation within the somber framework of the mental gulf between Soviet Russia and the liberal West. Such reflections enliven a learned and graceful study. The total effect is nothing short of magnificent.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
YALE UNIVERSITY

The Roots of American Communism. By THEODORE DRAPER. New York, The Viking Press, 1957.–x, 498 pp. $6.75.

This book, the first in the Fund for the Republic's survey of the influence of communism in American life made under the general editorship of Professor Clinton Rossiter, sets a high standard for the subsequent volumes in the series. The history of the formative years of American communism is here presented with thoroughness and scholarly objectivity, plus a readibility that, unfortunately, is too often missing in serious writing.

Here is a product of painstaking and judicious research. As the author tells us in his introduction, "a little research on the Communist movement is a dangerous thing." He points out the many obstacles—the different purposes served by different communist communications media dealing with the same material, the frequent revisions of earlier positions, the omissions and distortions in the writings of leaders and important expatriates, the literary character assassinations of unsuccessful rivals—which necessitate a deeper digging in the sources by one who seeks the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

true story. And while probing further, the researcher must be fully cognizant of the purposes for which communist documents were issued at a particular time, or he will be deceived by what lies on the surface. The trail, as Draper indicates, may have to be followed to the highest party circles in the United States, or outside to the élite of the old Comintern, or to the center of power in the Russian Communist party.

All of this demands the supplementation and checking of the written sources by contact with, and knowledge of, those closely associated with the American communist movement in its early years. (The author acknowledges the assistance derived from Jay Lovestone, Earl Browder, Bertram Wolfe, Max Bedacht and James P. Cannon, among others.) In addition the weighing of the evidence, in view of the conflicting statements found in all types of sources, demands an insight into the Communist mind, a feeling for the "atmosphere" of the movement, joined with a scrupulous objectivity. Here the author's former membership in the party has been of value. His understanding is marked by a personal detachment that stands in contrast to the partisan accounts of certain other former Communists.

The early chapters of the book survey American radicalism of the eighties and nineties that had developed in answer to the dangers present in the exploiting capitalism born of the era after the Civil War. Some of the important native-born Americans who were destined to be leaders of the Communist party belonged to that generation that had grown up in a time of doubt and anxiety concerning the future of American capitalism and democracy.

The American communist movement was, of course, to be born mainly out of the element in the Socialist party that stood in opposition to the reformist majority. So the story of American socialism must be summarized, and it is skillfully done. That party of conflicting elements had enjoyed comparatively great success in the elections of 1912. But World War I disemboweled the American party, as it did the international movement, creating among other things a new and more radical Left wing. With the later successful Russian Revolution, the way was open for this radical element to move out of a splintered party under favorable circumstances. Draper makes the reader feel the intoxicating effect of the Russian Revolution upon these American radicals, with their belief that even a revolution might be possible in the United States.

The dramatic events abroad opened the road to an American communist movement. Years, however, were to pass before a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unified party could be created. A good deal of the Draper history is devoted to the various splits among the Communist adherents that produced the contending Communist, Communist Labor, and Workers parties. Unity finally came in 1923, after a bitter battle between those desiring underground, extralegal action, and those favoring a legal party. This unity came only after the Comintern had threatened expulsion for all not accepting the unified party.

As Draper emphasizes, this shift to a legal party was, like all subsequent shifts, the result of an American reaction to a Russian stimulus. For, when the expected European revolution did not materialize in the years after 1917, Lenin's opportunistic policies demanded a change from the tactics of violence and illegality, to those emphasizing the mass party appealing to the workers' everyday interests. Thus the views of the legalists in the American communist movement, *at the time*, were in good standing with those of Moscow; and American radicals, like others affiliated with the Comintern, in the name of internationalism became the agents of Russian nationalism. Yet, as Draper points out, to many American Communist early leaders Moscow seemed more truly a help in settling internal disputes which the Americans seemingly could not settle and which threatened disruption of the American movement, than a dominating force.

The author is currently engaged in writing the history of the American communist movement between 1924 (when the present book ends) and 1945. We may expect another definitive work.

CARROLL HAWKINS

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Communism in Latin America. By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1957.—x, 449 pp. $9.00.

Professor Alexander has combined in this volume a detailed history of communism in each country of Latin America with a tract for the times on what United States policy should be toward these twenty nations struggling to develop their human and economic resources.

As a prescription for the Department of State to follow, Part I of the book contains many home truths on the background, history and prospects of the communist movement in Latin America. At the zenith of their power during 1945 and 1946, when the party was legal or tolerated almost everywhere, the Communists have subsequently suffered defeats in most countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Many Latin-American governments have followed the lead of the United States in turning against the Communists but the danger is far from over, as Alexander emphasizes in his concluding chapter on "The Right and the Wrong Way to Fight Communism in Latin America". Communism is principally a political problem there rather than a military one, the author holds, and we should meet it by steady and sufficient economic assistance as well as by wise political decisions instead of reliance upon conservative groups and dictators who enthusiastically suppress civil liberties, while passing stern resolutions against communism, and ruthlessly attack as party members anyone who opposes their iron rule.

Professor Alexander perhaps may give too much, or too exclusive, credit to the Democratic Left and the trade unions in Latin America as the only bulwark against communism. Nowhere does he explain clearly enough that Latin-American unions are quite different in history and present development from those in the United States. Trade unions are dependent upon Latin-American governments to a degree unknown here; the control exercised by those governments over their labor organizations often surprises American labor leaders who, fortunately, have long manifested an intelligent and sustained interest in their fellow workers in Latin America. That acute and well-informed Mexican intellectual, Daniel Cosío Villegas, whose interpretation of communism in Latin America is one of the few significant omissions from Alexander's bibliography, does not so much as mention trade unions in his penetrating and sophisticated analysis.[1] Cosío recognizes that the Army, the Church, the Press, and wealthy groups all oppose communism; he also believes that Russian achievements in World War II and later, and the omnipresence of American products and power in Latin America which arouse anti-American feeling, are both responsible for the growth of sympathy for communism. But many will agree with Alexander that the salvation of Latin America depends to a great extent upon its own agricultural and social reforms, that the United States ignores or steadfastly opposes these forces at its peril, and that only a renewed concern for Latin America and its many difficult problems plus discreet support in Washington for its emerging democratic forces will avert further surprises and embarrassments to us below the Rio Grande.

As history, the work is not wholly satisfactory; it is repetitious, awkwardly written at times, encyclopedic, and contains such a

[1] "El comunismo en la América Latina", in three parts, appeared in *Excelsior* in Mexico City, August 18-20, 1953.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formidable mass of sheer facts that reading through it becomes a chore. The author does not organize his copious material sufficiently, he fails to select significant detail, and does not convey to this reviewer a sense of the historical unfolding of the social and political forces he describes.

On the other hand, some parts are well done, such as the chapter on Brazil, and it is unlikely that the work will be superseded for some time. The author actively gathered material for ten years, traveled frequently and widely in Latin America for first-hand views of its tumultuous and ever-changing scene, and conducted some 3,000 interviews. Probably no man alive knows more Latin-American Communists, ex-Communists, anti-Communists, and labor leaders. Professor Alexander's volume, consequently, is a rich collection of information on the many diverse personalities who have had a hand in the tangled politics of Latin America since 1940. His praiseworthy perseverance in collecting material, much of it fugitive, gives an impressive documentary quality to the work. But he would have produced an even better book if he had kept his readers more in mind.

The "Bibliographical Note" and extensive footnotes at the end of this meaty volume show the diversified nature of Professor Alexander's sources. The Index is a careful compilation and is itself a useful guide to the bewildering array of trade unions, or *Confederaciones,* whose long titles confuse all but the most expert students of the subject.

Professor Alexander has both compiled a valuable corpus of material on communism in Latin America and set forth some challenging views on American policy toward this vast area, whose population now exceeds that of the United States, for the first time in a century, and is expected by the year 2000 to exceed it enormously. Let us hope that some day he will put us further in his debt by writing a hundred-page summary and interpretation, based upon this substantial volume.

LEWIS HANKE

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth. By GEOFFREY MARSHALL. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957.—xi, 277 pp. 35*s.*; $5.60.

The concept of the "sovereignty of Parliament", which was finally established by Dicey as the cardinal principle of English constitutional law, has been under attack in some quarters in recent years—by political conservatives like Professor Keeton (*The Passing of Parliament*) because it has been the main legal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instrument for the effectuation, since the war, of the welfare state; and also by some critics of the excesses of legislative majorities in the Union of South Africa, since the Nationalist government was returned to power there in 1948.

Mr. Marshall belongs to the second group of critics. His book is, substantially, a repetition, in more detailed and comprehensive form, of the legal arguments advanced by the opponents of the present South African government, and though there is nothing in the book that has not already been amply canvassed in the doctrinal disputes of several years ago, it has the virtues of clarity and comprehensiveness of presentation and general moderation of treatment. The discussion is, however, rather abstract and theoretical and doctrinaire—un-"fact oriented"—by American standards. This is partly because it is written in the dominant English positivist tradition of legal study, and partly because of the necessities of the case in South Africa. The opponents of the Nationalist government needed legal arguments that would go to the one issue, but no more. They wanted to defeat the Nationalist government's attempt to remove the 50,000 "coloured" (i.e., of mixed blood) voters in the Cape Province from the common electoral rolls (these persons invariably voting for the oposition party and their vote being crucial in a number of seats); but they did not want to get into questions of ultimate political rights, for, as the recent United Nations commission on South Africa found, both government and opposition in South Africa were agreed on the merits of political non-representation of the non-Europeans in South Africa (the 1 million other "coloured" persons, 10 million Natives [Africans], and 300,000 Indians). This, plus the fact that the South African Supreme Court's philosophy of law was itself uniformly positivist in tone, dictated a tactical avoidance of any discussion of questions of a fundamental-law nature, questions of basic political and social rights in a democratic society and especially the right to vote—such as have begun to exercise the United States and Canadian Supreme Courts with the current neo-Natural Law revival in legal theory.

It is to Mr. Marshall's personal credit that, as an Englishman and not a South African, in reaction to the whole Apartheid program in South Africa, he should be prepared to repudiate the legal opinions advanced by the great majority of English and Commonwealth jurists (these opinions being advanced from the time of the enactment of the Statute of Westminster, in 1931, onward, and therefore independently of the bitter partisan events in South Africa of the early 1950's), that there were no longer,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since the passage of the Statute of Westminster, any legal barriers to the South African Parliament's acting, by ordinary legislative majority, to remove the "coloured" voters from the common rolls. Mr. Marshall's distinguished mentor, Professor K. C. Wheare, indeed, went beyond this and took the extreme step, in the fifth edition of his well-known study, *The Statute of Westminster,* of uttering a *mea culpa* as to the views of the South African Constitution that he had adhered to consistently (in common with most other Commonwealth authorities), throughout the first four editions. One may wonder, however, whether the *ad hoc* quality of this type of legal theorizing does not run counter to the main affirmative virtues of the English positivist creed which rests, after all, on an officially proclaimed non-subjectivity and impartiality of juristic attitudes in respect to great political *causes célèbres;* and whether, in such case, it is not better to embrace openly theories as to necessary minimum values in laws. To the answer that this latter solution would be politically embarrassing in a South African context, one may observe that the opposition in South Africa seem to have feet of clay and, on their actual detailed record in the parliamentary debates, do not seem in many instances to be much more meritorious than the government supporters. In any case it is worth recording now that at the time Mr. Marshall's book was in press, the South African Supreme Court, after a course of decisions over several years, in which it seemed to be trying to pursue a policy of introducing political and civil rights covertly, finally decided that the confines of an officially positivist judicial philosophy could be stretched no further in South Africa; and by its Senate Act decision, the Court broke down the last legal barriers to the government's removing the 50,000 "coloured" voters from the common electoral rolls, once and for all.

EDWARD MCWHINNEY

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good. By BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL. Translated by J. F. Huntington. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957.—xiv, 320 pp. $4.50.

M. Jouvenel's latest work is, in his words, a "difficult piece of exploration" for the "canons of conduct for the public authority of a dynamic society." Although the reader may hesitate to declare it a twentieth-century classic of political philosophy, he can hardly fail to be impressed by the rich learning, the graceful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wisdom and the forceful argument of the author. The leitmotif of *Sovereignty* is the liberalism of the "new Manchester School" represented in varying degrees by Professors Hayek, Jewkes, Oakeshott, Polanyi and Simons, and the late Ludwig von Mises. Its catalogue of political virtues includes the broad diffusion of political and economic power in society, laissez faire in market and forum, and the rule of law. Political sin incarnate is the Minotaur of "positive" government and "rationalistic" politics.

Hence the configuration of M. Jouvenel's pluralistic "utopia" is not surprising. Society, he eloquently reasons, develops by means of a dialectic between *dux* and *rex*, the human agents of change and stability. Man strives to achieve his private goods through group participation, and so change takes place. Change is necessary for the "dynamic society", but change unrestrained results in anarchy or totalitarianism. The essence of the state, therefore, must be "conservation", the preservation of a matrix of stability and order in which change can operate. The state as one group among others should function as the social adjuster continually reëstablishing the equilibrium upset by innovation stemming from group activity. All initiative and change properly belong to the group in its quest to satisfy private goods, and not to the state. A premium is placed upon liberty as voluntary obligation; the citizen must force himself to be free.

Two criticisms of M. Jouvenel's vision of the social and political good immediately come to mind. One is the old attack against classic pluralism given a fillip by Michels: How is the individual to attain his goods through the group if the group is unresponsive to his desires and needs? M. Jouvenel has not recognized, much less circumvented, the implications of the "iron law of oligarchy". His critique of the state can also be directed at the group. A second criticism amounts to training upon M. Jouvenel the very artillery that he aims at rationalistic politics. His good society is no less an ideal to be realized than that of the socialists, an abstraction of a past mode of behavior to be universalized in the future. The tension existing between intention and implementation is as true of M. Jouvenel's politics as it is of socialist politics. Such is a tragic aspect of life in general, not the peculiar defect of a particular political creed.

The clue to another type of criticism may be found in M. Jouvenel's Aristotelian outlook. The similarity of concepts is striking: the end of man as self-realization through social coöperation; political science as a moral science; the good society as an equilibrium of social forces; concord and law as the basis of political stability; the emphasis upon the aristocratic virtues;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the notions of association, authority and distributive justice. Also reminiscent of the founder of the Lyceum is the fact that the book is indeed an "exploration" and not a systematic treatise, as are the diffuseness of language and organization, and the wealth of curious folklore. But of more vital import is that M. Jouvenel like the Stagiran has written a grand coda to activity already completed, a political *Recherche du Temps Perdu*—in short what might be called a sublime failure to recognize that much of the past is past.

NEAL WOOD

BARNARD COLLEGE

As France Goes. By DAVID SCHOENBRUN. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957.—ix, 341 pp. $5.00; Text, $3.75.

The French Nation: From Napoleon to Pétain, 1814-1940. By D. W. BROGAN. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957.—328 pp. $4.50.

Winston Churchill is credited with the quip that the heaviest cross he had to bear during the war was the Cross of Lorraine. The course, some would say the vagaries, of the Fourth Republic and the seeming confusion of France since the liberation have been a perpetual source of hope to her detractors and a trial to her well-wishers. This condition and a wish to probe and understand the often irksome puzzle that is France are responsible for Mr. Schoenbrun's book. In addition, he is aware of and concerned by the fact that France cannot merely retreat into the position of another Switzerland and that the course of French affairs cannot help but have wide repercussions; hence the choice of his title.

Mr. Schoenbrun is primarily interested in present conditions and future prospects. His book is not history, though he has a proper appreciation of the unusual importance of the past in the French case; his historical introduction, while apt, is brief to the extent that it contains observations that may seem at times questionable. His method is the clinical one that examines the symptoms of a malady with a view to reaching a verdict on its causes, likely course, and possible cure. The roots of much of France's present difficulty lie in the past, especially in the period since the Great Revolution. The legacy of that unfinished and unresolved experiment has been the instability and division that stand in sharp contrast with the American experience: "our American *philosophy* of government is democratic, but our *form* of government is republican. In France the contrary is true"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(p. 75). No less significant is the fact that "France has never had a great, intelligent conservative party of the Right" (p. 91). Weak government has been the outcome, by intention rather than by accident. There is much to be said for weak government, but it is inadequate to the stresses of the twentieth century.

How to remedy this difficulty is the poser. Mechanical change alone, at the level of institutions, will not suffice, for "the National Assembly is . . . a true portrait of France itself" (p. 146); change must take place at the grass roots. The stress is well put on the importance of the French system of education with its emphasis on ruthless competition; more might have been said on that subject. What compounds the difficulty and bedevils any forecast is the fact that an analysis of the whole French complex supplies equally solid grounds for the prediction of ultimate disaster or astonishing revival. There is dearth of neither human nor material resources in France where stagnation and backwardness, of a degree appalling in a country supposedly modern, go hand in hand with developments of a most promising nature.

Mr. Schoenbrun does not feel that this duality can long endure; he sees France as a patient going through a high fever, the climax of the crisis of illness: death or recovery must follow in short order. The most acute and current manifestations of the crisis he finds in the imperial field, to a study of which the last section of his book is devoted. The record of folly—understandable in context, but folly nonetheless—is dramatically rehearsed in these pages. The analysis is generally sound though one detects in it a measure of the moralistic tendency characteristic of the American approach to imperial affairs.

However that may be, Mr. Schoenbrun, CBS correspondent in Paris these past ten years, knows the French scene, and his description of its various aspects—save for an amusing bias on the score of French traffic—will be found enlightening and useful by anyone interested in the drama currently being played out on the French stage.

If the rôle of history is of such importance in France, a good place to observe this rôle is the book of Professor Brogan, published earlier in England. Honorary citizen of the commune of *La Roche Blanche,* Professor Brogan has long made himself thoroughly familiar with French history and the contemporary French milieu; his detailed survey of *France Under the* [*Third*] *Republic* is well established in the field. The present book is much shorter and covers a longer period; less burdened with detail, it makes for easier reading. His knowledge of the subject

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is indeed encyclopedic, but he carries his learning with lightness which enables him to give proper attention and weight to the aspect of cultural development, for instance, and to relate it to others.

With many of Mr. Schoenbrun's observations Professor Brogan would agree; writing as a historian, his analysis goes naturally deeper when he illustrates and underscores the factor of continuity and the weight of tradition. The Great Revolution unquestionably wrought profound changes in the French body politic, but also allowed much to continue; the concept and the rôle of *notable* have ever been a large factor in shaping the course of events. A relatively little advertised institution, quietly operating in the background of the more obvious political turmoil, the *conseil d'état,* still carries on this tradition under the Fourth Republic to which the *grand commis* is also anything but alien.

The political instability associated with France is here depicted and traced through the variety of régimes and constitutions that have been hers during the nineteenth century. It all becomes quite understandable, no evidence of any special or congenital inability, but rather token of devotion to principle combined with a quality of intellectual intransigeance—so-called, mistakenly, French logic—which has minimized the rôle of that indispensable component of successful government, compromise.

Order in the political domain need not be the highest good; we have had occasion in our time to reckon the cost both to themselves and to others of orderly and efficient peoples and governments. The fact remains that disorganization and division can also be expensive luxuries, as the events of 1940 proved in the French case, even if due weight should be given to the drain that the First World War was on France and to the impossible position in which that conflict left her: guardian of the organization of Europe without adequate power for the task, France was in addition impeded rather than aided by her erstwhile allies.

The fact remains also that the French, a people individually dedicated to the virtue of thrift, have been highly wasteful of their resources, human no less than material. To prefer moderation in all respects, even in wealth, is not necessarily criminal, but to refuse to modernize industry is not consistent with the maintenance of a former place among nations. Both writers agree that things may be changing in France, but Professor Brogan, the historian, less concerned with the immediate, closes on a note of mellow skepticism:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A people which, in one hundred and fifty years, has astonished the world in every field of achievement, which had known every form of glory, in war, in sanctity, in all the arts and sciences, had yet failed to find institutions that united the French people and gave them a political way of life worthy of their genius, their courage, their legitimate hopes. Possibly the historian is wise to content himself with echoing the philosopher and not being disappointed or surprised. "This world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil."

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders. By HANS SPEIER. Evanston and White Plains, Row, Peterson and Company, 1957.—xiii, 272 pp. $5.00.

West German Leadership and Foreign Policy. Edited by HANS SPEIER and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON. Evanston and White Plains, Row, Peterson and Company, 1957.—x, 323 pp. $7.00.

Credit our military services with a more encompassing research interest than the development of anti-missile missiles and space ships. The United States Air Force, for instance, commissioned the RAND Corporation to study important West European military and political developments. These two volumes, dealing with the German scene, are an impressive contribution to this project, and continue the RAND series of praiseworthy, scholarly monographs.

German Rearmament and Atomic War is a thoughtful analysis of the attitudes of German military and political leaders toward problems of defense. No novice to military strategy and German politics, Hans Speier, head of RAND's Social Science Division, has drawn upon a variety of German sources, especially military journals, and firsthand observations gathered from two hundred interviews. A few of the findings may cause apprehension, for they reveal the bulk of the former military leaders, some again on active duty, to be quite conservative in military and political affairs. Thus, in reflecting upon the past, most officers refuse to admit the Reichswehr's contribution to Hitler's rise to power, and fail to pass moral judgment upon the attempted assassination of him in 1944.

Of little political influence as a pressure group nowadays, the officers nevertheless have an impact upon the military posture and strategy through their personal contacts at all levels of officialdom in government and business. Therefore, their views

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on related problems of war and peace assume significance to German and United States policy-makers. German officers generally view the cold war as a game of chess, deprecate neutralism, support a Western alliance, and fear the weakness of the NATO Powers in the event of atomic blackmail or actual hostilities. Their strategic planning deals with land rather than air warfare, with conventional rather than nuclear weapons. To be sure, the younger elements in the Defense Ministry do not entirely share their views concerning strategy.

An attitudinal survey of the political élite on matters of foreign and military policy follows, and lends a fresh perspective to familiar events. In his incisive comments, the author spares no party. He characterizes the Social Democratic blindness to the Soviet policy against reunification as unrealistic and naïve, and brands Adenauer's protestations that a Western policy of strength would lead to reunification as "the rhetoric they had always been." He surveys the conflicting position of the parties as they pertain to the European Defense Community, Western European Union, and current problems arising from the newly created military establishment. In addition he focuses attention on the interaction of the politician and the military specialist.

A companion volume, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy*, edited by Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, further sweeps along the political spectrum. Six social scientists, all astute observers of German developments and experts in their respective disciplines, have contributed chapters on various important institutions. They have succeeded well in their endeavor to study key issues and analyze the types of decisions German leaders are likely to make in the future. The selection and description of institutions provide breadth and depth to the study, although one may question the omission of the churches, which are politically quite active.

The title of the book is somewhat misleading as several writers deal with domestic policy in addition to foreign policy. If there is a unifying thread running through the symposium, based in large part on German sources and personal interviews, it is the lack, so far, of a democratic institutional pluralism which could effectively exert pressure upon the Bonn policy-makers in the realms of domestic and foreign affairs. True, Germany lacks the grass-roots tradition of civic participation but, more significantly, her citizens at all strata have tired of politics and, as leaders outside of government readily attest and themselves demonstrate, tend to be unopinionated, especially about foreign policy developments. How easy then for the Chancellor to act

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with few restraints. How essential the need, it would seem, for an enlightened officialdom and attentive public to provide the necessary checks.

Samuel L. Wahrhaftig deals primarily with the rôle of the Foreign Office and its struggle to assume the stature of a major policy-making department in the mold of the Wilhelmstrasse era. Characteristically, in making the decisions on foreign affairs, Adenauer relies not only on the advice of ministerial officials but even more on a few trusted friends and party men. Henry J. Kellermann describes the views of party leaders toward selected foreign policy problems and toward the major Powers. There is, for instance, much talk about supranationalism, but no agreement as to its effectuation. There is some political neutralism, but cultural orientation toward the West. The image of other Powers often reflects prejudice based on personal experience, rather than on objective information. John H. Herz concerns himself with the "unpolitical" ideas of the majority of civil servants who are pitted against a minority of liberal anti-Nazis, many in leading positions. The resulting tension may bode ill not only for the service, but for the already tenuous relationship between the citizen and the bureaucrat. Otto Kirchheimer and Gabriel A. Almond deal, respectively, with the politics of the trade unions and organized business whose pressures upon the government primarily concern economic affairs and only spasmodically foreign affairs. Labor chiefs generally support the Social Democrats, while many business men, especially the Ruhr magnates, have turned into "industrial fanatics" and shy away from partisan politics, although enriching Christian Democratic campaign coffers. W. Phillips Davison diagnoses the mass media and public opinion polls. He concludes that the mass media have surprisingly little influence upon government policy, although they serve to reinforce the political and economic *status quo*. Polls dealing with foreign affairs indicate these attitudes: Western military forces should not be withdrawn from Germany; rearmament is grudgingly accepted by a majority; and the peaceful means to reunification must be fully explored.

Political apathy is the normative and not the exceptional pattern, but a gradual awareness and acceptance of democracy as a way of life are becoming evident. These conclusions are reached by most authors in this volume and are reinforced by the pollsters. Thus one may regard the future course of German foreign policy with a mixture of optimism tempered with pessimism. Given the fluidity of world politics and internal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

developments, future policy remains, of course, unpredictable. Yet policy is also a reflection of traditions, mores, doctrines, personalities and expectations. These two invaluable volumes provide the necessary reference points for an understanding of governmental policy and the dynamics of the German political scene.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Behind the Rape of Hungary. By FRANÇOIS FEJTÖ. New York, David McKay Company, 1957.—xv, 335 pp. $4.00.

François Fejtö undoubtedly succeeded in accomplishing the difficult task of presenting the tragedy, of which as a Hungarian exile he is part, free from rightly expected subjectivity. Or, as Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote the preface to this book, more fittingly observes, the author " tells the truth without unnecessary pathos ".

The subject is the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. Correctly, the author emphasizes meticulously the antecedents back to 1945 but concentrates on the events which took place in Hungary after Stalin's death. Greatly intriguing are those parts which deal with the frustration of the " intelligentsia " in Hungary that eventually led to its own palace rebellion and ultimately to the whole popular uprising. The reader is left little doubt concerning the untenableness of the standard argument of the pro-Soviet apologists, namely, that the revolt had been entirely the work of Fascists, encouraged by (mostly American) reactionary elements from abroad. By the way, the top three of the now imprisoned angry writers—Háy, Déry and Zelk—are of Jewish extraction. How could this critical corps of intellectual vanguards, whose loyalty to the radical Left never left any doubt and who suffered so enormously from the anti-Semitism of Nazism, be accused of Fascist allegiance?

The author also gives an answer to a long-disturbing question. Did the rebellion, as suspected by many observers abroad, really have an anti-Semitic taint? Was not another white terror in the making on account of the fact that many of the Communist top leaders in Soviet-controlled Hungary, such as Rákosi, Gerö, Vas and others, happened to be of Jewish extraction? The author gives a detached and convincing account of how this aspect can easily be ruled out, since there was not a single noteworthy manifestation of this kind during the whole course of the uprising. Indeed, a nation such as Hungary, subjected to the cross fires of Nazism, war, foreign rule and communism—all within the span

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a single generation—does not need anti-Semitic or other ulterior stimuli to rebel against a rule which became unbearable to the great majority. What the rebels, truly the Hungarian people, wanted were the elementary freedoms of any democracy. The moderate character of their plans for the future, spontaneously manifested in the very heat of the uprising and comprehensively presented in the narrative, makes it convincing that these freedoms would not have been misused.

In his conclusions the author suggests that the October uprising can by no means be marked as a victory for the West. His reason for this raises an interesting but debatable point: "while rejecting the totalitarian communist system the Hungarian people displayed no desire to return to the bosom of Capitalism. The path of the uprising did not lead backward; it led forward, toward the democratization of socialism" (p. 333). However, one can hardly debate over this concluding statement: "the West lost a battle in Hungary by its failure to give assistance to the Hungarians, by making it possible for the Russians to prove to all their satellites that revolution does not pay" (pp. 333-34).

Although this very illuminating and easy flowing book was apparently designed for the lay reader, it is also most informative to the student in this field.

G. CHARLES PAIKERT

LE MOYNE COLLEGE,
SYRACUSE, N.Y.

Bulgaria. Edited by L. A. D. DELLIN. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957.—xvii, 457 pp. $8.50.

Romania. Edited by STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957.—xv, 399 pp. $8.50.

These two volumes are part of a series of seven published in 1956 and 1957 for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee under the general editorship and directorship of Professor Robert F. Byrnes. The series is intended to provide thorough, accurate and well-organized information on developments in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia under Communist rule. Conceived in the spring of 1954, when the dearth of accurate information on these countries was probably the most troublesome aggravation confronting the contributors and editors, the volumes neared completion just when the flow of valuable material increased suddenly and sharply, necessitating some major and obviously hurried revisions. These politically-caused hazards

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

served to compound the normal difficulties confronting all pioneer research.

An attempt has been made to maintain a parallel organization of the contents of the two volumes here reviewed. Each opens with a brief historical introduction and continues with chapters on geography and demography. There follow analyses of the constitutional system, political parties, governmental organization, and national security. Cultural and social developments are dealt with in chapters on religion, education, literature, the arts, information media, labor, public health and social security, while the economies of Bulgaria and Romania are discussed under the headings of national income and product, agriculture, industry, transportation and communications. A separate chapter on trade in the book on Bulgaria is replaced in its sister volume on Romania by one dealing with mining. To both studies are appended brief and occasionally inaccurate biographical sketches of leading Communists, chronologies for the years 1944 to 1956, and the dates of principal treaties and agreements concluded during the same time span. Useful bibliographies conclude each book. The nineteen chapters and three appendices of the volume on Bulgaria represent the work of fifteen scholars while eight contributors produced the sixteen chapters and three appendices of the Romanian equivalent.

It is manifest that a major editorial problem which is confronted in the preparation of books of this genre is to avoid falling between the two stools of vague schematization and excessive agglomeration of detail. Professor Dellin appears to have coped with this difficulty somewhat more successfully than did Professor Fischer-Galati. In each volume, the chapters dealing with geography, demography and the economy are, probably by the nature of these subjects, useful as reference material rather than as narrative reading. They all indicate a high level of competence on the part of the contributors. It is in the treatment of historical, political and social developments that the relative superiority of the volume on Bulgaria manifests itself. Professor Cyril E. Black, writing on "Bulgaria in Historical Perspective", has capably compressed into twenty-five pages an informative and provocative summary. He argues (pp. 4-7) that the five centuries of Ottoman rule over Bulgaria were hardly the permanent nightmare they are often alleged to have been and that the Turks by no means bear exclusive responsibility for Bulgaria's backwardness on emerging into independence in modern times. He is also justifiably vigorous (p. 15) in his strictures on the policy, pursued by almost all pre-Communist Bulgarian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governments with the exception of the Stambolisky interlude of 1919 to 1923, of concentrating on the achievement of Bulgaria's irredentist frontier claims to the virtual exclusion of internal reform and modernization, thereby crippling the country's social and political development and contributing heavily to her economic stagnation.

A few errors and misinterpretations mar this chapter and the equally excellent one by Professor Dellin himself on "Politics and Political Organizations". Thus, Professor Black mistakenly dates the founding of the Bulgarian Social Democratic party in 1894 and ascribes primary credit for this action to Yanko Sakazov. In fact, this party had been founded in 1891, Sakazov sharing the initiative with Dimitar Blagoev and Nikola Gabrovsky. Under the pressure of police persecution, the party almost disintegrated in 1892 when Sakazov decided that its founding had been premature and withdrew to organize the professedly nonpolitical Social Democratic Union which in 1894 he remerged with the Social Democratic party. Another criticism which might be made without injustice is that neither Professor Black nor Professor Dellin stresses sufficiently the extent to which the Macedonian population of Bulgaria in general and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in particular held Bulgarian policy to ransom from the fall of Stambolisky in 1923 to the military *coup d'état* of 1934. Otherwise Professor Dellin's typology of Bulgarian political parties and his account of the Communist seizure of power are masterly.

In at least three different passages (pp. 76, 115, 186) it is correctly claimed that, during the Second World War, Bulgaria alone of the Axis Powers refused to permit the deportation of her Jewish citizens. Simultaneously, it is admitted that some anti-Jewish legislation was enacted. This important issue must be clarified without ambiguities. Bulgaria had virtually no anti-Semitic tradition and when, under German pressure, the establishment of ghettoes and labor camps was announced in August 1942, Prime Minister Filov, Interior Minister Gabrovsky, Metropolitan Stefan and the King's secretary, Balan, successfully used their power and influence to mitigate the effect of these decrees as well as that of the expulsion of Sofia's Jewish population into the countryside in May 1943, on which occasion Metropolitan Stefan even hid the Chief Rabbi. It is undeniable, however, that in March 1943 the Bulgarian government organized the transportation of 11,000 Jews from the Macedonian and Thracian provinces of Yugoslavia and Greece which its army was then occupying, to the death camps of Auschwitz, Treblinka and Lublin.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Romania, in contrast to Bulgaria, had as virulent an anti-Semitic tradition as any country in Eastern Europe, a fact brought out in the volume edited by Professor Fischer-Galati. The virtues of this highly useful book are marred by a number of faults most of which are due to excessive brevity and schematization in the discussion of issues meriting fuller development. The thirteen-page chapter presenting the historical background is cryptic to the point of confusing the reader who is uninitiated, for example, in the problem of the Magyar and Romanian arguments over Transylvania. Neither this chapter nor the one on political parties discusses adequately the interwar difficulties posed by the fusion of the Old Kingdom with Transylvania, Bessarabia, Banat and Bukovina after the First World War. Nor is the peculiarly patrimonial nature of party leadership in pre-Communist Romania analyzed.

Since the primary purpose of this entire series of volumes is, however, to inform the reader of developments since the Communist seizure of power, these shortcomings, though deplorable, are hardly catastrophic. Both books are useful.

J. A. ROTHSCHILD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Yugoslavia. Edited by ROBERT F. BYRNES. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957.—xv, 488 pp. $8.50.

This is the third in a series of seven volumes entitled "East-Central Europe Under the Communists", a project of the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee. It is twenty-third in the Praeger Publications in Russian History and World Communism.

As any handbook should, this one offers much information. Its nineteen chapters are about equally divided between capsule accounts of Yugoslavia's history, geography, political life and education on the one hand, and statistical reviews of the post-war Yugoslav economy on the other. A useful appendix offers the biographies of forty leading Yugoslav Communists and lists of chief Communist party and government officials. The volume as a whole reflects the state of the Yugoslav nation up to August 1956. It would appear that the state of the Yugoslav nation is not good.

Though this work avoids evaluation, it leads inevitably to the conclusion that Tito has been more successful in establishing political control than economic progress. Nestling beneath the shrubbery of statistics throughout the latter half of the book are hard rocks such as these:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> If 1939 is taken as a starting point, the past decade represents a considerable decline in a majority of branches of agricultural production . . . . Lack of skilled technicians has become a serious problem . . . . Improper management is one of the most serious dilemmas confronting the mining economy . . . . Productivity of labor is low . . . . Industrialization has lowered living standards. . . . The distribution of electric power is generally very inefficient. . . . Although Yugoslavia has more than 1200 kilometers of navigable rivers, its river shipbuilding industry is neglected . . . . The number of state, co-operative, and private retail stores in the 1946-54 period . . . shows that the socialization of the retail trade network was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the number of stores . . . . There is general recognition of the weakness of the credit system, but no effective action has been taken to correct it . . . . Over 50 per cent of the population is not covered by any form of social insurance . . . . The Yugoslav standard of living remains one of the lowest in Europe.

One can compare such statements with the following observation: "The enormous Communist bureaucracy (far larger than that of the prewar government) live on a standard at least comparable to that of the prewar bourgeoisie."

It seems ungracious to chide for its omissions and other faults a volume that brings together in such convenient form much useful and reasonably reliable information, especially when the editor himself is so frank about the shortcomings of this symposium. Professor Byrnes supplies some explanations: the material is fragmentary. Communist data are untrustworthy. All pioneer research has faults and weaknesses, especially lack of analysis. Direction of the project changed in midstream. The authors represented a wide variety of training, experience and political points of view. This particular volume in the series, Byrnes volunteers, "suffered heavily from the Center's having given Yugoslavia a low priority in terms of maintaining a research staff and of collecting material." Byrnes does not say why this should have been so; he only states that the result was the omission of "several of the most significant and fascinating problems and factors in recent Yugoslav history: new Yugoslav Communist theories on the organization of the state and of the economy, the role of Western aid, the economic and political viability of Yugoslavia, the relative popular appeal of the present regime, and the effectiveness of the regime in building a foundation for the time when Tito is no longer on the scene." It would be difficult to imagine more serious omissions, but Editor Byrnes supplies more: "religion, one of the most important and underrated forces of our time and probably the most significant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cultural and political factor affecting Yugoslav developments; literature and the arts; and labor."

The obvious moral is that plural efforts do not in themselves produce teamwork, that salaried or commissioned research does not in itself guarantee the best results, and that one scholar's intellectual engagement and even personal judgment can outweigh the scattered efforts of a dozen researchers doing a competent job. The present reviewer would rather have, even as a reference work covering much of the same material, the work of one scholar, Jozo Tomasevich—*Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford University Press, 1955)—than the present manual, however useful, and others like it. Still one should be grateful for any straightforward effort to deal with so complex a subject. The present volume, and indeed the series as a whole, should serve many needs.

MICHAEL B. PETROVICH

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood. By MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xviii, 360 pp. $6.00.

This book is an over-all appraisal of Israel's governmental structure, and an excellent detailed analysis of certain governmental agencies or functions. Coverage is thus uneven. To national economics and to welfare-state activities, Professor Bernstein devotes nearly half the book (pp. 183-342). The first half includes a historical introduction, a description of the structure of government, a thumbnail sketch of political parties, a discussion of the electoral system, and a competent discussion of the administrative and judicial services of the country. "Despite the relative absence of appropriate experience in democratic governance and the unsuitability of Zionist politics as a foundation for statehood," Professor Bernstein finds that "Israel has displayed remarkable adaptability in meeting the challenge of national independence" (p. 342).

The book suffers from a number of weaknesses. For one thing (and this may be the fault of the publisher rather than the author), it is mistitled. The brief section on political parties is adequately descriptive but lacks depth of analysis. For instance, the German background of the Progressive party and of the former *Aliyah Ḥadasha* group whose members it largely absorbed is inadequately discussed (pp. 77-78). Nearly entirely absent is a discussion of the political dynamics of the country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What there is of it suffers from oversimplification. Professor Bernstein seems to have a particular antipathy toward the religious parties of the country and their adherents. As a result, he fails to sense the feeling of frustration of those elements in Israel who hoped for a Jewish state and feel cheated by the secular state of Jews in which they live. If "some ultra-orthodox Jews [regard] civilian government [in Israel] as wholly superfluous and irreligious", it is not simply "because it encouraged men to rely on their own efforts rather than God's will" (p. 154), but because "the sale of pork, the raising of pigs, and the conscription of women," inadequate religious education, and nonreligious activity on the Sabbath (p. 73) are to them a desecration of the pattern of Jewish personal religious conduct all the more lamentable because it occurs in a state of Jews. (The same conflict, *mutatis mutandis*, exists in the Muslim states where, similarly, "civilian government" is under attack by those who view with horror the super-imposition of secular Western concepts and institutions on traditional Muslim society.)

Although the Arab political parties in the *Knesset* (Parliament) have held five seats (out of 120) since 1951, only two paragraphs are devoted to them (p. 80). Arab political life in Israel could have been treated more fully here and elsewhere in the book. The nature of Army control over Arab-inhabited areas and the activities of the Alien Property Custodian in relation to Arab property are mentioned but not discussed adequately.

Professor Bernstein's discussion of the governmental machinery, with his criticism of and his suggestions concerning it, is no doubt the best part of the book. Certain omissions from this section are regrettable, however. At least the non-operational aspects of the Israel Defense Forces should have been discussed, such as civilian-military relationships in government, political activities of and in the forces, the administration of the Defense Ministry's armaments industry, and so on.

There are a few minor comments and corrections. The consistent use of the term "Cabinet" would have been better than "Government" (although an explanation is given on p. 122). Terms like *Aliyah* (p. 7) and *Emek Jezreel* (p. 11) should have been explained. *Vaadat Hamazav* should be rendered as "Committee on the Situation" rather than "Committee of the Condition" (p. 33).

The author has relied heavily on his own observations in Israel. It is a pity that, with very few exceptions, no Hebrew sources appear to have been consulted. For instance, there have been articles on Israel's government in *Ha'aretz* which equal if not surpass in value articles in the *Jerusalem Post*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite its weaknesses, this is a valuable book, of particular interest to students of Israeli public and economic administration, as well as to all interested in governmental problems of new states.

ABRAHAM M. HIRSCH

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Islam in Modern History. By WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—x, 317 pp. $6.00.

Islam Inflamed: A Middle East Picture. By JAMES MORRIS. New York, Pantheon Books, 1957.—326 pp. $5.00.

The two books under review have little in common except the word "Islam" in their titles. In style, approach and content they differ fundamentally, and whereas Professor Smith's book will remain for long an indispensable work in the field, that of Mr. Morris will most probably be soon forgotten.

Professor Smith, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University, has been closely studying the Islamic world for some twenty-five years, and has a thorough knowledge of at least two of its leading languages, Arabic and Urdu. He is fully aware of the importance, and has attempted to analyze the operation, of two sets of forces that are shaping the Muslim world: the religious, including Islam, Christianity and Hinduism, and the socio-political, including nationalism, industrialism, Marxism and democracy. He is bold, deep and incisive in his thinking, but without a trace of arrogance, and clear, vivid and often eloquent in his style. The result is in many ways the best book on the subject since H. A. R. Gibb's *Modern Trends in Islam* of 1947.

The first chapter deals with "Islam in History" and contains suggestive new interpretations of the course of medieval Islam; its central thesis is the stress laid by Islam on righteous action by and through the community, and hence on the historical process, "which is that community in motion." "By ignoring complexities, one might arrange representatives of these faiths in a graded series as follows: the Hindu, for whom ultimately history is not significant; the Christian, for whom it is significant but not decisive; the Muslim, for whom it is decisive but not final; the Marxist, for whom it is all in all."

The second chapter covers "Islam in Recent History", and is followed by area studies. "The Arabs: Islamic Crisis" brings out very well the social and political problems of the Arabs and their nationalist and religious responses. "Turkey: Islamic Reformation" studies the impact of social changes in that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country and raises two fundamental questions: "Can a non-Christian nation be a member of Western civilization?" and "Can one generate a Reformation by fiat?—even when providing the milieu?" "Pakistan: Islamic State" discusses the difficulties faced in the attempt to build on Muslim bases a state capable of coping with contemporary problems. "India: Islamic Involvement" describes the unique position of the Muslim minority in these terms: "Muslims have either had political power or they have not. *Never before have they shared it with others.*" The concluding chapter deals very briefly with "Other Areas".

There are a few slips in the book; for example, the "fall of Czechoslovakia to communism" is put in 1952 (p. 105); and, naturally, this reviewer disagrees with certain interpretations, such as, that the power of the clerics in Pakistan seems to have been overstressed. But these are minor criticisms of what is, to repeat, an outstanding book by a learned, intelligent and thoroughly penetrating scholar.

Like Professor Smith, Mr. Morris writes very well, but there the resemblance ends. He is no scholar but a journalist who has managed to produce four books in three years. Taking full advantage of modern transport, he has flitted from Juba in the south to the Caspian and feels he has to give a wider public the benefit of his impressions. Many of these impressions are vivid and some are amusing, especially those of the Arabian sheikhdoms, which readily lend themselves to burlesque. Hence the reader who is not unduly bothered by the distinction between *Dichtung* and *Wahrheit* may get a good deal of fun out of this book.

But those who really want to learn something about the Middle East will have to turn elsewhere. It is not merely the factual errors, though there are plenty of these. Take economics for example: Egypt's annual per capita income is put at "less than $28" (p. 23) instead of $100. "Iraq can look ahead to Scandinavian standards of comfort" in "only a decade or two" (p. 285). This conclusion is not surprising in view of the assertion that "Iraqi agriculture alone can produce an annual income of twelve million [presumably billion] dollars—about $3000 annually per capita" (p. 288). Or take history: Tamerlane's capture of Damascus (1401 A.D.) is placed in the twelfth century (p. 122). Iraq's medieval population is put at 35 million (p. 285). In the Middle Ages, cultural exchanges between Arabs and Europeans are said to have taken place by "way of Spain and the Danube Basin" (p. 122)—one can imagine the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kulturtraeger trudging cheerfully through hordes of Pechenegs, Bulgars, Magyars and other Danubian devotees of culture. But all this is forgivable. When, however, Mr. Morris reports the following conversation in Lebanon, "'What feast day is this?' I asked the taxi driver. 'Christmas friend,' he replied without a smile (it was the middle of July)" (p. 110), and when one recalls how religious and conscious of feast days are all Lebanese, one really begins to wonder.

The truth is that Mr. Morris does not like the Middle East of today. If it had only consented to remain a museum piece he would have been happy. For, "one of the great pleasures of the Middle East is to encounter a tribe of Kurds on the move" looking like "a community of unusually cheerful brigands crossing a steppe to commit an atrocity" (p. 278). Unfortunately, things have changed; for instance, "Arabs often made excellent mechanics and machine workers and adapted themselves all too easily to the industrial life" (p. 251). And by the same token, Middle Easterners and other Asians will not like Mr. Morris' book. Indeed, if anyone wants to understand why the West is so cordially disliked in Asia, all he has to do is glance through *Islam Inflamed*—a horrible title but one for which not Mr. Morris but presumably his American publisher is responsible.

CHARLES ISSAWI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence. By HUGH TINKER. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1957.—xiv, 424 pp. 42*s.*; $6.75.

In 1942 John L. Christian brought out his masterpiece, *Modern Burma.* Enlarged and reissued in 1945 as *Burma and the Japanese Invader,* it stands as the definitive survey of pre-war Burma. For the period from 1945 on, in which Burma won her independence and launched herself into the international community, no full-scale work on Burma has been published to bring Christian up to date. The one collective effort, *Burma* by Frank N. Trager and Associates (New Haven, 1956), has so far had only very limited distribution.

Dr. Hugh Tinker, of the University of London, has filled this gap, providing a first-rate study of contemporary Burma which will stand with George Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* as a classic in Southeast Asian studies. In *The Union*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Burma, Tinker specifically sets himself the task of providing a sequal to Christian—an interim progress report on Burma. He is fully aware that it is early to produce a definitive and objective review of this period and that abrupt and unexpected changes are possible at any time—a few of which, especially in shifts in leadership, have already occurred since his book went to press. Even so, through a combination of thorough research, sympathetic understanding of the Burmese people, and a personal ability to view his own judgments with detachment and self-effacing humor, Tinker has succeeded in producing an authoritative study which will stand up under the most exacting reading of the specialist and, at the same time, can be expected to hold the interest of the general reader.

He sketches the backdrop for modern Burma in two concise introductory chapters covering the war years, the nationalist negotiations and threatened violence, the British withdrawal, and the widespread, and continuing, civil war which followed. The body of his study is divided into eleven additional well-balanced chapters covering the political, economic and social progress of the period. The record, as he intends it, is saved from being thoroughly unimpressive by the constant reminders of the violence and dislocation in Burma in the past fifteen years. Tinker reports all the reasons that would justify deep pessimism for Burma's future. Yet throughout he presents a basis for a well-reasoned hope.

For American readers it will probably be the two chapters, "Towards a Welfare State" (chapter 4) and "Education and Social Services" (chapter 7), that are most interesting; for, here in the course of criticizing Burmese developments, he ventures some important criticisms of the American approach to problems in Burma and Southeast Asia. He describes Burmese plans for political reform and economic development as a "divorce of planning from reality". "The pattern of Burma's economy is the same today, in 1956, as it was five years ago: a pale imitation of the same economy fifteen years ago" (p. 127). For this Tinker in part blames the American advisory firm on whose comprehensive survey Burma had built her development plans. Tinker's comments here are addressed to the underlying assumptions upon which the economic projections are based—particularly that the Burmese population would respond to economic stimuli in the same manner as Americans and that the government could count on a high rate of capital formation. This criticism is softened by Tinker's note that the whole American effort is in striking contrast to traditional British policies, that "it is not for an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Englishman to pass judgment on an attitude that is so dissimilar to his own," and that, while the short-term effects of the American efforts "have not been impressive . . . their long-term influence may be much greater than that of Europe in Asia" (p. 110).

Similarly Tinker's severe criticism of the Burmese government for its lagging political reforms is softened by the well-merited praise he gives its leaders, especially U Nu, but also U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein, M. A. Raschid and others. He praises them for their steadfastness in the face of overwhelming adversity, their willingness to experiment, and their ability to subordinate personal differences in support of the national interest. (This last is in striking contrast to the in-fighting among the pre-war Burmese politicians.)

In the excellent chapter on Burmese education, American educators may well examine their conscience in connection with one of Tinker's passing comments: "To an increasing extent Burmese students are finding difficulty . . . in adjusting themselves to the standards of British universities. Some American institutions have adopted a double standard with only nominal requirements for Asian students, and it is much easier to secure a place in American universities where scholarships are offered on a more lavish scale than in Britain" (p. 210). When this reviewer was in Rangoon in 1955 a resolution was introduced—but did not pass—in the University Senate to equate an American M.A. with a Rangoon University B.A.

For all the discouraging factors in a contemporary survey of Burma, the over-all tone of Tinker's book is hopeful. If, as he expects—and it seems reasonable from all recent reports to do so—Communist China will leave Burma in relative peace, Burma should make steady improvement over the coming years. Since his book went to press a number of things have already occurred to bear out his predictions. The rule of law appears to be emerging slowly as the rule of Burma.

Tinker's summary contains the surprisingly sweeping statement—that "In a major sense the story of Britain's rule in Burma is one of failure" (p. 381). Throughout his book he has heavily criticized Britain on specific issues, but nothing he said would build to such a conclusion. As a Britisher he is harder on Britain than many others, including Burmese political figures who have been known to argue that Burma's instability as compared with India is due in part to Burma's shorter experience under British rule. Written shortly after the Suez Crisis at the time of a former British governor's visit to Burma, an editorial in Burma's leading English-language paper, the *Nation*, ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pressed the underlying attitude: "It would seem that in some countries, that which we look upon as British annoyance has assumed the intensity of hatred, but as far as we are concerned we have so deeply imbibed British culture and institutions that we are in fact, if not in theory, spiritually associated" (Rangoon, January 10, 1957).

JOHN SEABURY THOMSON

CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND

Japan Between East and West. Edited by PHILIP E. MOSELY. Foreword by ERNEST A. GROSS. New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957.—xxii, 327 pp. $4.75.

The changing rôle of an independent Japan in world affairs was the subject in 1956 of a study group of the Council on Foreign Relations. The group, which discussed six papers prepared by experts, included some area-language specialists, others responsible for dealing with problems of diplomacy, trade and cultural exchange, and still others interested in American foreign policy. Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director of Studies for the Council, helped steer the discussions and edited the final volume. The group was indebted to the Honorable Ernest A. Gross, former Assistant Secretary of State and United States Ambassador to the United Nations, who skillfully served as chairman. (This reviewer was privileged to participate and to attend discussions of all the papers.)

In view of the vigor of the discussions and the experience of those who participated in the study apart from the six authors, it is a shame that the entire proceedings could not be brought to the reader. There was a wide consensus of views on the current situation in Japan. Indeed, the only general criticism of the book might be that each finished contribution must stand on its own merits, since there is no attempt to formulate conclusions subscribed to by all. Nevertheless, the discussions strengthened each paper.

All the papers, as Ambassador Gross points out in his Foreword, play around a common theme: "the assumption by Japan of its rightful place in the international community and the problems attending this process." In counterpoint, the assumption that control by an occupation is very much like a colonial establishment is implicit in the papers, and may indeed explain the attendant frustrations of American policy, faced by a Japan which often acts with the neutralist Afro-Asian bloc rather than as an independent ally of the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" Politics and the Future of Democracy in Japan " is the first paper, contributed by Hugh Borton, recently become President of Haverford College. All political tensions, Dr. Borton explains, are not the heritage of the occupation. Segmentation of both major parties, for example, is in the pre-war tradition. The discussion of the original study group concentrated on the staying power of democracy in Japan. Eugene Dooman, former Counselor of the United States Embassy in Tokyo, felt that our reforms were weak because there was no natural basis for them; Dr. Borton, because they were imposed by the occupiers.

In " Communism in Independent Japan ", Paul F. Langer of the University of Southern California describes the strategy, leadership, organization and strength of the Japan Communist party.

Jerome B. Cohen, well-known authority on the Japanese economy and Professor in the College of the City of New York, contributes " International Aspects of Japan's Economic Situation ". In the group discussion, vigorous argument revolved around Dr. Cohen's thesis that, in economic terms, China had little to offer Japan, despite the widespread pressure in Japan for revival of trade. Dr. Cohen admits that communist countries often use barter as a political weapon.

In " Literary and Intellectual Currents in Postwar Japan and Their International Implications ", Donald Keene of Columbia University is forthright in refusing to attribute any direct political implications to Japanese literary art. In its apolitical emphasis, however, lies a source of strength because of a fierce Japanese urge to independence. Professor Keene's is an intriguing portrait of Japanese literary life and a well-written essay.

The present Director of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, C. Martin Wilbur, contributes a carefully documented paper on " Japan and the Rise of Communist China ". Here we have a field-tested analysis of China's campaign to win over Japanese public opinion. (Appendix A offers findings of Japanese public opinion polls.)

In many ways, William J. Jorden's concluding chapter, on " Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West ", most clearly epitomizes the book. Certainly this paper sparked the most heated and interesting discussion. Mr. Jorden spent six years in Japan (1948-1954), obviously devoted to close observation. (He has since become chief of *The New York Times* bureau in Moscow.) He boldly and accurately pin-points the corrosive effects of our continuing semi-occupation. The discussion of Okinawa—our Pacific Cyprus—is especially significant. Such points of friction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been disruptive both to domestic Japanese politics and to Japanese–American relations. (Appendix B presents a summary of Japan's external relations as of May 1, 1957.)

The original proceedings and papers have been enhanced with a series of eighteen valuable tables, dealing with election returns, trade statistics and public opinion.

ARDATH W. BURKS

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite". By JAMES H. MEISEL. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1958.—vii, 432 pp. $7.50.

In his big, rich, exhaustive, learned, well-written, and on the whole objective book, Professor Meisel of the University of Michigan has presented us with what he calls "an intellectual biography" of Gaetano Mosca. This biography is recounted through a detailed description and critique of Mosca's work: primarily those writings that develop the theory of the ruling class, but also his voluminous works on the history of political theory. To use a phrase he himself applies to Mosca, Professor Meisel is "anything but an intellectual miser," and what he gives us here is an enormous amount of learning and wisdom not only about Mosca but also about Machiavelli, Pareto, Michels, Saint-Simon, Rousseau, Sorel, More and Marx, to name only the major luminaries with whom he deals in secondary but still extensive degree. Indeed, so great a company of notables from the history of political and social theory has been made relevant by Professor Meisel that his book may be taken as an attempt to examine the whole of that history through the person of his central figure, Gaetano Mosca. So grand an effort is required partly because Mosca's various works represent "a treatise about politics in general" (p. 126), not just a theory of the ruling class; but partly, also, the effort is a natural consequence of Professor Meisel's own great talent and learning about "politics in general".

But if the book is distinguished as intellectual history and even as theoretical critique, it is a little less successful as systematic political and social theory. Professor Meisel has been better able, in an unsystematic and discursive fashion that is not unlike Mosca's own, to show inadequacies in Mosca's analyses of political problems than to provide a systematic set of positive alternatives himself. The problem of the relations between the few and the many in society, to take only this central concern in Mosca's work, has been a perennial theme in politico-social

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thought at least since Plato. In the long history of this theme, Mosca's theory represents only one summing up and moderately important advance. As Professor Meisel points out in his discussion of Mosca and Michels, the latter's "iron law of oligarchy" was another moderately important advance, although Mosca did not understand its novelty. And since the time of Mosca and Michels, other advances have been made in the theory of the few and the many which add to our systematic knowledge. For example, there are Chester I. Barnard's *The Functions of the Executive,* Gabriel Almond's *The American People and Foreign Policy,* S. M. Lipset's *Union Democracy,* and Robert A. Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory.* Professor Meisel mentions none of these works. The apparent ignorance, in one so learned, is at least a sign of his lesser success with systematic theories of his own about "the élite" and "the mass", to use the current terms of discourse. Perhaps Professor Meisel's strong and somewhat quick mortal commitment to anti-élitism is a little responsible for this shortcoming.

But we cannot ask all the things we want from a single man. It is one of the beauties of scholarship and science, social as well as natural, that partial contributions are eventually synthesized into systematic cumulation. Professor Meisel has given us in his book some valuable, if partial, contributions to the theory of the few and the many in society by writing an excellent critique and compelling intellectual history. This is not just a book for the specialists in Mosca. Anyone who loves and labors in the field of social and political theory will find it rewarding in large measure.

BERNARD BARBER

BARNARD COLLEGE

The Unconscious Motives of War: A Psycho-Analytical Contribution. By ALIX STRACHEY. New York, International Universities Press, 1957.—283 pp. $5.00.

Many psychoanalysts and a few similarly oriented psychologists have tried to explain war through the study of the deeper layers of "the minds of men". Alix Strachey, who is assisting her husband, James Strachey, in editing and translating a new and presumably authoritative version of Freud's writings, here supplies the most recent attempt along these lines. She is described on the flyleaf of this volume as having also a "wide knowledge of sociology and international affairs," but the point of view presented is of the orthodox Freudian variety, and her relatively brief bibliography is almost exclusively devoted to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

writings of Freud and of his immediate followers. There is almost complete neglect of the many other disciplines which over the years have accumulated data and at least a partial understanding of this complicated problem.

This review cannot be the occasion for a critique of orthodox psychoanalysis, but one point may perhaps be made. Explanations of behavior in terms of instinct have gone out of fashion (except in strictly Freudian circles), for the very good reason that by themselves they account for such a tiny fraction of our behavior. Aggressivity, for example, has had to be defined so broadly in order that it may still be considered universal, that for many Freudians it seems to be the practical equivalent of activity drives, curiosity and mastery over the environment. This is not the same as hostility, which has the greater relevancy for war, and in which the cultural or learned component plays a much more significant part. The further fact that most men must be made to fight—that they must be "drafted"—shows how little a native "instinct of aggressivity" can be regarded as the cause of warfare.

This does not mean that psychoanalytic principles of explanation are completely irrelevant. Mrs. Strachey seems to this reviewer to be on somewhat more solid ground in her later chapters, particularly in some of her comments regarding the effects of membership in a national group. Certainly the inability of individuals "to take a realistic view of their own group or of objects outside it, especially in relation to their group, or to make independent ethical judgments about them" (p. 191) is a serious barrier to international understanding and deserves emphasis, even if we are doubtful of Mrs. Strachey's explanation in terms of "regression". The kind of identification with a nation or state which blinds us to its aggressive acts, and enables us to condone in our country what we condemn in individual behavior, also seems to Mrs. Strachey to constitute one of the greatest dangers of what she calls "state-mentality".

When it comes to "recommendations", Mrs. Strachey is reasonably cautious. She would like to see the right kind of leadership in every country; therefore we must foster democratic government in every country. Authoritarian and assertive leaders must be kept down; in fact it might "be better always to put unleaderlike persons in the position of leaders" (p. 214). We must also reduce the independence of any state in relation to other states; what is needed is "nothing less than a single World State, or World Federation of States" (p. 221). (Others have reached this conclusion without benefit of psychoanalysis—and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

often with just as little inkling as to how such a World State could be realized.) Individuals must also be changed; they must receive fuller gratification of their instincts, particularly in early childhood, and must be protected from emotional conflicts. How to bring all this about remains unclear. Small wonder that the author herself adds: "So far, the recommendations we have been able to make on the strength of our psycho-analytic knowledge do not seem very promising" (p. 242). What we really need, she continues, is the universal application of the psychoanalytic method as a prophylactic measure. Since this, too, is manifestly impractical, she must settle for an increased knowledge of psychoanalysis—by everybody.

It seems to this reviewer that such knowledge would be of definite value. If members of any one national group realized the extent to which their perceptions and judgments are so frequently group-centered or ethnocentric; if they were aware of the unconscious nature of much of their motivation; if they could recognize such mechanisms as rationalization and projection—all this would help to prepare the way for an understanding of one's own group and other groups on the basis of what the Freudians themselves call "reality testing". Granting that this might be a contribution toward peace, the danger lies in the assumption that it tells the whole story. The neglect of historical, political, economic and demographic factors is at least as dangerous as overlooking the psychological component. Even at the psychological level, the assumption that all that counts is the unconscious may also result in a one-sided, partial approach. The area of international relations has much to gain from contact with psychoanalysis, but it is not ready to be taken over by the followers of Freud. If there ever was a problem that required an approach from many sides, and for which no one discipline can possibly supply an adequate understanding, it is the problem of war. Mrs. Strachey has supplied a little light, but not enough to show the way by itself alone.

OTTO KLINEBERG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Britain's Postwar Dollar Problem. By ELLIOT ZUPNICK. New York, Columbia University Press, 1957.—xv, 256 pp. $5.50.

There was a time, not so long ago, when it was neither inaccurate nor unfashionable for admirers of Britain to describe her Empire as one upon which "the sun never sets." This de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scription was not so much a comment on the geographical distribution of British real estate as an attempt to express the greatness of an empire (and a civilization) at its zenith. Time has erased much of the greatness and in so doing has brought in its wake many complicated problems. Mr. Zupnick explores one of the most important and apparently intractable: the post-war dollar shortage.

The basic problem can be stated simply. Britain's economic survival depends upon her ability to earn sufficient foreign exchange, especially dollars, to pay for her imports of food and raw materials. The problem is not entirely new; indeed, its origin can be traced back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It did not assume catastrophic proportions, however, until the end of World War II when a victorious Britain turned to face the rigors of austerity and the ever-present threat of national bankruptcy.

In the late nineteenth century, the rise of the United States and Germany as world economic Powers presented a challenge to British monopoly of foreign markets. It was not until the inter-war period, however, that the threat to British economic survival became serious. Lulled by temporary factors into believing that she had no severe balance-of-payments problem, Britain failed to modernize her basic industries. More important, Britain failed to develop sufficient new products to replace her traditional products which, because of foreign competition and the erection of local tariff barriers, were gradually being displaced from overseas markets. Tragically, but inevitably, Britain's contribution to the defense of Western civilization in World War II only aggravated her balance-of-payments problem. In order to win the war, Britain was forced to liquidate valuable foreign assets, assume crushing foreign debts, sacrifice her established position in overseas markets and pursue financial policies which provided the basis for her post-war inflation.

Mr. Zupnick's presentation of the causes of the British dollar shortage is brief and admirably lucid. His real contribution, however, results from his analysis of the controversial policies adopted by successive British governments to cope with this shortage. Interestingly, the dollar shortage persisted even after "overall balance" had been achieved in the balance of payments. Britain then found herself unable to exchange "soft" currencies earned from countries with which she had an export surplus for the gold and dollars needed to finance imports from areas with which she had an import surplus.

Probably the most controversial policy followed by the Labor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government in the early post-war period was the substantial encouragement given to capital formation in both nationalized and private industries. This policy led to Roy Harrod's brilliant pamphlet, *Are These Hardships Necessary?*, in which he answers his own question with a ringing "No!" Briefly, and in measured terms, Mr. Zupnick answers Harrod and others with two significant points: (1) The level of capital formation was not excessive; indeed, the statistics which Zupnick cites show that "it was not until 1950 that Britain's prewar stock of fixed capital was restored," and that "it was not until 1953 that annual net investment in fixed capital approximated the level achieved in 1938" (pp. 60-62). (2) More important, however, Zupnick argues that "under some circumstances the only way in which a permanent solution to international disequilibrium can be effected is by pursuing policies that may result in temporarily larger deficits" (p. 61).

Having weathered the first thirteen years of the post-war era, does Britain face a bright economic future? Hardly. The struggle to adapt her economy to changing world markets must be continued. As the author states, "the stakes . . . are high. Should Britain . . . fail to adapt, her traditionally high standard of living will be irrevocably lowered" (p. 229).

Mr. Zupnick has presented the economics profession with a book of which he surely can be proud. Although written as a doctoral dissertation, something which too often manages to combine shallow scholarship with impressive dullness, Mr. Zupnick's work is not to be dismissed in this fashion. Indeed, it is so good that it could easily pass as the mature product of a distinguished mind.

LEON QUINTO

NEW YORK CITY

Organized Business in France. By HENRY W. EHRMANN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xx, 514 pp. $7.50.

One of the chief characteristics of our modern, complex societies is that people form innumerable groups along the lines of their professional, religious, political, educational, or social interests in order to create more nearly the kind of a world which they want for themselves. In fact, in some of these societies, like that of the French, interest groups are of extraordinary importance in the formation of public policy, for by means of political parties which they dominate they strive to realize their programs by state action.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In spite of the rôle which interest groups play in France, no complete and systematic study of them has ever been attempted. The reasons for this fact are legion, but the major ones are undoubtedly that French sociology has been oriented toward theory and away from empiricism, that the French discipline of *géographie humaine* has been dominated by physical geographers, that the simple Marxist concept of two classes has had a quasi monopoly in France in the field of social structure, and most significantly of all that no one had ever attempted an investigation of the organization and operation of big business from the point of view of pressure groups.

At last this great lacuna has been filled—and in a most commendable manner. Not only has Professor Ehrmann amassed data suggested by a theoretical framework, which, as he says, he borrowed largely from David Truman, but he has performed his task with enterprise, imagination and judiciousness, based on an excellent knowledge of France. For the years since 1936 the book is exceedingly well informed and its basic judgments are well founded. It shows conclusively how divided French business men are, even those organized in the *Confédération du Patronat Français*, the peak association. They are so set on protecting established interests and ways of doing things that they lack both the organization and the drive for great collective achievements. They are so prone to seek easy refuge in "state intervention" for the settling of differences among interest groups that they contribute but little to the attainment of a consensus on public issues—a consensus based on the greatest good for the commonweal. By their influence on political parties and their unwillingness to compromise, they add to the intransigeance which characterizes pressure groups and political parties in France and which finds expression in prolonged and numerous ministerial crises.

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The best service

at the lowest cost

in the long run

depends on good earnings

Low telephone earnings do not mean low rates

Good telephone earnings do not mean high rates

Many years ago the Bell System pledged itself to provide the best possible service at the lowest possible price.

We meant it then and we mean it now.

Today, more than ever, it is evident that the best service at the lowest cost in the long run depends on good earnings.

To a considerable extent the public, and we are afraid many who should know better, have come to think that low earnings mean low rates and good earnings mean high rates.

Yet few people have the idea that the lowest earning soap company makes the best and cheapest soap. Or the lowest earning meat packer makes the best and cheapest hams. Or that the lowest earning company in any line makes the best and cheapest products and renders the best service.

It doesn't apply to the telephone business either.

There are many ways in which telephone users benefit in both the cost and quality of service through good earnings for the telephone company.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



sign of outstanding banking service

why don't you talk to the people at Chase Manhattan—they're ready to provide a complete range of banking services.

99 CONVENIENT OFFICES IN GREATER NEW YORK

THE
CHASE
MANHATTAN
BANK
Chartered 1799
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

Four Anchor Titles

Edmund Wilson

TO THE FINLAND STATION

A study in the writing and acting of history, the background of the socialist movement, and the men and ideas behind the present crisis in our civilization. $1.25

Samuel Lubell

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS

A lively survey of the social changes that have transformed the pattern of American politics since 1928. 95¢

David Riesman

CONSTRAINT AND VARIETY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION

The author of *The Lonely Crowd* and *Individualism Reconsidered* here presents a penetrating survey of the changing nature of American education. 95¢

William H. Whyte, Jr.

THE ORGANIZATION MAN

The subject of this penetrating best seller is the conflict between traditional American individualism and the tendency toward uniformity that now threatens to destroy it. $1.45

For a complete list, ask your bookseller or write to
DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS,
575 Madison Avenue, New York 22

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"*America Votes* . . . assembles more detailed and official statistics of American elections than ever before collected for any period, and for the first time in one volume. Until now these figures had to be sought in hundreds of scattered sources."

Arthur Krock in *The New York Times*

AMERICA VOTES

Compiled and Edited
by Richard M. Scammon
Director of Elections Research
Governmental Affairs Institute

Designed as a biennial reference, the *America Votes* series presents the only complete reference concerning United States political election records, county-by-county, ward-by-ward, with votes, pluralities and percentages.

The Second Volume is now available which offers the complete up-to-date United States voting history for 1956 and 1957. Among the many new features are the primary election results for the 1956 Presidential election, primary and general results of the Gubernatorial, Senatorial, and Congressional elections for both years.

Supplementing the election statistics are new Congressional District maps illustrating boundaries, the latest figures on membership in state legislatures and new districting arrangements.

Only *America Votes* presents the official indisputable record of United States elections in handy reference form.

AMERICA VOTES — Volume I
(1945-1955) $12.50

AMERICA VOTES — Volume II
(1956-1957) $12.50

The Macmillan Company
60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OXFORD books of exceptional interest

Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism

By JAMES HADLEY BILLINGTON

This is a study of the strange, visionary populist movement that flourished among the thinking elite of Russia during the last 40 years of the 19th century and of its leading spokesman who lived on to oppose the ideology of Lenin and the early Marxists. Frontispiece. $4.80

British Pressure Groups

Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons

By J. D. STEWART

Despite the fact that lobbies have become important in British government there has been little writing on the subject and this is the first serious book about it. Mr. Stewart discusses strategy and tactics of pressure groups, particularly since 1939, and bases his book on facts recorded in *Hansard* and reports and journals issued by the groups themselves. $4.80

The Basis of Obligation in International Law

and other papers by the late James Leslie Brierly

***Edited by* SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT *and* C. H. M. WALDOCK**

This volume prints the late Professor Brierly's Hague lectures for the first time in English and other articles and addresses having lasting value. $8.00

The Evolution of India

By VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT

The Whidden Lectures, January 1957. Mrs. Pandit reviews the historical process that has molded Indian civilization; describes the task of educating 360 million largely illiterate people and how it is being handled by the government; tells something of the objectives and achievements of India's two five-year plans. $1.00

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, INC.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1812

1958

First National City Bank
Monthly Letter
Business and Economic Conditions

New York, May, 1958

General Business Conditions

THE business decline has ... form of a leveling out in the drop of new orders, ... even modest improvement, in individual com- ... The significance of such re- ... of ...

Up-to-date information on economic conditions

The First National City Bank of New York Monthly Letter—"must" reading for everyone interested in American business—is prepared by the Bank's own Economics Department. It is available on request to interested people and for use in connection with college classes.

Send your request for the Monthly Letter to:

The **FIRST**
NATIONAL CITY BANK
of New York

78 Branches in Greater New York 71 Overseas Branches, Offices and Affiliates

Head Office: 55 Wall Street, New York 15, N. Y.

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Announcing . . . The fourth volume in a distinguished series on American Administrative History

THE REPUBLICAN ERA 1869-1901

by LEONARD D. WHITE, *late Professor of Public Administration, University of Chicago*

THE REPUBLICAN ERA is the fourth and final volume of Dr. Leonard White's brilliant series, which traces the evolution of our system of government from 1789 to 1901.

In this authoritative book, the author examines the changing functions of the great government departments and the personalities of the men at the helm in those formative years after the Civil War and ending with the assumption of the presidency by Theodore Roosevelt. $6.00

Critics acclaim the first books in the series by Dr. White . . .

THE FEDERALISTS 1789-1801

"Masterly in concept, painstaking in detail, based on a thorough examination of source materials yet written with simplicity and restraint, this account of public administration under the Federalists must inevitably command the respect of historians as well as administrators. A 'first' in a new field."—William Anderson, *The American Historical Review*

THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1829

"An excellent volume, enriched by scholarship, enlivened by its author's deep understanding, made timely by frequent parallels between current problems and those of a century and a quarter ago."—Ralph Adams Brown, *The Boston Sunday Herald*

THE JACKSONIANS 1829-1861

"Mr. White doesn't merely tell the story of each of the gradually multiplying branches of the national government. He livens the tale with a delicious wealth of contemporary comment on the whole business. He writes with both humor and knowledge . . . It is saturated with practical politics from beginning to end, warmed by passion, singed by invective, and not infrequently blasted in a struggle of titans . . . In the light of present day resumption of the struggle between the Executive and the Legislative, 'The Jacksonians' will prove both entertaining and instructive to many."—James H. Powers, *The Boston Sunday Globe*

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Decision to Intervene

Vol. 2, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920

By GEORGE F. KENNAN

"Russia Leaves the War, the outstanding first volume, won a Pulitzer prize. *Decision to Intervene* maintains the standard of excellence set by the first. It is passionately interesting . . . great drama . . . first-rate history. It is also remarkable as an exposition of the process of foreign affairs."—*N. Y. Times Book Review.* "Some of the ablest historical writing of our time, with lessons in diplomacy still full of instruction and warning for our bewildered governments."—*Washington Post & Times-Herald.*

520 pages. Illustrated. $7.50

The Politics of Israel

The First Decade of Statehood

By MARVER H. BERNSTEIN

A full account of Israel's first ten years as a nation, with a complete analysis of the internal political development—the politics of Zionism, the evolution of the constitutional framework, party politics, the electoral process, the legislative and judiciary, the cabinet and office of president, the struggle for economic independence, and the welfare state in action. "A good summary not only of how the Israeli government works, but what its problems are."—*Washington Post & Times Herald.*

378 pages. Maps. $6

The Berlin Blockade

A Study in Cold War Politics

By W. PHILLIPS DAVISON

This dramatic study of the Berlin Blockade gets to the heart of the problem of resistance to Soviet cold war pressure. The book opens with a history of Germany and Berlin in the years 1945 to 1948, and then gives a close-up view of events in the city during the time it was under siege. The author shows how the Soviets skillfully initiated and maintained the crisis and how the Allies met the challenge with the air lift. Most important, he shows why the people of Berlin resisted so stubbornly and how they were able to hold out during the long blockade winter. *A RAND Corporation Research Study.*

446 pages. Illustrated. $7.50

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS,
Princeton, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FRENCH POLITICAL SYSTEM

By *Maurice Duverger*

The author realistically examines the strengths and weaknesses of the French political system in an effort to assess its ability—or inability—to face and solve its problems. He discusses the sharp ideological and cultural divisions that have always made for constant internal disagreement on the very nature of the political regime, and offers clear insight into the character of a democracy which upholds defiance of the state as the best guaranty of individual freedom. Concise and comprehensive, this is an honest critical analysis of the French system that no student of French government or of comparative politics should ignore. $4.00

DILEMMAS OF POLITICS

By *Hans J. Morgenthau*

The need to distinguish between the new and the perennial in contemporary political problems, and between the valid and the obsolete in political ideas and institutions, confronts both the observer and the practitioner of politics with intellectual and practical dilemmas. Hans J. Morgenthau has substantially rewritten a group of his finest essays to highlight these dilemmas, which he traces in five general areas: the understanding of politics, the understanding of international politics, the burden of obsolescent ideas and institutions, the autonomy and integrity of political action, and the restoration of sound political thought. $7.50

THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES OF WOODROW WILSON

Edited by Earl Latham

Woodrow Wilson's role in and influence upon American politics were discussed at length at the American Political Science Association meetings of 1956—the centennial year of his birth. This book, sponsored by the Association and by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, presents some of the most important contributions to that discussion by many noted political scientists. Their papers have been organized so as to develop a full picture of Wilson: his preparation for the presidency, his domestic and foreign policies, and his political contributions as seen with the perspective of three decades' distance. $5.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New D-G Map Series

WORLD HISTORY

IN 16 LARGE MAPS
Each 64 x 44 inches.

5,000 years of the history of man on earth, in a chronological sequence.

Each map portrays the world at a given period in time, with inset maps highlighting regional areas within the same time span.

A historical time line across each map designates the concurrence of important events in separate parts of the world.

Write for information

DENOYER-GEPPERT CO.

Scientific Map Makers

8235 RAVENSWOOD AVE., CHICAGO 40

THE DARK MISSOURI

Henry C. Hart

The story of flood and drought control in the Missouri basin. Hart's description and evaluation of the vast program of technological projects which the Government has undertaken to subdue "the last frontier" is made more valuable by his careful and astute analysis of the future needs of the area.

336 pages $6.00

The University of Wisconsin Press

430 Sterling Court, Madison, Wisconsin

ANNOUNCEMENT

Memorial to John Bartlet Brebner

A committee of some of the friends and colleagues of the late John Bartlet Brebner, Gouverneur Morris Professor of History at Columbia University, have undertaken to provide a memorial to this great scholar who died last November at the age of 62. They propose to raise a fund of upwards of ten thousand dollars, the income from which will be used to purchase primary research materials not otherwise available in this country. This collection, to be kept in the Columbia University Library, will include, mostly in microfilm, manuscripts, newspapers, and other documents in the three fields of Professor Brebner's own scholarly interests: Canadian history, English constitutional and legal history, and the history of Britain since 1750. The committee feel that such a collection would be of use to as wide a range of students and scholars in this country as any memorial could be, and that it would be unusually flexible as well as highly appropriate to its purpose.

Inquiries and contributions may be sent to Professor R. K. Webb, Hamilton Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new titles in

THE VAN NOSTRAND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

MODERN GOVERNMENTS

By **Harold Zink**, *Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.*

This forward-looking text achieves a remarkable balance, both in subject matter and in approach. It recognizes the vital significance of European political experience, and therefore devotes greatest attention to Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. At the same time it discusses the importance of other governments in the modern age — Norway, Sweden, Latin America, Japan and India. 832 pages, $6.95

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
National, State and Local

By **Harold Zink**; **Howard R. Penniman**, *Professor of Government, Georgetown University;* and **Guy B. Hathorn**, *Assistant Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland.*

Offering the traditional structural approach, this text gives a complete, although brief, picture of the operation of government at national, state and local levels. The text incorporates significant developments in current political and legislative affairs, including the Supreme Court decisions on civil liberties, school integration, anti-trust, and the opening of FBI files in criminal cases. A maximum of accuracy and objectivity is assured by the fact that all three authors, whose political viewpoints vary, carefully checked the book. 456 pages, $5.25

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

By **Conley H. Dillon**, *Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science;* **Carl Leiden**, *Associate Professor of Political Science;* and **Paul D. Stewart**, *Associate Professor of Political Science,* all at *Marshall College.*

This unique volume is exactly what it claims to be—an introduction to the field. It organizes basic concepts of political science as a unified whole, rather than a confusing mass of abstractions. It covers every major area of political science and offers a glossary, the only one to be found in an introductory volume in political science. 320 pages, $4.85

Write for examination copies

D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

120 ALEXANDER STREET PRINCETON, N. J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Strategic Surrender

THE POLITICS OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT

Paul Kecskemeti. A clear and forcefully written analysis of surrender as a problem in political theory, with detailed case studies of the four major surrenders of World War II. $5.00

Ethiopia Today

Ernest W. Luther. Authentic information on political, economic, and social conditions in Ethiopia, based on the author's six years of work and travel among the people of this fascinating but little-known land. $4.00

The Political Uses of History

A STUDY OF HISTORIANS IN THE FRENCH RESTORATION

Stanley Mellon. Shows how such writers as Mme de Stael, Bonald, Guizot, Constant, and Thierry were motivated by their political outlooks and by specific problems under debate in Restoration politics. $5.00

The British Political System

Andre Mathiot. "The treatment can lay claim to real originality, presenting a combination of judicious appraisal and freshness of view."—*The Journal of Politics.* $6.00

The Jacksonian Persuasion

POLITICS AND BELIEF

Marvin Meyers. "Professor Meyers' essay in intellectual history is unique for its varied methods in discovering a contemporary definition for Jacksonianism."—*Political Science Quarterly.* $5.00

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aggression and World Order

A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression

BY JULIUS STONE

A definitive work on some of the most central and urgent contemporary issues of international law and politics in which a well-known authority examines attempts from the League of Nations onward to build a peaceful world order based upon the concept of "aggression." *240 pages, $5.00*

Confucian China and Its Modern Fate

The Problem of Intellectual Continuity

BY JOSEPH R. LEVENSON

Acutely relevant to present-day political developments, this study in cultural change is an analysis of the modern Chinese intellectual world as it has been affected by the intrusion of Western ideas. *238 pages, $5.00*

The White Umbrella

Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi

BY D. MACKENZIE BROWN

Giving the western reader a summary of Hindu political ideas in an easily grasped form, this scholarly yet vivid and compelling analysis illuminates current Indian policy and political practice. Foreword by C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar.

2d printing, 1st paperbound edition. 216 pages. $1.50

At your bookstore

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Address: Berkeley 4, California

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE

by ALAN F. WESTIN, Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University; and Member of the District of Columbia Bar

This is a comprehensive study of a single constitutional law case, from its rise in a labor dispute through its final settlement in the United States Supreme Court. The Steel Seizure Case of 1952 (Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v Sawyer) is documented by extracts from the court proceedings, transcripts, briefs, oral arguments, newspaper stories, and selections from Truman's memoirs. These primary sources, together with the author's commentary, present the student with a step-by-step descriptive analysis of the constitutional process and its setting.

Designed as a supplementary source book. 6 x 9. Paper

Published Spring 1958

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

by ROCCO J. TRESOLINI, Associate Professor of Political Science, Lehigh University

Written with the liberal arts student in mind, this book enables the reader to appreciate the significance of major issues facing the court today. The cases have been chosen to illustrate basic doctrines and the evolution of constitutional principles. For greater clarity, special attention has been focused on matters which often cause confusion, such as the basic facts of the case, the identification of each of the parties, and the route by which the case reached the Supreme Court.

To be published Winter 1958-1959

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED